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It is entirely proper to view with sympathy the plight of the
battered and bruised minority shareholder in a closely held
corporation,' and the problem of "oppression" in such enter-
prises has been the subject of considerable commentary.2 Not
all minority shareholders are abused, however, and differences
between participants in corporate ventures frequently are re-
solved on a day-to-day basis, even in the face of an imbalance
of power. In these situations, the common objective of maxi-
mizing a return on the capital and services invested binds to-
gether individuals with potentially conflicting interests and
facilitates the resolution of differences. 3 In addition to op-
pressed minority shareholders, therefore, there are presumably
many participants who are satisfied with their roles as minority
shareholders.
Between the two extremes of the abused and the satisfied
shareholder there exists a third kind of minority participant-
the individual who is generally dissatisfied with some aspect of
his or her role in the business but who has not been the victim
of misconduct by those in control. The causes of the dissatis-
faction and the extent to which they can be articulated will, of
course, vary. For example, dissatisfaction may stem from a dif-
ference of opinion concerning a basic policy or policies, from a
personality conflict or other breakdown in the relationship with
a coowner,4 from concern with conditions in the business or in-
dustry or from a perception that there are preferable sources
1. For a discussion of the definition of a close corporation, see infra text
accompanying notes 209-16.
2. The classic work in the field is F. O'NWEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINOR=Y
SHAREHOLDERS (1975). For a discussion of oppression as a ground for corporate
dissolution, see infra text accompanying notes 120-80.
3. Cf. Heymann, The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules, 86
HARv. L. REV. 797, 822 (1973) ("Since coordinated actions to obtain outcomes of
benefit to all parties often depend upon trust, each actor who wants to be a par-
ticipant in, and thus beneficiary of, such cooperative schemes in the long run
and on a number of separable occasions has an important stake in creating and
preserving a reputation as a trustworthy party.").
4. For a consideration of the development of such problems in a family
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for the investment of capital or labor.5 Whatever the reason, a
shareholder may become dissatisfied and may lack the ability
to remove the source of his or her concern. Further, because of
the difficulty of selling a minority interest in a closely held cor-
poration,6 the dissatisfied shareholder may be without a means
of escape and therefore "trapped" in an unhappy investment
situation. The plight of this individual-admittedly less sympa-
thetic than that of the "oppressed" minority shareholder but
nevertheless worthy of consideration-has received little
attention.7
Even less consideration has been given to the position of
the dissatisfied participant in the general partnership. This ne-
glect is largely attributable to two factors. First, the source of
partnership law-the Uniform Partnership Act (U.P.A.)-pro-
tects the position of all partners not only by insuring each the
right to participate in the management of the business 8 but also
by providing an escape mechanism in the event that unhappy
relationships develop. This latter result is accomplished by
making the partnership relationship dissolvable upon the ex-
press will of any of the partners,9 a principle which provides an
important distinction between the partnership and the corpora-
tion.'0 This principle of free dissolvability and the deference
business, see Levinson, Conflicts that Plague Family Business, 49 HARv. Bus.
REV. 90 (1971).
5. The dissatisfaction may also stem from heavy-handed conduct by those
in control which is not deemed sufficiently "oppressive" to justify relief. For a
discussion of oppression as a basis for relief, see infra text accompanying notes
120-80.
6. The difficulty of selling minority interests in a close corporation is well
recognized, and the problem may be compounded by restrictions on the trans-
ferability of shares. See generally F. O'NEA., supra note 2, § 2.15.
7. This may be because the problem of oppression has not yet been effec-
tively addressed. It has been suggested that the two most significant areas of
needed reform in the treatment of close corporations are the need for flexibility
in internal management, and the need to protect minority shareholders from
oppression. See Bradley, A Comparative Assessment of the California Close
Corporation Provisions and a Proposal for Protecting Individual Participants,
9 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 865, 865-67 (1976). See also O'Neal, Close Corporations: Ex-
isting Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAw. 873, 881 (1978) ("As
minority participants in a close corporation may not anticipate dissension or
oppression, and indeed may be unaware of their vulnerability, they frequently
fail to bargain for adequate protection against mistreatment."). On the subject
of oppression, see infra text accompanying notes 120-80.
8. UNiF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(e) (1914). (This act will hereinafter be re-
ferred to as the U.P.A., and all references will be to the 1914 text.) Each part-
ner has the right to participate in the management of the business "subject to
any agreement between them." See infra note 220.
9. U.P.A § 31(1) (b), (2). See infra text accompanying notes 27-45.
10. For a consideration of the permanence of the relationship among
shareholders, see infra text accompanying notes 110-200.
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paid by the U.P.A. to the right of the partners to vary by agree-
ment its otherwise applicable provisions" apparently provide a
flexible and sane approach to the regulation of relationships
among coventurers. Indeed, the U.P.A. is sufficiently respected
in this regard that it is frequently offered as a model for the re-
form of the law applicable to close corporations. 2 Thus, one
reason for the lack of attention focused upon the problems of
the dissatisfied partner may be the perception that a problem
does not in fact exist.
A second factor is that the study of partnership law as an
academic discipline has been significantly neglected, at least
when compared with the attention devoted to the problems af-
fecting close corporations.13 The difficulties inherent in apply-
ing a unified approach to the problems of publicly held and
closely held corporations have been well chronicled,14 and re-
cent years have seen a significant development of the law appli-
cable to close corporations.' 5 Partnership law has not received
anything approaching the critical attention devoted to corpo-
rate law. Although the relative neglect of partnership law is in
part justified by the paucity of reported appellate litigation,16 it
is unfortunate since the U.P.A., a uniform act which has re-
11. See infra text accompanying notes 33-34.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 204-08.
13. See D. FESSLER, ALTERNATrVES TO INCORPORATION FOR PERSONS IN
QUEST OF PROFIT XVii (1980); Mechem, How to Include Partnership in a
Crowded Curriculum, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 549, 549 (1954).
14. See infra notes 204, 208.
15. A number of states have enacted special close corporation legislation.
Some have done so in a separate, integrated close corporation section, sub-
chapter, or chapter. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 10-2A-300 to -313 (1980); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 10-201 to -218 (1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-356 (1974 &
Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 1201-1216 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7201 to -7216 (1981); MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 4-101 to
-603 (1975 & Supp. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1371-1386 (Purdon Supp. 1982);
RI. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-.51 (1969); TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. arts. 12.01-12.54
(Vernon Supp. 1981). Others accord recognition to close corporations within
the context of nonintegrated corporation codes. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 300, 1800(b) (5) (West 1977 & Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.107 (West
1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-611 (1977); MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. §§ 450.1463, .1466
(1973 & Supp. 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A.5-21, 14A:12-7(1) (c) (West 1969 &
Supp. 1981); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 620, 1104-a (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1981);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73 (1975); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-11-220, 33-21-130 (Law. Co-
op. 1976 & Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-714 (1979). Courts have also recog-
nized the special character of these enterprises. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32
ILl. 2d 16, 27-28, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583-84 (1964), appeal dismissed, 69 Ill. App. 2d
397, 217 N.E.2d 111 (1966), modified, 21 Ill. App. 3d 811, 316 N.E.2d 114 (1974);
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 585-86, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511
(1975).
16. The relative infrequency of such reported litigation does not suggest an
absence of problems in the area. D. FESSLER, supra note 13, at xvii
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mained unchanged for almost seventy years,'? is thought by
many to contain the solutions to a number of problems affect-
ing the relationships among shareholders in close corpora-
tions.18 The U.P.A.'s treatment of the dissatisfied partner
therefore warrants a thorough analysis, not only for its own
sake, but also to determine whether it may also provide an ap-
propriate model for dealing with the problem of the dissatisfied
but nonoppressed minority shareholder.
It is the purpose of this Article to examine the position of
the dissatisfied minority participant in both the general part-
nership19 and the close corporation.2 0 The central theme of the
analysis is the terminability of the business relationship by
such a participant in the absence of misconduct on the part of
those in control. The Article assumes the existence of a well
managed 2 ' and solvent, 22 as opposed to a failing, business en-
terprise. If the venture is in the corporate form, those in con-
trol have not displayed the type of oppressive or abusive
conduct which will justify relief in most jurisdictions. 23 It will
also be assumed that the participant is without power in the
enterprise to assert a position of control 24 and has not con-
17. See generally Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act 24 YALE L.J. 617
(1915). The U.P.A., which represents the culmination of more than twelve
years of effort, was approved by The National Congress of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1914. Id. at 620. It has been substantially adopted in 48
states, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. See 6 U.L.A. 1
(West Supp. 1981).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 204-08.
19. A discussion of limited partnerships is beyond the scope of this Article.
Joint ventures are for most purposes treated as the equivalents of general part-
nerships and will be considered as such in the analysis. See generally D. FEs-
sLER, supra note 13, at 191-97.
20. For a consideration of the difficulties encountered in defining a close
corporation, see infra text accompanying notes 209-16.
21. In many jurisdictions, misapplication or waste of corporate assets will
be a basis for relief. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 97(a) (4) (1980), in-
fra note 127.
22. Solvent is used here in a broad sense to refer to a reasonably success-
ful enterprise. Insolvency in the sense of inability to satisfy obligations is a
ground for involuntary dissolution in some states. See, e.g., La. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:143A (West 1969); OKLa. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.195(1) (West 1951).
23. The individual may nevertheless perceive that he or she has been the
victim of oppressive conduct, and at least one court has taken an extremely
broad view of the concept of "oppression." See infra text accompanying notes
157-66. The portion of this Article dealing with close corporations, however, is
devoted primarily to the position of the shareholder who is dissatisfied but is
unable to establish the type of misconduct which under traditional standards
will justify relief Admittedly, the line between oppression and dissatisfaction
may be fine.
24. A controlling faction may consist of a single shareholder or several, and
control may lie in the hands of holders of less than the majority of the stock.
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tracted in advance concerning important policies or the alloca-
tion of control within the venture. The position of this minority
participant, in short, is that of an outsider to the "control
group,"25 and his or her objective will be presumed to be a
withdrawal from the relationship and a liquidation of the
investment.26
Part I of the Article considers the extent to which the "typi-
cal" partnership is, as many may believe, truly an easily dis-
solved and therefore impermanent relationship. The analysis
emphasizes the impact under the U.P.A. of a preexisting agree-
ment-express or implied-concerning the duration of the part-
nership and the extent to which such an agreement may serve
to stabilize the relationship among the participants.
Attention shifts to the close corporation in Part U1. The
ability of a dissatisfied minority participant to withdraw funds
by means of a forced dissolution of a solvent, responsibly man-
aged close corporation in most jurisdictions is nonexistent in
the absence of misconduct by those in control. Misconduct jus-
tifying relief-typically referred to as "oppression"--may be an
evolving concept, however, and in some cases has been ap-
proached from the more neutral perspective of the effect of a
given action on the minority participant rather than the intent
of those who are exercising control. This approach, which de-
See Note, Standards of Management Conduct in Close Corporation: A Transac-
tional Approach, 33 STA. L. REv. 1141, 1141 n.3 (1981).
25. This status is more clearly defined in a close corporation than a part-
nership because even minority partners have significant rights of participation
in the affairs of a partnership. For example, a minority partner has equal rights
in the management and conduct of the partnership business, U.P.A. § 18, and
access to information concerning the partnership, U.P.A. § 20. In addition, part-
ners are accountable to each other as fiduciaries, U.P.A. § 21. See infra note
220.
26. This Article is concerned principally with the ability of a participant to
withdraw from the venture. Objectives may, of course, vary. In certain circum-
stances, the individual may be willing to remain a participant in the venture if
certain things which he views as objectionable are changed. If the changes are
not forthcoming, the participant is prepared to liquidate the investment. To the
extent that such an action is viewed by the other participants as undesirable,
the dissatisfied participant may attempt to use this bargaining leverage to se-
cure a change in policy that he or she is otherwise organizationally powerless
to effect. Another type of dissatisfied minority is one who wishes to "freeze-
out" some or all of the other participants. The participant with this objective
has control of a resource essential to the operation of the venture and views the
other participants as parasites who are not making critical or irreplaceable con-
tributions. The objective of this type of dissatisfied participant, therefore, is to
terminate the relationship with the coventurers without affecting his or her
ability to continue the business. See generally Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquid-
ity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close
Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REv. 1, 27 (1977).
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fines oppression in terms of the frustration of reasonable ex-
pectations of the minority, will be questioned, not because
expectations are irrelevant but rather because they are incor-
rectly applied to the fault-based concept of oppression.
Part DI addresses in more detail the question of whether
the dissatisfied minority stockholder should be given the power
to compel a dissolution of the enterprise as a means of provid-
ing liquidity for his or her investment. The partnership-close
corporation analogy is examined in order to establish that the
partnership model, though instructive, is not a proper basis for
the reform of corporate law. The analysis concludes by propos-
ing criteria for granting relief to the dissatisfied minority share-
holder based upon a denial of that participant's reasonable
expectations.
I. PERMANENCE AND THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG
PARTNERS
A. THE POWER TO DIsSOLVE A PARTNERSHIP
An analysis of the position of the dissatisfied partner must
begin with an examination of the extent to which the U.PYA
treats the partnership relationship as one of permanence. Sec-
tion 31 of the U.P.A. sets forth its basic principle concerning the
permanence of the partnership relationship with succinctness
which should be the envy of any draftsperson. A dissolution of
the partnership, according to this section, may be caused "by
the express will of any partner."27 Thus, the U.P.A. starts from
the proposition that a partner has the power to dissolve the
partnership relationship at any time, with or without proper
cause and without regard to any existing agreement concerning
dissolution.28
Because of the ease with which a partnership may be dis-
solved, a dissatisfied partner, at least in theory, will not be
27. See U.P. § 31(1) (b), (2). This principle predates the U.P.A. See J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 269 (1841). Story indi-
cates that "[t]he same rule equally prevails in the Roman law," and "[tihis
also is the clear result of the French law ... under ordinary circumstances."
Id. § 270 (citation omitted).
28. A dissolution does not in and of itself terminate the partnership, which
continues until the affairs of the partnership are concluded. See U.P.A. § 30.
Normally, the partner seeking to terminate the relationship has the right to
have the assets of the partnership liquidated. See U.P-. § 38(1). The right to
compel a liquidation, however, may be affected if the dissolution is "wrongful."
See U.P.A. § 38(2) (b); infra text accompanying notes 38-45.
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"trapped" in an unsatisfactory business relationship.29 The jus-
tification for the U.P.A.'s position in this regard is that a part-
nership is both an agency and a personal relationship, and an
individual should not be forced to remain in such a situation
against his or her will.30 Because a partner's personal assets
are potentially put at risk for the obligations arising out of the
partnership relationship,3 1 the U.P.A. treats the reasons for
withdrawing32 and the impact that withdrawal will have on the
other participants as irrelevant to the question of whether the
power to dissolve may be exercised. It is enough that the par-
ticipant wants to terminate the relationship.
The power of a participant to dissolve a partnership should
not be overstated, however, for it is limited to the termination
of the existing relationship among the coventurers. The fate of
the business and the economic consequences of the act of dis-
solution depend upon whether the exercise of that power was
coupled with the right to so act.
B. THE RIGHT TO DISSOLVE A PARTNERSHIP
The principle that a partnership represents a fragile rela-
tionship terminable at the will of any of its participants is tem-
pered by a competing precept, underlying much of the U.P.A.,
that supports the right of partners to arrange their affairs as
they deem fit.33 The respect accorded by the U.P.A. to agree-
29. See generally Bromberg, Partnership Dissolution-Causes, Conse-
quences, and Cures, 43 TEX. L. REV. 631 (1965).
30. The official comment to U.P.A. § 31 indicates:
The relation of partners is one of agency. The agency is such a per-
sonal one that equity cannot enforce it even where the agreement pro-
vides that the partnership shall continue for a definite time. The power
of any partner to terminate the relation, even though in doing so he
breaks a contract, should, it is submitted, be recognized.
Occasional decisions demonstrate a lack of familiarity with this principle. In
Williams v. Terebinski, 24 Ohio Misc. 531, 261 N.E.2d 920 (1970), for example, the
court concluded that notice of dissolution by the defendant "was no more than
an expression on the part of [defendant] of his desire to have the partnership
dissolved, which required under the circumstances plaintiff's consent to such
dissolution." Id. at 57, 261 N.E.2d at 923.
31. See generally H. REUScHLEIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP §§ 194-207 (1979).
32. See, e.g., Campbell v. Miller, 274 N.C. 143, 150, 161 S.E.2d 546, 551 (1968).
But see infra text accompanying notes 87-99.
33. For example, U.P.A. § 18 is a provision of considerable importance be-
cause it sets forth the broad rights and duties of the partners in relation to the
partnership. This section, however, is "subject to any agreement" between the
parties. Several other U.P A. sections are qualified in a similar fashion. See,
e.g., U.P.A. §§ 8, 9, 19, 25, 27, 37, 40, 42, 43.
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ments between the partners34 may have a significant impact on
the ability of a partner to dissolve an unsatisfactory relation-
ship with coventurers by imposing unacceptable consequences
on a person prematurely dissolving the partnership.
1. The Agreement as to Duration
The existence of an agreement concerning the duration of a
partnership stands in apparent conflict with the principle that a
partnership may be dissolved by the express will of any of its
partners. Section 31(1) of the U.P.A. contemplates just such an
agreement by providing, in part, that dissolution may be caused
"without violation of the agreement" between the partners,
(a) By the termination of the definite term or particular undertaking
specified in the agreemen, [or]
(b) By the express will of any partner when no definite term or par-
ticular undertaking is specified.3 5
A strong policy favoring the right of parties to arrange their
affairs as they desire would render it impossible, or at least
very difficult, for a dissatisfied partner to dissolve a relationship
in contravention of an agreement establishing a partnership
term.36 This partnership law does not do, for just as the U.P.A.
supports the right of individuals to supplant its provisions by
private agreement, so too it will not force an individual to re-
main in a partnership against his or her will. Section 31(2)
makes this clear by permitting the dissolution of a partnership
by the express will of a partner even if that dissolution is "[i] n
contravention of the agreements between the partners." The
compromise between these two potentially conflicting princi-
ples-the right to agree as to a term or undertaking and the
power to dissolve the relationship-is found in the conse-
quences under the U.PYA. of a "wrongful" dissolution.3 7
34. The U.P.A.'s deference to agreements between partners has had an im-
portant influence on the reform of close corporation law. See infra note 208.
35. U.PA. § 31(1) (a), (b) (emphasis added). The agreement may also at-
tempt to cover the consequences of a dissolution, in which case the agreement
will govern. See, e.g., Gibson v. Angros, 30 Colo. App. 95, 103, 491 P.2d 87, 91
(1971); Adams v. Jarvis, 23 Wis. 2d 453, 458, 127 N.W.2d 400, 403 (1964). On the
subject of partnership continuation agreements, see generally Bromberg, supra
note 29, at 653-59; Fuller, Partnership Agreements for Continuation of an Enter-
prise After the Death of a Partner, 50 YALE L.J. 202 (1940); Note, Partnership
Continuation Agreements, 72 HAnv. L. REV. 1302 (1959).
36. An alternative to the approach taken by the U.P.A would be to prohibit
the dissolution of a partnership without a showing of good cause.
37. See U.P A. § 38(2).
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a. The "Wrongful" Dissolution
Although a minority partner, through a mere expression of
will, has the power to dissolve the partnership at any time, the
consequences of such an action depend upon whether the dis-
solution is "wrongful," a concept which the U.P.A. treats as
largely equivalent to "in contravention of the partnership
agreement."3 8 Thus, a dissolution in violation of a partnership
agreement specifying a term or undertaking, though effective,
is wrongful.
There are three principal consequences of a "wrongful" dis-
38. "In contravention" language appears in U.P.A. §§ 31(2), 38(1), and
38(2). Section 31(2) provides that dissolution is caused "[iln contravention of
the agreement between the partners, where the circumstances do not permit a
dissolution under any other provision of this section, by the express will of any
partner at any time." Section 38 provides, in part
(1) When dissolution is caused in any way, except in contraven-
tion of the partnership agreement, each partner, as against his co-part-
ners and all persons claiming through them in respect of their interests
in the partnership, unless otherwise agreed, may have the partnership
property applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied to
pay in cash the net amount owing to the respective partners....
(2) When dissolution is caused in contravention of the partner-
ship agreement the rights of the partners shall be as follows:
(a) Each partner who has not caused dissolution wrongfully shall
have,
L All the rights specified in paragraph (1) of this section, and
11. The right, as against each partner who has caused the dissolu-
tion wrongfully, to damages for breach of the agreement.
(b) The partners who have not caused the dissolution wrongfully,
if they all desire to continue the business in the same name, either by
themselves or jointly with others, may do so, during the agreed term
for the partnership and for that purpose may possess the partnership
property, provided they secure the payment by bond approved by the
court, or pay to any partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully,
the value of his interest in the partnership at the dissolution, less any
damages recoverable under clause (2a 11) of this section, and in like
manner indemnify him against all present or future partnership liabili-
ties.
(c) A partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully shall
have:
L If the business is not continued under the provisions of para-
graph (2b) all the rights of a partner under paragraph (1), subject to
clause (2a II), of this section,
IL If the business is continued under paragraph (2b) of this sec-
tion the right as against his co-partners and all claiming through them
in respect of their interests in the partnership, to have the value of his
interest in the partnership, less any damages caused to his co-partners
by the dissolution, ascertained and paid to him in cash, or the payment
secured by bond approved by the court, and to be released from all ex-
isting liabilities of the partnership; but in ascertaining the value of the
partner's interest the value of the good-will of the business shall not be
considered.
In addition, the partnership agreement may permit dissolution at any time
but impose a non-competition clause on the withdrawing partner. See, e.g.,
Fuller v. Brough, 159 Colo. 147, 154, 411 P.2d 18, 21 (1966).
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solution, all of which are economic and each of which will vary
in seriousness depending upon the particular circumstances in-
volved. First, the partner causing a wrongful dissolution of the
partnership will be liable to the remaining partners for dam-
ages which occur as a result of the dissolution.39 Second, if the
remaining partners wish to continue the business,40 they may
do so and thereby avoid liquidation.41 This second conse-
quence may also have the important results of precluding any
use of partnership property by the wrongfully dissolving part-
ner4 2 and enabling the remaining partners effectively to
39. U.P.A. § 38(2) (a)II. The settlement of the withdrawing partner's ac-
count may be reduced by the amount of these damages. U.P.. § 38(2) (b). Al-
though a complete discussion of the measure of damages is beyond the scope
of this Article, it should be noted that a surprisingly small number of cases
have provided guidance as to the manner in which damages will be calculated
under such circumstances. Perhaps the most extensive discussion is found in
Gherman v. Colburn, 72 Cal. App. 3d 544, 561-65, 140 CaL Rptr. 330, 341-43 (1977).
See also James v. Herbert, 149 Cal. App. 2d 741, 749, 309 P.2d 91, 96 (1957)
("Where, without fault on his part, one party to a contract who is willing to per-
form is prevented from doing so by the other party, the primary measure of
damages is the amount of his loss, which may consist of his reasonable outlay
or expenditure toward performance and the anticipated profits which he would
have derived from performance.... Damages consisting of the loss of antici-
pated profits need not be established with certainty."). If the innocent partners
exercise their right to continue the business, they may forfeit any claim which
they have for destruction of the business, although they can recover for dam-
age to it. See A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 75 at 428
n.78 (1968). Cf. Beck, Formalizing the Farm Partnership, 54 NEB. L. REV. 558,
564 (1975) (suggesting that partners may wish to provide for an "exacting meas-
ure of damages in the formalized partnership agreement").
40. If the affairs of the partnership are to be concluded, a partner wrong-
fully causing the dissolution has no right to participate in the winding up of
partnership affairs. See U.P.A. § 37.
41. Certain conditions are imposed by § 38(2) (b) under such circum-
stances to protect the interests of the partner "wrongfully" causing the dissolu-
tion. The partners may continue the business and possess the partnership
assets by either settling the withdrawing partner's account or posting a bond
securing his interest. Further, the remaining partners must indemnify the
withdrawing partner against present and future partnership liabilities.
The liquidation right is also unavailable in at least two other circum-
stances. The first is if the dissolution occurs because of the expulsion of a part-
ner which is "bonafide under the partnership agreement." U.P.A. § 38(1). See
generally Note, The Expulsion Clause in a Partnership Agreement: A Pre-
Planned Dissolution, 13 U.C.D. L. REV. 868 (1980). The use of an expulsion
clause in a partnership agreement is said to be rare. See Bromberg, supra note
29, at 653. The second situation in which the liquidation right is not available is
when there has been an agreement to the contrary. See U.PA. § 38(1). Al-
though additional exceptions to the liquidation right have been recognized at
equity, one commentator has observed that "[t]hey cannot be relied on for
planning purposes." Bromberg, supra note 29, at 651 n.122. The soundness of
such equitable exceptions is questionable. See infra note 104.
42. U.P.A. § 38(2) (b).
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purchase the interest of the withdrawing partner.4 3 Third, if
the remaining partners do not liquidate the assets but instead
continue the business, the settlement of the dissolving part-
ner's account may be at a discount, for it need not include his
or her proportionate share of the goodwil 4 4 of the partner-
ship.45 Thus, the partner wrongfully causing the dissolution is
43. See supra note 41.
44. U.P.A. § 38(2) (c)ll. This assumes that the business is continued by the
remaining partners. No attempt will be made in this Article to define or ex-
plore in depth the nature of "goodwill." The following is an aged but still useful
definition:
This good-will may be ... described to be the advantage or benefit,
which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere value of the
capital, stock, funds or property employed therein, in consequence of
the general public patronage and encouragement, which it receives
from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local position, or
common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or
from other accidental circumstances or necessities, or even from an-
cient partialities or prejudices.
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF PARTNERSHIP § 991, at 169-70 (6th ed.
1868). Cf. CAL. Cirv. Poc. CODE § 1263.510(b) (West 1982) (" '[G]oodwill' con-
sists of the benefits that accrue to a business as a result of its location, reputa-
tion for dependability, skill or quality, and any other circumstances resulting in
probable retention of old or acquisition of new patronage."); CAL Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 14100 (West 1964) ("The 'good will' of a business is the expectation of
continued public patronage."). It may be easier to define than apply the con-
cept, and one commentator has suggested that it is "so elusive that a cynic may
wonder whether it serves any purpose beyond the padding of one partner's
claim against another." A. BROMBERG, supra note 39, § 84 at 477. For discus-
sions of the application of the concept of goodwill to partnerships, see id. § 84;
H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 31, §§ 224-226. Some courts distin-
guish between individual and partnership goodwill. See infra note 95. The
problems of identifying, valuing, and treating goodwill and related assets are
not limited to partnerships. See, e.g., Bergman, The Valuation of Goodwill, 53
L.A.B.J. 87 (1977); Bruch, The Definition and Division of Marital Property in
California: Toward Parity and Simplicity, 33 HASTINGS LJ. 769, 810-21 (1982).
45. The "all or nothing" approach which the U.PA takes to the disposition
of goodwill after a wrongful dissolution may produce harsh results when the
goodwill component of the business is substantial. See, e.g., Drashner v. Soren-
son, 75 S.D. 247, 63 N.W.2d 255 (S.D. 1954) (where goodwill was the most valua-
ble asset of the business). The forfeiture of goodwill under such circumstances
has been rationalized as a proper sanction against one who acts wrongfully. Id.
at 254, 63 N.W.2d at 259. This cannot, however, be an adequate explanation,
since the forfeiture is not permitted unless the remaining partners continue the
business. U.P-.A § 38(2) (c)IL If the business is not continued and the assets
are liquidated, goodwill, to the extent realized upon the liquidation, is shared
by all partners, including the one who has caused the wrongful dissolution. See
U. A 38(2) (c)L
A number of arguments may be offered in support of the "all or nothing"
position of the U.P.A with respect to goodwill and the distinction which it
draws between continuing and liquidating a business. First, the value of good-
will is difficult for a court to determine standing alone, however, this argument
is less than compelling in light of the willingness of courts, taxpayers, and the
government to deal with similar valuation problems in other contexts. See, e.g.,
Bergman, supra note 44, at 87. Second, the U.P A. approach facilitates the con-
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able to sever the relationship with his or her coventurers, but
only at what in a given situation may be an unacceptable cost.
b. Equitable Dissolution of the Fixed Term Partnership
Under certain circumstances the dissatisfied partner may
be able to terminate the relationship despite the existence of
an agreement specifying a term or undertaking and neverthe-
less avoid a wrongful dissolution. Such a result may be accom-
plished by obtaining an equitable decree of dissolution under
section 32(1) of the U.P.A., which defines the grounds for such
relief as follows:
(a) A partner has been declared a lunatic in any judicial proceeding
or is shown to be of unsound mind,
(b) A partner becomes in any other way incapable of performing his
part of the partnership contract,
(c) A partner has been guilty of such conduct as tends to affect preju-
dicially the carrying on of the business,
(d) A partner wilfully or persistently commits a breach of the part-
nership agreement, or otherwise so conducts himself in matters
relating to the partnership business that it is not reasonably prac-
ticable to carry on the business in partnership with him,
(e) The business of the partnership can only be carried on at a loss,
(f) Other circumstances render a dissolution equitable.
These grounds are noteworthy in two respects. First, three of
the grounds-lunacy, incapacity, and likelihood of loss-and
perhaps a fourth-other circumstances which render a dissolu-
tion equitable4 6 -do not require some form of misconduct by
another partner.47 Second, the grounds do not depend upon
tinuation of the partnership business by potentially lowering the amount which
must be paid in settlement of the dissolving partner's account. Third, it is gen-
erally assumed that all or a substantial portion of the goodwill will not be real-
ized in the event of a liquidation of assets, see infra note 147, and the fact that
the remaining partners intend to continue the business is a mere fortuity that
should not accrue to the benefit of the dissolving partner.
46. This latter ground does not appear to have developed as a strong, in-
dependent basis for dissolution.
47. Because misconduct as a basis for partnership dissolution is not the
concern of this Article, no attempt will be made to review the nature of actions
which will justify relief under U.P.A. § 32(1). For a general treatment of the
matter, see A. BROMBERG, supra note 39, § 78. For representative decisions in-
dicating that relief will not be granted lightly under these sections, see Fuller v.
Brough, 159 Colo. 147, 153, 411 P.2d 18, 21 (1966) (describing standard for relief
as follows: "[G]ross misconduct, want of good faith, wilful neglect of partner-
ship obligations, and such other causes as are productive of serious and perma-
nent injury to the partnership, or which render it impracticable to carry on the
partnership business.... [A] court of equity will not dissolve an existing
partnership for trifling causes or temporary grievances involving no permanent
mischief."); Potter v. Brown, 328 Pa. 554, 561, 195 A. 901, 904 (1938) ("Differences
and discord should be settled by the partners themselves by the application of
mutual forebearance rather than by bills in equity for dissolution."); Lunn v.
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control status within the partnership. A dissatisfied partner,
therefore, may be entitled to relief even though the partner
whose status or actions are complained of is also a minority
partner and therefore not part of the "control" group.
Obtaining an equitable decree of dissolution protects the
dissatisfied partner from the consequences of a wrongful disso-
lution. It may also be possible for the dissatisfied partner to as-
sert that the actions of the other partners were such that they
should be treated as having wrongfully dissolved the partner-
ship.4 8 This argument, if successful, would permit the with-
drawing partner to continue the business, possess the
partnership assets, utilize the partnership goodwill, and re-
cover damages from the culpable partners. Whether one can
consider any dissolution other than a dissolution by the ex-
press will of a partner pursuant to section 31(2) to be "wrong-
ful" and thus subject to the consequences outlined in section 38
is not clear, however. While logic and policy considerations
would require that this be answered in the affirmative, sections
31, 32, and 38 of the U.P.A. raise a considerable amount of un-
certainty on the subject.49
Kaiser, 76 S.D. 52, 54, 72 N.W.2d 312, 314 (1955) ("[P]ersonal animosity ... ex-
isting between the parties did not detract from the successful conduct of the
business."). Failure to properly account or fully disclose the state of partner-
ship affairs, on the other hand, is sometimes asserted with success as a ground
for dissolution. See, e.g., Owen v. Cohen, 19 Cal. 2d 147, 152, 119 P.2d 713, 715-16
(1941) (although it acknowledged that "trifling and minor differences which in-
volve no permanent mischief will not authorize a court to decree a dissolution,"
the court granted relief because the circumstances of the business required co-
operation and added: "It is not only large affairs which produce trouble. The
continuance of overbearing and vexatious petty treatment of one partner by an-
other frequently is more serious in its disruptive character than would be
larger differences which would be discussed and settled."); Olivet v. Frischling,
104 Cal. App. 3d 831, 843, 164 Cal. Rptr. 87, 93 (1980) (dicta indicating that a part-
ner who agrees to give his personal attention to the partnership business and
who engages in activities preventing him from giving the business the attention
it needs will have "breached his implicit agreement to refrain from undermin-
ing the partnership's best interests," and the remaining partners will be enti-
tled to equitable dissolution under either ground (d) or (f)); Ferrick v. Barry,
320 Mass. 217, 221, 68 N.E.2d 690, 694 (1946) (dissolution granted on the "imprac-
ticable to do business" ground because "while [the accused partner] was not
dishonest in his dealings with the partnership business, his mannerisms mani-
fested an assumption of preeminence in the firm; he was reluctant and slow in
making full disclosure of his doings to his partners; he was wanting in sponta-
neous candor; he was indiscreet and created natural suspicion and distrust in
the minds of his partners.").
48. See Bromberg, supra note 29, at 638.
49. The uncertainty arises from the use of the terms "wrongful" and "in
contravention of the agreement" in U.P.A. §§ 31, and 38. Section 38 establishes
the rights of the partners upon dissolution and varies these rights depending
upon whether the dissolution is caused "in contravention of the agreement."
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2. The Implication of Agreements Concerning Partnership
Duration
a. Informality in the Establishment of a Partnership
Formalities are not required to form a general partnership.
In this regard, partnerships are very much unlike corporations.
No written contract or document need be drafted or filed to
form a partnership, and if there exists "an association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit,"
there is a partnership.5 0 It is therefore not necessary that the
individuals intended to establish the legal relationship known
as a partnership or that they were aware of the legal conse-
quences of establishing such a relationship.5 ' Not surprisingly,
whether a partnership relationship exists under a given set of
facts may not be susceptible of an easy resolution.5 2 At its ex-
treme, the consequences of this lack of formalism can be seen
See supra note 38. In discussing the relative rights of the parties when dissolu-
tion is in contravention of the partnership agreement, § 38(2) distinguishes the
rights of the partners who have caused the dissolution "wrongfully" from those
who have not, thereby implying that the only wrongful dissolutions are those
which are in contravention of an agreement. When read in combination with
§ 31(2), which provides, apparently in a definitional sense, that dissolution is
caused "fi]n contravention of the agreement between the partners, where the
circumstances do not permit a dissolution under any other provision of this
section, by the express will of any partner at anytime," it may be concluded
that a dissolution is only wrongful when it is caused by the express will of a
partner pursuant to § 31(2) as opposed to a judicial decree under § 32.
Resolution of this interpretive question is not necessary to permit a treat-
ment of the issues presented in this Article, and it would appear that this is an
area which merits further scholarly attention. It is not unreasonable to observe
at this point, however, that an interpretation of the U.P.A. which may be more
sensible than the one outlined above is that dissolutions which are wrongful for
purposes of § 38 are those which are accomplished either by the express will of
a partner pursuant to § 31(2) or by decree where there has been a finding of
fault under §§ 32(c) or (d). A course of conduct which prejudices the continued
operation of the business or which makes it impracticable to carry on the busi-
ness in partnership with the individual may, like a willful or persistent breach
of the partnership agreement, be viewed as conduct which causes a dissolution
"in contravention of the partnership agreement" for purposes of § 38 if "agree-
ment" is viewed in a broad sense to include implied convenants to cooperate
and act in good faith rather than in a manner which will prejudice the partner-
ship business. For a brief discussion of this issue, see A. BROMBERG, supra
note 39, § 75(d) at 430. See also Vangel v. Vangel, 116 Cal. App. 2d 615, 625-26,
254 P.2d 919, 925-26 (1953), aff'd in part rev'd in part, 45 Cal. 2d 804, 291 P.2d 25
(1955); Drashner v. Sorenson, 75 S.D. 247, 252, 63 N.W.2d 255, 259 (1954).
50. This is the definition provided in § 6(1) of the U.PA.
51. See infra note 53.
52. "[T]here is one matter connected with partnership which legislation
cannot make certain. By no human ingenuity would a Partnership Act which
does not abolish common law partnerships enable the person who reads it to
tell in every supposable case whether there is or is not a partnership." Lewis,
supra note 17, at 621.
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in those partnerships which, from the point of view of those un-
fortunate individuals later determined to be partners, were cre-
ated accidentally.53
Requiring a measure of formalism in the creation of a rela-
tionship does not insure that the parties will engage in what is
perhaps best referred to as "business planning."54 The absence
of any degree of formality, however, certainly decreases the
53. Howard Gault & Son, Inc. v. First Natl Bank, 541 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976) is illustrative. Plaintiff corporation and Thomas entered into an
agreement whereby Thomas would farm land, one portion of which plaintiff
owned and another portion of which plaintiff and Thomas co-leased from a
third party. As rent for using plaintiff's land, Thomas would pay plaintiff a
share of the crop. The agreement also provided for an equal sharing of all
losses and all net revenues, rents and proceeds after the payment of the land
rent by Thomas. It expressly stated, however, that the parties were not en-
gaged as partners but instead as landlord and tenant. In subsequent litigation
the court, while noting that § 7 of the U.P.A. provides that a partnership will not
be inferred when profits are received as rent to a landlord, nonetheless held
that other elements of the agreement established a partnership, despite the
parties' express intention to the contrary:
The statement ... that the farming operation was not a partnership is
not conclusive on the question of partnership. It is the intent to do the
things that constitute a partnership that determines that the relation-
ship exists between the parties, and if they intend to do a thing which
in law constitutes a partnership, they are partners whether their ex-
pressed purpose was to create or avoid the relationship.
Id. at 237.
Singleton v. Fuller, 118 Cal. App. 2d 733, 259 P.2d 687 (1953) is also instruc-
tive. In this case the court found that a creditor was a partner in the business
and therefore jointly liable for its debts, despite an express agreement that the
relationship was not a partnership but that of debtor-creditor. While acknowl-
edging that the payment of debts out of profits does not alone raise the infer-
ence of a partnership, the court found sufficient participation in the business
by the appellant to establish a partnership.
In Beverly v. McCullick, 211 Kan. 87, 505 P.2d 624 (1973), defendants agreed
to manage a cattle auction business for plaintiff then formed a corporation
through which capital was advanced and profits and losses were shared. Plain-
tiff successfully charged defendants with breach of contract not to compete and
with conspiracy to destroy plaintiff's business. Defendants sought to limit re-
covery to loss of rents by claiming only a landlord-tenant relationship had ex-
isted. The court, however, found a partnership had arisen. As a result, the
action was in tort, not contract, for breach of the fiduciary duty owed to a part-
ner, and defendants were liable as well for diminution of the value of plaintiff's
business facility and $100,000 in punitive damages. See also Associated Piping
& Eng'g Co. v. Jones, 17 Cal. App. 2d 107, 110-111, 61 P.2d 536, 538 (1936) (The
parties' "intention in this respect is immaterial... if the contract by its terms
establishes a partnership between the parties, even the expressed intent that it
should not be so classed would be of no avail."); Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213,
218, 158 N.E. 77, 78 (1927) ("Mere words will not blind us to realities. State-
ments that no partnership is intended are not conclusive.").
54. See, e.g., Fessler, The Fate of Closely Held Business Associations: The
Debatable Wisdom of "Incorporation," 13 U.C.D. L REV. 473, 483-84 n.22 (1980)
("Perhaps it is appropriate that the lack of considered reasoning that is often
behind the decision to incorporate can now be matched by an absence of par-
ticularized drafting in the crucial process of incorporation.").
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likelihood of such planning. Under such circumstances, the
parties are less likely to consult legal counsel or even take the
opportunity to discuss and reach understandings concerning
the relative rights and responsibilities of each.5 5 The U.P.A. ac-
comodates this potential lack of planning by providing a series
of rules to govern the relationships among partners in cases
where the parties have not reached agreements in advance.
The rules so provided are generally suppletory, however, and
the U.P.A. drafters happily withdraw the Act's norms in favor
of agreements concluded among the partners.
One of the more ironic features of the U.P.A. is that while it
shows great deference to an agreement among the partners it
at no time defines what it means by "agreement." Naturally,
the ideal situation is one in which the parties, with the assist-
ance of legal counsel, have developed a comprehensive written
document embodying the series of agreements which will gov-
ern their relationship. Between the comprehensive written
agreement and the unplanned partnership governed by U.P.A.
rules lie a variety of relations among partners based to some
degree on unwritten understandings. Problems of proof and
the statute of frauds aside,56 there appears to be no reason why
courts should not accord respect to such informal agreements.
Acceptance of this premise does not, however, answer the
question of how readily courts should infer an implied partner-
ship agreement regarding a "definite term" or a "particular un-
dertaking." The more easily courts infer such an agreement,
the more likely it is that "premature" dissolution of a partner-
ship will be wrongful, absent an equitable decree of dissolution.
55. The mere act of consulting an attorney at the incorporation stage may
be viewed as an act of distrust. For an account of a lawyer advising individuals
not to go into business together if they feel a need to have binding agreements
to resolve differences in advance, see Hetherington, Special Characteristics,
Problems, and Needs of the Close Corporation, 1969 U. II. IF. 1, 16 n.65. Cf
Worcester, The Drafting of Partnership Agreements, 63 HARv. L REV. 985, 986
(1950) ("Since a partnership is an extremely intimate relationship, perhaps the
greatest potential problem is the risk of future disagreement among those who
start out with the highest mutual regard."). The absence of planning at the for-
mation stage is a problem for both corporations and partnerships. See gener-
ally Dykstra, Molding the Utah Corporation: Survey and Commentary, 7 UTAH
L. REV. 1 (1960); Hetherington, supra, at 15-19; O'Neal, Close Corporation Legis-
lation: A Survey and an Evaluation, 1972 DuKE L. J. 867, 889. Cf 'Note,
Mandatory Arbitration as a Remedy for Intra-Close Corporate Disputes, 56 VA.
L. REv. 271, 276 (1970) ("Planning for irreconcilable disagreement may itself
strain the mutual trust upon which the business collaboration is founded.").
56. A consideration of the impact of the statute of frauds on the unwritten
partnership agreement is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally A.
BROMBERG, supra note 39, § 23 at 110-13, § 39 at 224-27.
[Vol. 67:1
DISSATISFIED PARTICIPANT
By increasing the probability of adverse consequences for the
dissolving partner, this result in turn would increase the stabil-
ity of partnerships.
b. The Implied Agreement Not to Dissolve a Partnership
Although the U.P.A. does not define the critical term
"agreement," section 31 provides that dissolution may be
caused, without violation of the agreement among the parties,
"[b]y the termination of the definite term or particular under-
taking specified in the agreement"5 7 and "[b]y the express will
of any partner when no definite term or particular undertaking
is specified."S8 Section 31 thus suggests that the type of agree-
ment which will alter the U.P.A. policy of dissolvability without
sanctions must be one which clearly sets forth the duration of
the partnership.5 9 At the very least, this provision of the U.P.A.
cannot be said to encourage the implication of terms or
undertaldngs.
(1) The Implied Definite Term or Particular Undertaking
A number of courts have shown a willingness to infer part-
nership terms or undertakings from facts that would not seem
to be contemplated by the rather precise language of section 31.
This lack of adherence to statutory language is understandable,
however, in light of the informality with which partnerships
can be created. While it would be of great assistance if the par-
ties would reduce to writing their understandings concerning
the relative rights and obligations of each, the failure to de-
velop such a document does not mean that mutually accepted
understandings and expectations do not exist. Thus, to con-
strue the language of section 31 literally and recognize only un-
disputed and exact agreements concerning the duration of the
relationship would introduce an element of formality un-
characteristic of both the U.P.A. and the environment in which
a substantial number of partnerships are created. The
problems in this connection should be more in the nature of
proof than of concept.
57. U.P-.A § 31(1) (a) (emphasis added).
58. U.P-.A § 31(1) (b) (emphasis added).
59. Not dispositive but worthy of note is one dictionary definition of "speci-
fied" as a matter "that is or has been definitely or specifically mentioned, deter-
mined, fixed or settled." THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DIcTioNARY 549 (10th ed. 1961).
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(2) Testing the Limits of Implication
Although in some circumstances it may be reasonable to
infer an agreement concerning partnership duration, a number
of courts have displayed a willingness to find such agreements
on the basis of facts best described as weak. The effect of such
an approach is particularly severe where the court not only im-
plies the existence of such an agreement but also determines
that the term established by the implied agreement is one of
substantial duration.
A series of California cases exhibits a clear progression
from a reasonable, if arguable, implication of an agreement con-
cerning duration, to an implication based on facts so weak that
virtually any partnership would be susceptible to an inference
of an implied agreement regarding duration.6 0
In Bates v. McTammany,6 1 two individuals formed a part-
nership for the purpose of operating a radio station. The fed-
eral license necessary to operate the station was renewable
every six months and was nontransferable; the value of the li-
cense, therefore, would be lost in the event of a dissolution of
the partnership. The principal issue presented was whether
this partnership was for a particular undertaking in light of the
importance of the license in the operation of the business.
Whether there existed an agreement concerning the duration
of the partnership was subject to resolution in one of three
ways. The first, rejected both at trial and on appeal, was that
this was not a partnership for a specified term or particular un-
dertaking and was therefore terminable at will. In the alterna-
tive, the duration issue could have been resolved by concluding
that the partnership was formed for a definite term which coin-
cided with the term of the federal license-that is, six months,
without regard to renewals. This alternative, which was not ad-
dressed in the opinion, would have permitted the treatment of
the partnership term as a series of successive terms, each of
which coincided with the renewal term of the radio license; the
partnership could then have been dissolved without violation of
the agreement at the end of any of the six month periods.
60. The California cases were selected because they represent the clearest
line developing the concept of implied agreements concerning partnership du-
ration. In addition, Zeibak v. Nasser, 12 Cal. 2d 1, 82 P.2d 375 (1938), and Page v.
Page, 55 Cal. 2d 192, 359 P.2d 41, 10 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1961), discussed in the suc-
ceeding section, are important in their own right. See D. FESSLER, supra note
13, at 153-65. For additional cases implying terms as to duration, see infra notes
77-79. For cases refusing to imply such terms, see infra note 85.
61. 10 Cal. 2d 697, 76 P.2d 513 (1938).
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Instead of following either of these two approaches, the
court sustained the finding of the trial judge that the partner-
ship was one for a definite undertaking for "so long as the fed-
eral license therefor could be procured."62 This conclusion,
which focuses on the renewability of an intangible partnership
asset,6 3 results in an undertaking for a period which is both
vague and of potentially significant length.64
That the California Supreme Court would be willing to
reach far to find implied terms or undertakings was demon-
strated even more clearly in Zeibak v. Nasser.65 In Zeibak, four
individuals and one corporation formed a venture having as its
purpose the acquisition of a business. The principal assets of
the business consisted of ownership and leasehold interests in
various theatres. The parties intended to acquire these assets
as partners and immediately thereafter form a corporation for
the management of the business. Plaintiff Zeibak was an im-
portant source of capital for the venture, and, accordingly, was
to own a one-half interest. The parties commenced the venture
and acquired the assets on the basis of an agreement, perhaps
best described as preliminary, calling for the formation of a cor-
poration to operate the theatres. 66 The agreement also pro-
vided that "definite understandings shall also be had"
concerning disbursement of funds, general policies, and the
manner and extent to which Zeibak would participate in the
operation of the corporation.67
Almost from the beginning, differences arose between
62. Id. at 700, 76 P.2d at 515.
63. This approach would appear to be equally applicable to leases,
franchises, supply contracts, and similar arrangements.
64. Regrettably, the facts supporting the finding of such a lengthy term
were not disclosed by the court. While it is not clear that the determination
rested on implied rather than express oral understandings, Bates was subse-
quently cited by the California Supreme Court in a manner suggesting that it
was based on implied understandings. See Zeibak v. Nasser, 12 Cal. 2d 1, 13, 82
P.2d 375, 381 (1938). An earlier California decision had also found an implied
partnership term. See Mervyn Inv. Co. v. Biber, 184 Cal. 636, 641-42, 194 P. 1037,
1039 (1921).
65. 12 Cal. 2d 1, 82 P.2d 375 (1938).
66. Id. at 4, 82 P.2d at 377. The document was curiously entitled "Memo-
randum of Understanding Reached and to be Reached." For reasons that are
not clear, one of the partners did not sign the Memorandum. He did sign a sep-
arate agreement providing that management and control of the business would
be entrusted to the same partners identified for this purpose in the Memoran-
dum. This separate agreement was apparently not executed by Zeibak. The
failure of the partner to sign the first Memorandum, and the apparent failure of





Zeibak and the partners active in the management of the enter-
prise.68 These differences, which included disputes over man-
agement policies and the relative rights of the partners, were
never resolved. Contrary to the original agreement, the busi-
ness was operated as a partnership rather than a corporation.
In addition, the "definite understandings" contemplated by the
preliminary agreement were never forthcoming, although nego-
tiations continued for nearly a year following the execution of
the preliminary agreement.6 9 Throughout this period, Zeibak
was kept well informed concerning the operation of the busi-
ness, but he was never permitted to participate in its manage-
ment. Although the business prospered, Zeibak was not
content with his passive role in the venture and initiated an ac-
tion seeking dissolution of the partnership and an accounting.
The remaining partners-anxious to continue the highly profit-
able business-argued that Zeibak had caused the wrongful
dissolution of the partnership.7 0 They asserted, therefore, that
Zeibak was liable in damages for the dissolution, and that they
should be permitted to possess partnership assets and continue
the operation of the business upon the payment to Zeibak of an
amount equal to his share of the value of the business, exclud-
ing goodwill.
The pivotal issues in this controversy were whether the
partnership was for an undertaking and whether Zeibak had
caused its premature dissolution.7 1 As in Bates, there were no
written agreements between the parties defining the term or
undertaking of the partnership. Indeed, it was clear that the
parties intended for the initial partnership to have the limited
68. Id. at 5, 82 P.2d at 377.
69. Approximately eight months after the execution of the Memorandum,
the parties came close to reconciling their differences. Draft agreements were
executed, but they were not exchanged because of last-minute attempts by
Zeibak to gain additional concessions. The court found this "a violation of the
duty he owed his fellow partners of cooperating with them to effectuate the
purposes for which all had joined." Id. at 9, 82 P.2d at 379.
70. The remaining partners presented three grounds for this argument:
(1) Zeibak had refused to cooperate in carrying on the partnership; (2) Zeibak
had not complied with the terms of the oral undertaking pursuant to which the
venture was established; and (3) Zeibak had asserted rights and made de-
mands not contemplated by that same oral understanding. Id. at 6, 82 P.2d at
378.
71. The court viewed the dissolution as caused by the exercise of the lower
court's equitable powers as opposed to the express will of any of the partners.
Id. at 16, 82 P.2d at 382. The equitable dissolution by the lower court was ap-
parently based on what it viewed as wrongful conduct by plaintiff Zeibak. For
a discussion of this approach to wrongful dissolutions, see supra note 49.
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function of acquiring the assets.72
The California Supreme Court, however, had little difficulty
in concluding that this was not a partnership terminable at will.
The court reasoned that "[n]otwithstanding the fact that the
trial court found the venture was not entered into for any spe-
cific period of time, but was to end. . . upon the formation of a
corporation, this was never done, and the parties voluntarily
continued their status as joint venturers ... ."73 Thus, the fail-
ure of any of the partners to dissolve the partnership at some
rl-defined point after the non-occurrence of an event-the fail-
ure to form a corporation-was sufficient to warrant a conclu-
sion that new implied understandings concerning the operation
of the venture and its duration had been reached. 74
The significance of the finding of an implied undertaking
increases in proportion to the length of that undertaking. The
court's view in Zeibak of the duration for which this partner-
ship was to have existed, however, is less than clear. Without
extensive analysis, it concluded that the life of the partnership
was coextensive with the duration of the theatre leases.7 5 In
72. Zeibak would then have been a fifty percent stockholder rather than a
partner. Although the preliminary agreement indicated that Zeibak would not
be involved in the management of the corporation, it also provided that his role
in the operation of the business had not yet been the subject of an agreement.
In addition, it showed a lack of agreement on such basic matters as "disburse-
ment of funds" and "general policies." See supra text accompanying note 67.
73. 12 Cal. 2d at 12, 82 P.2d at 381. The court's approach in Zeibak appears
to have been influenced by Zimmerman v. Harding, 227 U.S. 489 (1913). At is-
sue in Zimmerman was the term of a partnership formed under Puerto Rican
law. The Puerto Rican statute, however, did not reflect the approach eventually
taken by the U.P.A Instead, it provided that:
The dissolution of the partnership by the will or withdrawal of one of
the partners shall only take place when a term for its duration has not
been fixed, or if this term does not appear from the nature of the busi-
ness. CrVML CODE § 1607 (1902) (current version at P.R. LAws ANN. tit.
31, § 4396 (1980)) (emphasis added).
Thus, the statute presented in Zimmerman expressly contemplated the impli-
cation of a term based on "the nature of the business." The California statute,
on the other hand, provided for dissolution "[b]y the express will of any part-
ner when no definite term or particular undertaking is specified." 12 Cal. 2d at
13, 82 P.2d at 381. The Zimmerman decision, therefore, provided no support for
the analysis undertaken by the court in Zeibak. Zimmerman continues to be
misread. See, e.g., 68th St. Apartments, Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546,
562, 362 A.2d 78, 87 (1976).
74. These same understandings were supposedly reached notwithstanding
the existence of differences between Zeibak and his partners "practically from
the date of purchase of the business to the time of the filing of the complaint."
12 Cal. 2d at 5, 82 P.2d at 377.
75. "[T]he term of the venture, at least impliedly, was of similar duration
as the term of the leases under which the theatres were operated." 12 Cal. .2d
at 13, 82 P.2d at 381 (emphasis added).
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basing its conclusion in this regard on Bates, the Court leaves
open the possibility that the term would be extended further to
the extent that the leases were renewable or, perhaps, renego-
tiable. Zeibak, like Bates, demonstrates the vagueness inher-
ent in utilizing arrangements with third parties to establish the
existence and define the duration of a partnership term or
undertaking.
A further development of this approach to the implication
of an extended partnership term on the basis of partnership ob-
ligations or contracts is found in yet another decision of the
California Supreme Court, Owen v. Cohen:76
Defendant's objection to the finding that the partnership was one at
will is fully justified by the uncontradicted evidence that the partners
at the inception of their undertaking agreed that all obligations in-
curred by the partnership, including the money advanced by plaintiff,
were to be paid out of the profits of the business. While the term of the
partnership was not expressly fixed, it must be presumed from this
agreement that the parties intended the relation should continue until
the obligations were liquidated in the manner mutually
contemplated.77
The analysis employed in Owen has rather extraordinary
implications, and it is difficult to find a point of distinction be-
tween the facts of that case and any partnership in which debt
is incurred. The approach developed by Bates and Zeibak and
carried to its logical extreme in Owen could render the partner-
ship that is terminable at will without imposition of sanctions
on the dissolving partner a rarity. This line of cases, therefore,
will encourage stabilized partnership relationships.
76. 19 Cal. 2d 147, 119 P.2d 713 (1941).
77. 19 Cal. 2d at 150, 119 P.2d at 715 (emphasis added). A subsequent deci-
sion of the California Supreme Court implied that the critical factor in Owen
was the loan by one partner of funds to the partnership. See Page v. Page, 55
Cal. 2d 192, 195, 359 P.2d 41, 43, 10 Cal. Rptr. 643, 645 (1961). See also Drashner v.
Sorenson, 75 S.D. 247, 63 N.W.2d 255 (1954). Curiously, the Owen opinion cited
neither Bates nor Zeibak, relying instead upon an earlier decision, Mervyn Inv.
Co. v. Biber, 184 Cal. 637, 194 P. 1037 (1921). Additional decisions have also
found implied terms. See, e.g., Shannon v. Hudson, 161 Cal. App. 2d 44, 48, 325
P.2d 1022, 1025 (1958) (until partnership property could be disposed of on
favorable terms); Vangel v. Vangel, 116 Cal. App. 2d 615, 626, 254 P.2d 919, 926
(1953), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 45 Cal. 2d 804, 291 P.2d 25 (1955) (until part-
ners could recoup a loan); Meherin v. Meherin, 93 Cal. App. 2d 459, 464, 209 P.2d
36, 39 (1949) (insurance brokerage partnership term implied from the period of
the brokerage license, a lease, and the joint obligations of the partners to per-
form continuous services under insurance policies running from one to five
years); Pemberton v. Ladue Realty & Constr. Co., 237 Mo. App. 971, 982, 180
S.W.2d 766, 771 (1944) (until lots in subdivision were sold).
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(3) A Second Look at Implied Terms
Given the informality with which partnerships may be cre-
ated, it is not unreasonable in some situations to permit the im-
plication of understandings concerning the duration of the term
or undertaking. As a general proposition, however, the hkeli-
hood that the parties intended a term lessens as the length of
the term increases. From all appearances, the Bates-Zeibak-
Owen line of cases ignores this probability. The burden of es-
tablishing a substantial term should be on the partners not
seeking dissolution, and, as the duration of the purported term
increases, so should the difficulty of carrying the burden. For
example, it should not be a difficult burden to establish an un-
dertaking in a partnership formed for the purpose of develop-
ing and selling real property,7 8 while the burden should be
much more difficult to carry if the assertion is of a significant
undertaking in connection with the development and manage-
ment of that same property.79
78. See, e.g., Pemberton v. Ladue Realty & Constr. Co., 237 Mo. App. 971,
180 S.W.2d 766 (1944). Cf. Klein v. Greenberg, 461 F. Supp. 653, 655 (M.D.N.C.
1978) (plaintiff demonstrated strong likelihood of success on the merits in an
action for a wrongful dissolution of partnership to publish specific books); 68th
St. Apartments, Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546, 562, 362 A.2d 78, 87 (1976),
affd 150 N.J. Super. 47, 374 A-2d 1222 (1977) (a curious case applying partner-
ship principles to a close corporation and concluding that the term of the ven-
ture was until completion of a building). See also Hardin v. Robinson, 178 App.
Div. 724, 729, 162 N.Y.S. 531, 534 (1916), af'd 223 N.Y. 651, 119 N.E. 1047 (1918)
("[W] here a partnership has for its object the completion of a specified piece of
work, or the effecting of a specified result, it will be presumed that the parties
intended the relation to continue until the object has been accomplished.").
79. Consider, for example, the awkwardness of the analysis presented in
Shannon v. Hudson, 161 Cal. App. 2d 44, 325 P.2d 1022 (1958), where the court
concluded that a venture formed to build and operate a motel was not termina-
ble at will but was to continue until the motel could be sold on terms agreeable
to all partners:
Plaintiff contends that the court erred in finding that 'the purpose of
the joint venture was the acquisition of real property . . . and the
building, furnishing and equipping and the operation of a twelve-unit
motel until a sale of said motel could be effected at a profit.' She as-
serts that there is nothing in the record which indicates that the par-
ties intended not to sell the motel until they could recover a profit
thereby. She argues that this finding would have the parties retain the
property indefinitely because continued operation at a loss would make
it impossible ever to sell the property at a profit. Plaintiff has miscon-
ceived the meaning of the finding. It merely states the obvious objec-
tive of the parties to make a profit when they sold the property. There
can be no doubt that their purpose was to operate the motel to facili-
tate their selling it at a profit. Plaintiff has placed undue emphasis on
the words 'at a profit.' Obviously if it appears that continued losses are
inevitable and that the parties will likely be unable to sell the motel at
a profit, then their primary purpose must be abandoned and the prop-
erty must be sold at any reasonable price that can be obtained. The
finding is clearly without error. (Emphasis in original).
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There is some evidence that the inclination of the Califor-
nia courts to imply terms or undertakings has been suspended,
if not terminated. In Page v. Page,80 the California Supreme
Court considered whether a linen supply business formed on
the basis of oral understandings was a partnership for a term.8 1
Although the trial court found a term coextensive with the pe-
riod required to enable repayment of partnership indebtedness,
the supreme court held that this finding was without support in
the evidence:
[D] efendant failed to prove any facts from which an agreement to con-
tinue the partnership for a term may be implied. The understanding to
which defendant testified was no more than a common hope that the
partnership earnings would pay for all the necessary expenses. Such a
hope does not establish even by implication a definite term or particu-
lar undertaking ....
All partnerships are ordinarily entered into with the hope that they
will be profitable, but that alone does not make them all partnerships
for a term and obligate the partners to continue in the partnership un-
til all of the losses over a period of many years have been recovered.
8 2
It is likely that the typical partnership is inaugurated with
the partners' hope that their relationship will continue for an
extended period and will be profitable to all parties con-
cerned;83 the court's refusal to equate this common hope with
an agreement supplanting the terms of the U.PA. is sensible.84
In this connection, Page represents a perhaps more cautious
approach to the implication of terms concerning the duration of
a venture,8 5 and thus may undermine the earlier decisions in
Id. at 48, 325 P.2d at 1025. See also Williams v. Terebinski, 24 Ohio Misc. 53, 55,
261 N.E.2d 920, 922 (1970) (since the purpose of the partnership was to acquire a
cemetary and sell the lots, the term coincided with the period necessary to ac-
complish this purpose, which might be "many years in excess of five years.").
80. 55 Cal. 2d 192, 359 P.2d 41, 10 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1961).
81. See infra text accompanying note 87.
82. 55 Cal. 2d at 196, 359 P.2d at 43-44, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 645-46 (emphasis
added).
83. In addition, contracts, loans, licenses, or leases of more than a short
duration are not uncommon. In fact, the absence of all of these in an ongoing
business may be a rarity.
84. Cf. Girard Bank v. Haley, 460 Pa. 237, 244, 332 A.2d 443, 447 (1975)
("Leasing property, like many other trades or businesses, involves entering
into a business relationship which may continue indefinitely; there is nothing
'particular' about it.").
85. A number of other courts have refused to imply partnership terms or
undertakings. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kennedy, 350 Mass. 294, 298, 214 N.E.2d 276,
278 (1966) (no term can be implied from an unexecuted written agreement
specifying a 25-year term, where the oral agreement creating the partnership
specified no fixed term); Seufert v. Gille, 230 Mo. 453, 480, 131 S.W. 102, 109
(1910) (that a partnership has incurred debts and charged its assets for their
payment does not justify implication of a term to continue the partnership until
its debts are paid, since debts may be paid after dissolution); Frey v. Hauke,
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Bates, Zeibak and Owen.86
3. The Permanent Terminable At Will Partnership
While the California Supreme Court in Page showed a sen-
sible reluctance to infer, on the basis of weak facts, agreements
concerning the term or undertaking of a partnership, dicta in
the opinion raises the possibility of another type of implied
agreement that may substantially affect the dissolvability of a
partnership which might otherwise be considered terminable at
will. The partnership in Page had shown losses for a number
of years but was beginning to turn a profit.87 The future of the
business was bright. Plaintiff, who was apparently the partner
most familiar with and involved in the management of the busi-
ness, obtained a judgment declaring that the partnership was
terminable at will. In response to the other partner's concern
that the plaintiff's intentions were to dissolve the partnership
171 Neb. 852, 864-65, 108 N.W.2d 228, 235 (1961) (court refused to imply a definite
term merely from the incursion of debts); Netburn v. Fischman, 81 Msc.2d 117,
118, 364 N.Y.S.2d 727, 729 (1975) (no term can be implied from a partnership
agreement providing for termination by mutual consent); Malmuth v. Schnei-
der, 18 A.D.2d 1030, 1030, 238 N.Y.S.2d 986, 987 (1963) (partnership agreement
which provided for the continuing performance by the parties so long as the
agreement should be in effect, but contained no express provision for its dura-
tion, was not for a definite term); Campbell v. Miller, 274 N.C. 143, 150, 161
S.E.2d 546, 551 (1968) (lease of property to partnership by certain partners "for
as long as we wanted it" consistent with conclusion that partnership termina-
ble at will); Nicholes v. Hunt, 273 Or. 255, 262, 541 P.2d 820, 824 (1975) (that the
plaintiff partner was obligated to make seven annual payments on the balance
of his capital contribution did not negate a conclusion that the partnership was
terminable at will).
86. Page may be distinguishable from Bates and Zeibak, neither of which
was cited in Page and each of which involved legal arrangements pursuant to
which a third party conferred rights upon the partnership. Such a relationship
with a third party was not present in Page, where the major creditor was a cor-
poration owned by the plaintiff partners. The corporation held a $47,000 de-
mand note, and it could be argued that if this had been a term note, the result
in Page would have been different. In addition, the court in Page found evi-
dence in the record that there were no understandings concerning the term of
the partnership in the event of losses. 55 Cal. 2d at 194, 359 P.2d at 43, 10 Cal.
Rptr. at 645. The partnership was burdened with losses for a number of years,
although it had recently turned profitable, and the establishment of Vanden-
berg Air Force Base in the vicinity was a promising development. Id. Page
rather unconvincingly distinguished Owen by noting that it was a case in which
"the partners borrowed substantial amounts of money to launch the enterprise
and there was an understanding that the loans would be repaid from partner-
ship profits." Id. at 195, 359 P.2d at 43, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
87. For the first eight years of its operation, the partnership was unsuc-
cessful. The court indicated that there was no showing in the record that this
improved profit position was more than temporary. The recent establishment
of Vandenberg Air Force Base in the vicinity, 55 Cal. 2d at 196, 359 P.2d at 44, 10
Cal. Rptr. at 646, however, may suggest a contrary conclusion.
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and continue the business alone, however, the court issued this
strong warning to the plaintiff:
[P]laintiff has the power to dissolve the partnership by express notice
to the defendant. If, however, it is proved that plaintiff acted in bad
faith and violated his fiduciary duties by attempting to appropriate to
his own use the new prosperity of the partnership without adequate
compensation to his co-partner, the dissolution would be wrongful and
the plaintiff would be liable [to his partner because of the wrongful dis-
solution] for violation of the implied agreement not to exclude
defendant wrongfully from the partnership business opportunity.8 8
This analysis is, at best, unclear. It has long been recog-
nized that the fiduciary relationship among partners requires
that they act toward each other with the utmost "good faith and
loyalty."89 Thus, the failure of the plaintiff in Page to account
for some element of the partnership's goodwill after the disso-
lution would represent a breach of the fiduciary duty he owed
to the defendant.90 Page, however, has introduced a new con-
88. Id. at 197-98, 359 P.2d at 45, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 647 (emphasis added). The
court applied the corporate terminology of "freeze out" to describe this tactic.
Id. at 197, 359 P.2d at 44, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 646. For a pre-U.P.A, case somewhat in
accord with the Page approach, see Trigg v. Shelton, 249 S.W. 209, 215-16
(Comm. App. Tex. 1923). See also Howell v. Bowden, 368 S.W.2d 842, 848 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1963).
89. See generally A. BROMBERG, supra note 39, § 68; D. FESsLER, supra note
13, at 96-121; Note, Fiduciary Duties of Partners, 48 IowA L. REv. 902 (1963).
90. U.P.A. § 21(1) provides that: "Every partner must account to the part-
nership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him
without the consent of the other partnersfrom any transaction connected with
the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by
him of its property." (Emphasis added.) It is thus clear that the fiduciary rela-
tionship extends through the liquidation process. See also Vai v. Bank of Am.
Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 56 Cal. 2d 329, 339, 364 P.2d 247, 253, 15 Cal. Rptr. 71,
77 (1961); Laux v. Freed, 53 Cal. 2d 512, 522, 348 P.2d 873, 878, 2 Cal. Rptr. 265, 270
(1960); Woodruff v. Bryant, 558 S.W.2d 535, 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). But see
Babray v. Carlino, 2 Ill. App. 3d 241, 251, 276 N.E.2d 435, 442 (1971) (fiduciary re-
lationship ends at dissolution and during the winding up process the parties
may deal with each other on an arms-length basis). If, for example, plaintiff
partner in Page sells the partnership name after the dissolution, the proceeds
resulting from the sale must be shared with defendant. Goodwill cannot be dis-
posed of prior to the dissolution without unanimous consent. U.p.A. § 9(3) (b).
Similarly, if plaintiff personally uses the partnership name, see, e.g., Estate of
Spingarn, 5 Misc. 36, 38-39, 159 N.Y.S.2d 532, 534-35 (1956), or advertises that the
business is being continued with only a name change, see, e.g., Miller v. Hall, 65
Cal. App. 2d 200, 202, 150 P.2d 287, 288 (1944), he may be accountable to the de-
fendant for such use. Although arriving at a satisfactory definition of goodwill
is difficult, see supra note 44, the principle that goodwill is a partnership asset
for which each partner is accountable is clear.
Compare with Page the recent decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court
in Cude v. Couche, 588 S.W.2d 554, 555-56 (Tenn. 1979). In that case, a sharply
divided court found that the dissolution of a partnership was not in breach of
any fiduciary duty even though the dissolving partner owned the building in
which the business was based, announced that it would not be leased to any-
one desiring to continue the business, purchased the assets of the business
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cept-the "new prosperity of the partnership"--an appropria-
tion of which would be wrongful. Whether "new prosperity" is
analogous to goodwill, specific partnership opportunities, or
some other traditional concept is not clear, and the phrase is
not to be found in either the U.P.A. or common law partnership
decisions.
The truly extraordinary aspect of the Page dictum, how-
ever, is not its use of the term "new prosperity" but rather its
treatment of the concept "wrongful," a term of art under the
U.P.A. A literal reading of the U.P.A. may support a conclusion
that a "wrongful" dissolution can be accomplished only by the
express will of a partner pursuant to section 31(2) prior to the
expiration of the partnership term or undertaking.9' A more
sensible interpretation, however, would also permit the imposi-
tion of section 38 sanctions on a partner who has not expressly
dissolved the partnership but whose misconduct has neverthe-
less resulted in the granting of an equitable decree of dissolu-
tion to another partner under section 32.92 The Page dictum
carries this one very significant step further, for it raises the
possibility that dissolution of a partnership by the express will
of a partner pursuant to section 31(1) may be wrongful even
though the partnership is not one for a definite term or under-
taking93 and therefore might ordinarily be considered termina-
ble at will. 94
The test for the wrongfulness of a dissolution offered in
Page is whether the dissolving partner acted in good faith. Al-
though this suggests that the inquiry becomes one of intent at
the time of dissolution, the Page dictum indicates that the reso-
lution of this issue will turn on the question of whether the
"new prosperity" was actually appropriated, a determination
which cannot be made at the time of dissolution. Presumably,
through an undisclosed agent, and continued the business. A strong dissent in-
dicated that the dissolving partner "appropriated to his own use and benefit the
goodwill of a going business, for which the most elementary principles of eq-
uity and fair play demand that he pay just and reasonable compensation." 588
S.W.2d at 557.
91. See supra note 49.
92. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 39, § 75 at 430. See also supra note 49.
93. The California Supreme Court in Page held that the partnership was
terminable at wilL 55 Cal. 2d at 196, 359 P.2d at 43-44, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 645-46.
94. One commentator who has advocated a broad view of "wrongful," see
supra note 49, has also observed that "[w]hen the right [to dissolve the part-
nership] exists, it would seem that there is no liability for its exercise,
whatever the motive and whatever the injurious consequences to co-partners
who have neglected to protect themselves by an agreement to continue for a
definite term." A. BROMBERG, supra note 39, § 74 at 422.
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such an "appropriation" may be found upon a subsequent judi-
cial determination that the settlement of the weaker partner's
account was, in retrospect, unfair.9 5 Having established at
some point after the fact that the dissolution was "wrongful,"
the defendant in Page would then be able to recover the value
of the partnership assets "appropriated" by the plaintiff and ac-
tivate the "wrongful" dissolution sanctions provided by section
38(2) of the U.P.A. He could, for example, assert the right to
continue the business and possess the partnership assets.9 6
Additional capital needed for this new operation would be gen-
erated from a revised settlement of the partnership accounts,
for plaintiff, as the partner causing the wrongful dissolution,
would be deprived of his right to share in the goodwill of the
partnership, all of which would now accrue to the defendant.
To complete this rather dramatic turn of events, the defendant
could then recover from plaintiff any damages which he in-
curred as a result of the wrongful dissolution of the
partnership.
It is unclear whether the use of the term "wrongful" in the
95. The dissolution will probably result in either a liquidation of assets or
a negotiated settlement of accounts. It is widely recognized that a liquidation
of assets is an ineffective means of recognizing the full going concern value of a
business. See infra note 147. It is likely to be even less effective if the plaintiff
in Page is the only bidder. In a negotiated settlement, the unsatisfactory na-
ture of the liquidation alternative gives bargaining leverage to the plaintiff. The
question then becomes whether the mere existence of what the court perceives
to be a deficiency in the amount realized by defendant as a result of either a
liquidation or negotiated settlement, when combined with the operation of a
similar business by the plaintiff after the dissolution, will establish the exist-
ence of an "appropriation" by the plaintiff and thereby render the dissolution
"wrongful." If so, then the plaintiff in Page could only proceed at his peril. The
problem is compounded enormously by the difficulty of arriving at a satisfac-
tory definition and valuation of goodwill and identifying the goodwill attributa-
ble to the partners individually and therefore not part of the goodwill of the
partnership. A number of cases have distinguished goodwill which may be at-
tributable to the skill or reputation of a particular partner and have not treated
it as a partnership asset. See, e.g., Lyon v. Lyon, 246 Cal. App. 2d 519, 524, 54
Cal. Rptr. 829, 831-32 (1966); Cook v. Lauten, 1 Ill. App. 2d 255, 260-61, 117 N.E.2d
414, 416 (1954); Siddall v. Keating, 8 A.D.2d 44, 47, 185 N.Y.S.2d 630, 632-33 (1959).
But see Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., 91 Cal. App. 3d 477, 488, 154 Cal.
Rptr. 170, 177 (1979) (addressing a similar issue in the context of a close corpo-
ration and concluding that the clientele of a shareholder-salesman was a corpo-
rate and not a personal asset).
96. Given the dependence of the defendant in Page on the plaintiff, this
may not appear to be a significant threat to the plaintiff unless it is realized
that the business may be continued by the defendant in a new venture with a
third party. See U.P.A. § 38(2) (b), which provides, in part, that "[t]he partners
who have not caused the dissolution wrongfully, if they all desire to continue
the business in the same name, either by themselves orjointly with others, may
do so. . . ." (Emphasis added).
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Page dictum was loose or deliberate: if loose, then the court
was doing nothing more than reminding plaintiff that, as a
fiduciary, he was accountable for partnership assets; if deliber-
ate, the result contemplated is harsh and conducive to litigation
requiring retroactive analyses of motives behind dissolutions.97
The approach suggested in Page is best described as anoma-
lous, for it creates the possibility of the terminable at will part-
nership which cannot be dissolved with any degree of certainty
concerning the consequences of that dissolution.9 8 After Page,
any partner dissolving such a partnership runs the risk that if
he or she continues in the same line of business the dissolution
will later be found to have involved a wrongful appropriation of
some element of the "new prosperity" of the business. The
consequences of such a determination could be, as outlined
above, severe and unnecessary in light of the requirement that
each partner is accountable to the partnership for use or con-
version of partnership assets. 99 Page, therefore, may serve to
stabilize partnership relationships by rendering the conse-
quences of dissolutions uncertain.
97. It has been suggested that Page may be an invitation to blackmail. See
D. FESSLER, supra note 13, at 156. Additional evidence that the Page dictum is
without support in the U.P.A is demonstrated by a lack of certainty concerning
the term of the partnership which could then be formed by the defendant part-
ner in order to continue the business. U.P.A. § 38(2) (b) provides that the right
to continue a wrongfully dissolved partnership continues for the "agreed term"
of the former partnership. In light of the fact that it held the partnership was
not for a term or undertaking, how would the Page court define the term of the
new partnership? An infinite term would seem inconsistent with the express
provision of § 38(2) (b). No term would mean that the business could not be
continued by defendant partner and, therefore, plaintiff partner would not be
deprived of his interest in the goodwill. This latter alternative would leave
plaintiff liable to defendant partner for damages resulting from the wrongful
dissolution, a liability which the Page court could find includes defendant part-
ner's share of the new prosperity of the business. The fairness of such a result
is debatable, particularly in light of the fact that the partnership was one termi-
nable at will, but the tortuous analysis required to reach it indicates the extent
to which the Page court's reading of the U.P.A. is unsound. But see A. BROM-
BERG, supra note 39, § 75 at 429-30: "If literally read, the Act might permit the
innocent partners to continue the business only for the 'agreed term' of the
partnership. The more reasonable interpretation, giving effect to all parts of
the statute, is that the innocent partners may continue the business either in-
definitely (by paying the dissolver for his interest) or, at their option, for the
agreed term (by properly securing him)." Unfortunately, there is no specifica-
tion by this commentator of the other parts of the statute which undermine the
result reached when the U.P . is "literally read," at least with respect to a
partnership which is conceded to be'terninable at will.
98. The admonition in Page is largely limited to situations in which the
same or a related business is continued by the dissolving partner.
99. See supra note 90. One of the unfortunate aspects of the Page dictum




There is no evidence in the reported decisions that the dic-
tum in Page has been applied to a partnership terminable at
will. For example, in Nicholes v. Hunt, 100 a 1975 decision of the
Oregon Supreme Court, two partners were engaged in the busi-
ness of manufacturing and selling lead shot for shotgun shells.
As in Page, the success of the business rested largely on the ef-
forts of one of the partners, in this case, the defendant. The
partnership business was a successor to the defendant's earlier
sole proprietorship, and although the two participants were to
be equal partners, there was apparently an understanding that
the defendant would make all major decisions.1O' Eventually,
the defendant dissolved the partnership and continued to oper-
ate the business, arguing that plaintiff had failed to devote his
full time to the business and had refused to follow defendant's
instructions.102
A Page-type analysis would have required a rigorous re-
view of whether an implied agreement not to "wrongfully" ex-
clude plaintiff from the business existed, whether the
defendant acted in good faith, and whether the plaintiff was ad-
equately compensated for his interest. The court, however, re-
jected the argument, based on Page, that the dissolution was
wrongful: "Assuming that there was such a duty of good faith
in this case, the evidence proves that defendant acted in good
faith and did not act in contravention of the oral partnership at
will."103 Thus, the defendant not only was able to dissolve this
highly profitable partnership, but as a result of one of the more
questionable aspects of the decision was also permitted to
avoid liquidation and continue the business by paying the
plaintiff the value of his interest.104 Nicholes, as an opinion
100. 273 Or. 255, 541 P.2d 820 (1975).
101. Id. at 263, 541 P.2d at 824.
102. Defendant presumably based his assumption that plaintiff had waived
his § 18(e) "equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership
business" upon the understanding that major decisions would be made by the
defendant. After the dissolution, the defendant continued to maintain proper
records of all transactions, assets, and profits. Id. at 261, 541 P.2d at 823.
103. Id. at 263-64, 541 P.2d at 824 (emphasis added).
104. The Nicholes court's rejection of the defendant's request that the as-
sets of the partnership be liquidated was incorrect. A partner's right to compel
.a liquidation of assets, except in limited circumstances, is clear. U.PY.A § 38(1)
permits any partner to require the application of partnership property to dis-
charge the partnership debts, with "the surplus applied to pay in cash the net
amount owing to the respective partners." See Lewis, supra note 17, at 629.
The rule has been questioned by one commentator, who suggested that the
likely loss of value as a result of the liquidation is just enough "to require every
partnership to look to the ways of denying or restricting the liquidation right."
Bromberg, supra note 29, at 648. These might include an agreement as to the
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which tolerates and perhaps encourages the elimination of
weaker partners, avoids the stabilizing tendency of Page.
Although slight differences in their facts may provide some
basis for distinction, 105 the Page dictum and the analysis in
Nicholes are fundamentally irreconcilable. The Nicholes treat-
ment of the wrongful dissolution issue would appear to be the
sounder of the two approaches. If a partnership is terminable
at will, it is at best a continuously temporary arrangement be-
cause of the intention of the parties. The assumption that
there exists an implied agreement that a partner will not dis-
solve the partnership and continue in business alone normally
is not warranted in the case of a partnership formed without a
definite term or for a particular undertaking.106 Although the
Page dictum would attempt to minimize the inequities present
when a stronger partner "keeps" the weaker partner for only
such period of time as the partnership is incurring losses, it un-
dermines the very sensible approach of the U.P.A. that partner-
ships are dissolvable without sanctions absent an agreement
which makes such a dissolution premature. The flexible ap-
proach evidenced by the U.P.A. carries with it a responsibility,
and parties desiring to establish a partnership term or under-
taking, in turn, have the obligation to reach a clear understand-
ing on this point. The weaker partner in Page could have
bargained for a definite term, but he did not. Fairness under
such circumstances does not require the stronger partner to
continue to carry the weaker partner indefinitely.
C. AN EVALUATION OF THE PLIGHT OF THE DISSATISFIED
PARTNER UNDER THE U.P.A.
The above discussion demonstrates that not all partner-
ships are, in a practical sense, freely dissolvable. The power
accorded by the U.P.A. to each partner to dissolve a partner-
term, a continuation agreement, or an expulsion clause. See supra note 41. The
Nicholes court is not the only court to use equitable powers to restrict the liq-
uidation right. See, e.g., Rinke v. Rinke, 330 Mich. 615, 628, 48 N.W.2d 201, 207
(1951); Greg v. Bernards, 250 Or. 258, 258-59, 443 P.2d 166, 167 (1968). Such a re-
sult seems inappropriate in light of the clear language of § 38(1) and the corre-
sponding freedom given to the parties to vary by agreement the applicability of
this section of the U.P.A
105. For example, the Nicholes partnership was not subject to a sustained
period of financial losses and represented the continuation of a business previ-
ously operated by the defendant, the stronger partner. 273 Or. at 259-60, 541
P.2d at 822.
106. This is subject to the requirements that a liquidation of partnership as-
sets must normally follow a dissolution and that a partner must account for
partnership goodwill. See supra note 90.
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ship will enable a dissatisfied partner to terminate the relation-
ship among the participants, but the fate of the business itself
and the economic consequences of the act of dissolution must
be viewed as matters separate from the simple power to dis-
solve the partnership.
The characterization of a dissolution as "wrongful" is obvi-
ously a critical determination, and the dissatisfied partner must
address the important question of whether a dissolution would
be premature because of the existence of an agreement con-
cerning partnership duration. Faced with such an agreement,
the partner who wishes to dissolve the relationship prema-
turely must either obtain an equitable decree of dissolution on
one of the limited grounds set forth in section 32 of the U.P.A.
or suffer the consequences of wrongfully dissolving the partner-
ship. The threat of these consequences, including damages, re-
duced account valuation to reflect loss of goodwill, and a
continuation of the business and possession of the property for
this purpose by the remaining partners, may act as significant
disincentives to dissolution which tend to stabilize the
partnership.
The absence of an express agreement establishing a dura-
tion for the venture should not lull the dissatisfied partner into
a false sense of security, and the possibility that a term or un-
dertaking will be implied must be considered by anyone who
wishes to dissolve a partnership. This may indeed be a lonely
task, since the extent to which legal counsel can assist in
resolving a factual question of this nature is limited. The will-
ingness of some courts to imply duration agreements not only
increases the number of dissolutions which will be treated as
wrongful but also introduces an additional element of uncer-
tainty into the dissolution process.'o 7 Both of these results
may be expected to have a further stabilizing effect on the
partnership.
107. The dissatisfied partner may, in this situation, seek a declaratory judg-
ment that the partnership is not one for a definite term or particular undertak-
ing. See, e.g., Page v. Page, 55 Cal. 2d 192, 193, 359 P.2d 41, 42 (1961); Adams v.
Jarvis, 23 Wis. 2d 452, 453, 127 N.W.2d 400, 401 (1964). In addition to the time
and expense involved in seeking such a determination, this alternative may be
questionable from a strategic point of view, since the process of raising the
question may increase the likelihood of an adverse determination.' It is inter-
esting in this connection to note the position of the dissatisfied stronger partner
in Page. An abundance of caution convinced this individual to seek a declara-
tory judgment that the partnership was not for an implied term. Although he
was successful on appeal in this endeavor, the dictum in the opinion must have
increased his anxiety level. See supra text accompanying notes 87-99.
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Further, if the dissolving partner is going to continue in the
same or a similar line of business, the admonition in Page con-
cerning an implied agreement not to wrongfully exclude a fel-
low partner cannot be ignored. Although the Page dictum has
not been widely embraced, neither has it been rejected, and the
unsettled question of the extent to which the decision to dis-
solve a terminable at will relationship is subject to a "good
faith" requirement may be yet another disincentive to
dissolution.
Finally, even if there is certainty that the dissolution is not
wrongful, the likely economic consequences of a liquidation of
partnership assets may significantly discourage the dissatisfied
partner.108 The potential loss of some or all of the going con-
cern value of a business as a result of a liquidation of its assets
may convince the dissatisfied partner that the supposed escape
mechanism provided by the U.P.A. is unsatisfactory.109 Such a
perception may, in turn, make it less likely that the partnership
will be dissolved. The partnership relationship, in short, may
be stabilized.
I. PERMANENCE AND THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG
SHAREHOLDERS
Just as the partnership is, on the surface, a fragile and tem-
porary relationship, the corporation is, on the surface, a strong
and permanent form of business organization." 0 As was ob-
108. See infra note 147. The authorities cited therein pertain primarily to
the liquidation of the assets of a corporation as part of its dissolution, but the
principles have equal applicability to the liquidation of partnership assets.
Some courts have incorrectly concluded that the liquidation right is subject to
general equitable considerations. See supra note 104.
109. The threat that a significant part of the value of the business will not
be realized upon a liquidation of assets may be of concern to all of the partners.
In some situations, such a threat may be used by the dissatisfied partner as a
means of arriving at a settlement of his or her account not involving a liquida-
tion of the venture's assets. The other partners, however, may not consider the
prospect of liquidation a threat. For example, they may view themselves as the
likely purchasers at a liquidation sale, which would accord them the opportu-
nity to, in effect, acquire the interest of the dissatisfied partner at a bargain
price. The business may be one particularly dependent upon the skills of the
remaining partners and they may believe that the sale of the partnership assets
would not preclude them from the continued exercise of their skills. Thus, to
the extent that the dissatisfied partner is not able to utilize the threat of liqui-
dation, and the threat thereby becomes one to the dissatisfied partner, who
may feel that the dissolution mechanism provided by the U.P.A. is less than
satisfactory.
110. Continuity of life is frequently viewed as one of the advantages of the
corporate form of organization. See, e.g., H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF
CORPORAOTONS AND OTHER Busx-Ess ENTEramusEs 97 (1970); N. LATrm, THE LAw
1982]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
served in Part I of this Article, however, the common view of
the partnership as an easily terminable relationship is overly
simplistic, and a corresponding generalization that a corpora-
tion is "permanent" suffers from a similar limitation. Corpo-
rate permanence in any absolute sense is a myth. A
corporation cannot survive sustained economic losses, and the
death or withdrawal of a key shareholder or even an important
employee from a close corporation will frequently mark the ter-
mination of the entity as a viable economic enterprise.1 In its
reliance on the identity and performance of its owner-manag-
ers, the close corporation in this sense may bear greater resem-
blance to the partnership than to the publicly held
corporation." 2
Corporation codes tolerate but do not mandate the perma-
nence of corporations. All jurisdictions have statutory provi-
sions establishing procedures and grounds for dissolving a
corporation," 3 and voluntary dissolution1 4 of even a prosper-
ous business may generally be accomplished after the vote of a
requisite percentage of shares." 5 A close corporation, there-
OF CORPORATIONS 13-16 (1971); C. ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BusINEss ENTERPRISES § 2.34 (5th ed. 1975). For a discussion of some of
the advantages of permanence, see infra text accompanying notes 236-41.
111. Cf. A. BROMBERG, supra note 39, § 23B at 131 ("It is quite true that the
legalform of a corporation continues unchanged by events like deaths or trans-
fers of stock. But these events may be just as destructive of the business of a
corporation as of a partnership.") (emphasis in original).
112. This statement must be qualified because of the vagueness of the con-
cept "close corporation." See infra text accompanying notes 209-16.
113. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 9.28. On the subject of corporate dissolu-
tions generally, see N. LATTIN, supra note 110, §§ 175-186; F. O'NEA, supra note
2, §§ 9.28-9.31; J. TINGLE, THE STOCKHOLDER'S REMEDY OF CORPORATE DISSOLU-
TION (1959).
114. When applied to corporations, the meaning of "dissolution" may vary
in different jurisdictions. The following discussion is illustrative:
Under the New York and Delaware corporation codes, "dissolution" is
the event which starts termination on its way; a certificate of dissolu-
tion is filed promptly after the shareholders' decision to dissolve. After
dissolution comes liquidation, which may take years.
In contrast, the Model Act treats "dissolution" as the culmination
of the long process, which begins with a resolution of "intent to dis-
solve," or a judicial order to liquidate....
A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 234-35 (1976).
In this Article, "corporate dissolution" is used in its broad sense to include
both a termination of corporate existence and a liquidation of corporate assets.
The distinction between corporate and partnership dissolution should also be
recognized. In the latter situation, dissolution refers to a change in the rela-
tionship among the partners and might not be followed by a liquidation if, for
example, the act of dissolution was wrongful.
115. Votes commonly required for dissolution are fifty percent, see, e.g.,
CAL. CORP. CODE § 1900 (West 1977), a majority, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 275 (1975); MODEL BusNEss CORP. ACT § 84 (1980), and two-thirds, see, e.g.,
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fore, has permanence only as long as the required number of
shareholders desire to maintain the enterprise. 1 6 Since the
type of participant with which this analysis is concerned is not
a member of the controlling coalition of the corporation, how-
ever, the voluntary dissolution statutes" 7 do little more for this
individual than highlight the disparity which exists between
controlling and minority positions in close corporations." 8 The
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1001 (McKinney 1963). In addition, it is not unusual for
a state officer or creditors to have statutory authorization to seek dissolution or
liquidation. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 94, 97(b) (1980).
116. There is an indication from some courts that the power to cause a dis-
solution is not absolute but must be exercised in good faith. See, e.g., In re Se-
curity Finance Co., 49 Cal. 2d 370, 377, 317 P.2d 1, 5 (1957) ('There is nothing
sacred in the life of a corporation that transcends the interests of its sharehold-
ers, but because dissolution falls with such finality on those interests, above all
corporate powers it is subject to equitable limitations." See also Lebold v. In-
land Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), modified, 136 F.2d 876 (1943), cert.
denied 316 U.S. 675 (1942); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185,
123 N.E. 148 (1919). Compare with this line of cases the Page decision, discus-
sed supra in text accompanying notes 80-99, suggesting that the right to termi-
nate a terminable at will partnership is subject to good faith limitations, a
breach of which would not prevent the dissolution but would result in the im-
position of the U.P.A's sanctions for a wrongful dissolution.
117. Related to and often followed by voluntary dissolution is the sale of all
or a substantial portion of the assets of the corporation. See generally F.
O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 4.08. Although at common law this typically required
the unanimous consent of the shareholders, virtually every state now permits
such an action upon the approval of a specified percentage of the shares out-
standing. The trend has been to reduce the percentage required. Id. For ex-
ample, the Model Act has reduced the percentage from two-thirds, MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 72 (1953), to a majority, MODEL BusInEss CORP. ACT
§ 79(c) (1980).
118. Further, the essentially unmarketable character of minority interests
in close corporations does nothing to improve the position of the dissatisfied
minority shareholder. Consider the following comment: "In a small business
[the free transferability of interests] may be more theoretical than real. For
example, what if a small stockholder in a closely held company wants to con-
vert his investment to cash? Who is there to buy it?" W. CARY & M. EISENBERG,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 22 (1980). See also F. O'NEAL, supra
note 2, § 2.15. Some courts have treated this as a prominent factor in according
separate judicial treatment to close corporations. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32
Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964), appeal dismissed, flL. App. 2d 397, 217 N.E.2d 111
(1966), modified, Ill. App. 3d 811, 316 N.E.2d 114 (1974) (recognizing the validity
of a shareholders' agreement); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578,
328 N.E.2d 505 (1975) (applying partnership fiduciary principles to the close cor-
poration). The problem is compounded by the common practice of restricting
the transferability of shares in a close corporation. See generally F. O'NEAL, 2
CLOSE CORORATIoNs: LAw AND PRACTICE §§ 7.02-7.29 (2d ed. 1971); Andre, Re-
strictions on the Transfer of Shares: A Search for a Public Policy, 53 Tui. L.
REv. 776 (1979); Gregory, Stock Transfer Restrictions in Close Corporations,
1978 S. IL.T U.L.J. 477.
Free transferability, if truly available, would assist minority shareholders
in three ways. First, if the controlling shareholders wish to avoid the involve-
ment of a new participant in the business, either because they value the contin-
ued participation of the dissatisfied minority shareholder or because they are
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position of the minority shareholder therefore differs signifi-
cantly from that of a partner, who always has the power under
the U.P.A. to dissolve his or her relationship with coven-
turers.1 9 Nevertheless, there are limited circumstances in
which a minority shareholder can force the involuntary dissolu-
tion of a close corporation. Two of these may have relevance to
the present inquiry.
A. ABILIY OF A DISSATISFIED MINORrY SHAREHOLDER TO
OBTAIN RELIEF BASED UPON THE MISCONDUCT OF
THOSE IN CONTROL
Historically, a minority shareholder has been without the
power to compel a dissolution of either the corporate entity or
the relationship among shareholders, and early decisions dis-
played a reluctance to offer relief even in the face of abusive
conduct by those in control of the corporation.120 Courts of eq-
uity, however, eventually began to provide relief in the form of
a corporate dissolution upon any one of several grounds,121 in-
cluding abandonment of corporate functions, 122 failure to
achieve corporate objectives, 23 deadlock and dissension among
directors or shareholders preventing the successful conduct of
uneasy over the identity of the new shareholder, they have an incentive to re-
move the source of dissatisfaction for the minority shareholder. In this case,
the possibility of free transferability becomes negotiating leverage for the dis-
satisfied shareholder, the existence of which may promote the reaching of con-
sensus. Second, the liquidity of the investment may provide the participant
with a sense of security that he or she will not be subject to oppression or a
squeeze-out by those in control. Liquidity, in short, minimizes the possibility
of exploitation. Cf. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 26, at 5 ('"The exploita-
tive power of the majority arises from the exercise of the traditional managerial
prerogatives in a situation in which the minority suffers from a complete and
near permanent loss of liquidity."). Finally, if the interest is freely transferable
for fair value, the minority shareholder has been provided with an escape
mechanism should his or her level of dissatisfaction become intolerably high.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32.
120. "Until fifty years ago, the uniformly accepted principle was that, in the
absence of statute, a court has no power to decree the winding-up of a corpora-
tion at the suit of a minority stockholder." Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate
Abuse-Judicial Power to Wind Up a Corporation at the Suit of a Minority
Stockholder, 40 CoLuM. L. REv. 220, 220 (1940). See also J. TINGLE, supra note
113, at 25-32.
121. See generally Hornstein, supra note 120, at 230-38. See also Comment,
Oppression as a Statutory Ground for Corporate Dissolution, 1965 DuKE LJ.
128.
122. See, e.g., Briggs v. Traders' Co., 145 F. 254 (C.C.N.D. W. Va. 1906);
Cairns v. Bethea, 211 Ala. 635, 101 So. 587 (1924); Lind v. Johnson, 183 Minn. 239,
236 N.W. 317 (1931).
123. See, e.g., Jones v. Henderson, 210 Ala. 614, 98 So. 878 (1924); Edison v.
Fleckenstein Pump Co., 249 Mich. 234, 228 N.W. 705 (1930).
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the corporate business,124 and, most significant for purposes of
the present analysis, illegal, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct
on the part of those in control of the corporation.125
Oppression as a basis for relief is noteworthy for it permits
a penetration of the traditional myth that only a harm to the
corporate entity need be recompensed and therefore recognizes
that minority shareholders can also be the victims of abusive
conduct. The theory that wrongful conduct by those in control
may serve as a basis for the involuntary dissolution of a corpo-
ration has received widespread legislative acceptance. 126 Par-
ticularly important in this regard have been the provisions of
124. See, e.g., Bowen v. Bowen-Romer Flour Mills Corp., 114 Kan. 95, 217 P.
301 (1923); In re Diamond Fuel Co., 13 Ch. D. 400 (Ch. App. 1879). See also
Hornstein, supra note 120, at 231 ("Deadlock, which appears by the decided
cases to have occurred only in corporations having few stockholders, implies
dissension due to equal division, and therefore does not involve problems of
protection for the minority. It is significant, however, as a field of intracorpo-
rate conflict in which the courts have realized they must intervene.").
125. See, e.g., Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 64
F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 675 (1933); Henry v. Ide, 208 Ala.
33, 93 So. 860 (1922); Holden v. Lashley-Cox Land Co., 316 Mich. 478, 25 N.W.2d
590 (1947); Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892); Green v.
National Advertising & Amusement Co., 137 Minn. 65, 162 N.W. 1056 (1917);
Bflby v. Morton, 119 Okla. 15, 247 Pac. 384 (1926); Goodwin v. von Cotzhausen,
171 Wis. 351, 177 N.W. 618 (1920). See generally Hornstein, supra note 120, at
231-34; Comment, supra note 121, at 129-35.
126. There is a conflict on the extent to which involuntary dissolution stat-
utes preempt general equitable powers and discretion. A few courts have held
that a court has no discretion concerning whether to order dissolution upon es-
tablishment of a statutory ground for dissolution. See, e.g., Gidwitz v. Lanzit
Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960); Polikoff v. Dole & Clark
Bldg. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962); Strong v. Fromrn Lab., Inc.,
273 Wis. 159, 77 N.W.2d 389 (1956) (while suggesting that the remedy was auto-
matic the appellate court remanded to the trial court to devise a buy-out plan, a
nonstatutory remedy). The Model Act is phrased permissively, granting to the
court "full power to liquidate the assets and business of a corporation" upon
the showing of a ground for dissolution. MODEL BusINEss CoRP. AcT. § 97
(1980). A number of courts have indicated that dissolution is a remedy within
the discretion of the courts even if a statutory ground for dissolution has been
established. See, e.g., Stumpf v. Stumpf & Sons, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 235,
120 Cal. Rptr. 671, 674 (1975) ("involuntary dissolution is not an automatic rem-
edy but, rather, a matter for the court's discretion"); Kirtz v. Grossman, 463
S.W.2d 541, 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (judicial liquidation is "permissive" even af-
ter a finding of oppression); Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co., 219 Or. 560, 572, 348
P.2d 9, 21 (1959) ("[T]he plaintiff has not only the burden of proof to establish
jurisdictional facts ... but the further burden of proving equitable grounds for
dissolution."). Some statutes make this explicit. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw
§ 1104-a (McKinney Supp. 1981). See also Hornstein, supra note 120, at 245.
Further, courts not infrequently view the fashioning of a remedy other than
dissolution as within their discretion. One of the more explicit outlines of alter-
native remedies is found in Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or.




the Model Business Corporation Act (the "Model Act"), which
include as grounds for dissolution "illegal, oppressive or fraud-
ulent" acts by those in control of the corporation.127 A substan-
tial number of jurisdictions have now incorporated the
127. The grounds for involuntary dissolutibn in the Model Act are as
follows:
The... courts shall have a full power to liquidate the assets and busi-
ness of a corporation:
(a) In an action by a shareholder when it is established:
(1) That the directors are deadlocked in the management of the cor-
porate affairs and the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock,
and that irreparable injury to the corporation is being suffered or is
threatened by reason thereof; or
(2) That the acts of the directors or those in control of the corporation
are illegal, oppressive or fraudulent; or
(3) That the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power, and have
failed, for a period which includes at least two consecutive annual
meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose terms have ex-
pired or would have expired upon the election of their successors; or
(4) That the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 97(a) (1)-(4) (1980).
Oppression as a statutory ground for involuntary dissolution first appeared
in Illinois in 1933. See Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 Ill. 2d 566, 572,
141 N.E.2d 45, 49 (1957). Deadlock as a ground for dissolution is beyond the
scope of this Article, although it should be noted that at least one court has
raised the issue of the relationship between deadlock and oppression. See Gid-
witz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960). See also
Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence-Problems of Deadlock and
Dissolution, 19 U. Cm. L. REV. 778 (1952); Comment, Deadlock and Dissolution
in the Close Corporation Has the Sacred Cow Been Butchered?, 58 NEB. L REV.
791 (1979). In a few jurisdictions, dissension is a ground for dissolution, al-
though it is sometimes related to deadlock. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 1800(b) (3) (West 1977) ("There is internal dissension and two or more fac-
tions of shareholders in the corporation are so deadlocked that its business can
no longer be conducted with advantage to its -shareholders . . . 2"); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw § 1104(a) (3) (McKinney 1963) (restricted to suit by holders of one-
half of all outstanding shares). But cf Asuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-215(1) (c)
(1977) (investors in a close corporation are "so divided respecting the manage-
ment of the business" that irreparable injury is threatened or the business can-
not be conducted to the advantage of the investors generally); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 32, § 1214(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981) (internal dissension in a close corpo-
ration such that "the business and affairs can no longer be conducted in the
best interests of the shareholders"); MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 4-602(a)
(1975) (internal dissension among stockholders in a close corporation such that
the business cannot be conducted to the advantage of the stockholders gener-
ally); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1008(1) (iv) (1979) (internal dissension and two or
more factions of shareholders are "so divided that dissolution would be benefi-
cial to the shareholders"). Dissension has not developed as a significant
ground for dissolution and will not be treated in this Article, although it may be
of some assistance to the dissatisfied shareholder, particularly if relief will be
granted for dissension in the absence of deadlock. See generally Comment,
supra note 121, at 132 n.22; Comment, Dissolution at Suit of a Minority Stock-
holder, 41 MICH. L. REV. 714, 720 (1943).
A consideration of misapplication or waste of corporate assets as a ground
for dissolution is beyond the scope of this Article. In certain circumstances,
this ground may be a basis for relief for the dissatisfied shareholder.
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"dissolution for oppression" provision of the Model Act verba-
tim or with only minor variations,128 and several others permit
dissolution upon the related grounds of abuse or unfairness to
shareholders.129 The principle that a minority shareholder
should be entitled to relief upon a showing of serious miscon-
duct by those in control finds further support in the Proposed
Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act (the "Proposed Model Act Supple-
ment"),'30 which would authorize several types of relief other
than dissolution upon a showing that those in control of the
corporation have acted in a manner which is "illegal, oppres-
sive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner."' 3 '
The flexible approach to remedies evidenced in the Proposed
Model Act Supplement, including a buy out of the minority
128. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §10-2A-195(a)(1)(b) (1980); ALAsKA STAT.
§ 10.05.540(2) (1968); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-908(a) (2) (1980); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 7-8-113(2) (a) (Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-97(a) (2) (1980) (also requires a
showing of irreparable injury); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 § 157.86(a) (3) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.94(1)(c) (West Supp. 1981); MD.
CoRPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §3-413(b)(2) (1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 21A50.1825(1) (1973) ("willfully unfair and oppressive"); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 79-3-193(a) (2) (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.485.1(1) (b) (Vernon 1966); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 35-1-921(1)(a)(ii) (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2096(1)(b) (1977);
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A12-7(1) (c) (West Supp. 1981) (for corporations with 25 or
less shareholders if the directors or those in control have "acted fraudulently or
illegally, mismanaged the corporation, or abused their authority as officers or
directors or have acted oppressively or unfairly"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-16-
16(A) (1) (b) (1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1104-a(a) (1) (McKinney Supp. 1981)
(applies to holders of 20 percent or more of the shares of a close corporation);
ND. CENT. CODE §10-21-16(1)(b) (1976); Op. REV. STAT. § 57.595(1) (a) (B)
(1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2107(A) (2) (Purdon 1967); RIL GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-
90(a)(2) (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-150(a)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982)
("oppressive or unfairly prejudicial" actions); S.D. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 47-7-
34(2) (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-92(a) (2) (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11
§ 2067(a) (1) (B) (1973); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.28.170(1) (b) (1969); W. VA.
CODE § 31-1-41(a) (2) (1982); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-614(a) (i) (B) (1977).
129. See infra note 134. In addition, Connecticut provides as one ground for
dissolution "any good and sufficient reason," CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-
382(b) (1) (v) (West Supp. 1981), although this has been interpreted restric-
tively. Compare Bator v. United Sausage Co., 138 Conn. 18, 22, 81 A.2d 442, 444
(1951) (dissension not sufficient to justify relief unless it renders it impossible
to conduct corporate affairs) with Krall v. Krall, 141 Conn. 325, 335, 106 A.2d 165,
169 (1954) (granting relief where deadlock had existed for more than a decade).
130. The Proposed Model Act Supplement is contained in Report of the
Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law, American Bar Association, reprinted in 37 Bus. LAw. 269 (1981).
131. Section 16(a) of the Proposed Model Act Supplement provides:
(a) Any shareholder of record, the beneficial owner of shares
held by a nominee, or the holder of voting trust certificates of a statu-
tory close corporation may file a petition in the [ ] court for relief on
the grounds that:
(1) The directors or those in control of the corporation have or
will have acted in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or
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shareholder's interest at "fair value,"132 is consistent with that
unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner, whether in his capacity as a
shareholder, director, officer, or employee of the corporation; or
(2) The directors or those in control of the corporation are so di-
vided respecting the management of the corporation's affairs that the
votes required for action cannot be obtained and the shareholders are
unable to break the deadlock, with the consequence either that the cor-
poration is suffering or will suffer irreparable injury or that the busi-
ness and affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted to the
advantage of the shareholders generally, or
(3) Conditions exist that would be grounds for involuntary disso-
lution of the corporation.
Proposed Model Act Supplement, supra note 130, § 16(a). The relief available
under § 16 includes: cancelling, altering or enjoining an act of the corporation;
directing or prohibiting an act of the corporation, officers, directors, sharehold-
ers, or other parties to the action; cancelling or altering a provision of the arti-
cles or bylaws; removing or designating an officer or director; ordering an
accounting; appointing a custodian or provisional director; or ordering the pay-
ment of dividends. In the event that none of the above forms of relief is appro-
priate, § 16(b) (9) authorizes the court to order a dissolution unless the
"6corporation or one or more of the remaining shareholders has purchased all of
the shares of another shareholder at their fair value by a designated date."
Failing all of the above, the court may order a dissolution if any of the tradi-
tional Model Act grounds have been proven. See supra note 127. Section
16(a) (1) also authorizes the award of "damages to any aggrieved party in addi-
tion to or in lieu of any other relief granted."
132. Dissolution will result if the buy-out is not effected by the corporation
or one or more of the remaining shareholders. Proposed Model Act Supple-
ment, supra note 130, § 16(b) (9). Valuation is determined by the court
considering the going concern value of the corporation, any agreement
among some or all of the shareholders fixing a price or specifying a
formula for determining the value of the corporation's shares for any
purpose, the recommendations of any appraisers appointed by the
court, any legal constraints on the ability of the corporation to acquire
the shares to be purchased, and other relevant evidence.
Proposed Model Act Supplement, supra note 130, § 16(d) (1). The valuation
based upon going concern value is noteworthy, for it may result in a figure
higher than that which the dissatisfied shareholder would receive if the assets
are liquidated. Compare with this approach that taken by the California stat-
ute, which also would permit the avoidance of dissolution through a buy-out
but bases the valuation on "the liquidation value but taking into account the
possibility, if any, of sale of the entire business as a going concern in a liquida-
tion." CAT. CORP. CODE § 2000(a) (West 1977). See generally 2 H. MARsH,
MARsH's CALwoIRIA CoaRoRATioN LAw § 20.22 (1981).
California would appear to be unique in its emphasis on liquidation value.
A number of other states have adopted statutory buy-out provisions within in-
voluntary dissolution frameworks. Most permit under certain circumstances
the corporation or the other shareholders to purchase the shares of the peti-
tioner as a means of avoiding an involuntary dissolution. The details of these
provisions and their method of establishing valuation vary widely. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-384 (West Supp. 1981) (valuation determined as of
the day prior to the date on which the dissolution petition filed and without re-
gard to the filing of the petition, thus mandating something other than a liqui-
dation value); MD. CoRps. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 4-603 (1975) (valuation
determined as of the day prior to the filing of the petition, using methods pur-
suant to which shareholders dissenting from a merger, consolidation, or trans-
fer of assets may have their shares valued); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 subd. 2
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currently taken in a minority of states.133
(West Supp. 1981) (valuation on the basis of methods used for shareholders as-
serting appraisal rights in the event of a merger or consolidation); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A.12-7(8) (West Supp. 1981) (using appraisal techniques employed
when shareholders dissent from a merger, to the extent applicable, although
the court may make any adjustments it deems equitable if the petition for in-
voluntary dissolution was based upon fraud, illegality, mismanagement, abuse
of authority, oppression or unfairness); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1118 (McKinney
Supp. 1981) (valuation as of the day prior to the filing of the petition and with-
out regard to the effect of the filing); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-134 (1982) (establishes
procedures but no guidelines for determining "fair cash value"). Although the
buy-out privilege is normally elective, the language of some statutes would ap-
pear to permit a court-directed buy-out even against the will or the corporation
or the other shareholders. See, e.g., MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 450.1825 (2) (d)
(1973) (permitting the court to order a "[plurchase at their fair value of shares
of a shareholder, either by the corporation or by the officers, directors or other
shareholders responsible for the wrongful acts"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1
("fair value to be determined in accordance with such procedures as the court
may provide"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-155 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982) (provides
for court order that shares be purchased at "fair value" but does not indicate
how this is to be determined).
133. E.g., CAT. CoRP. CODE § 1804 (West 1977); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 450.1825(2) (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1 (1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-155
(Supp. 1982). See generally F. O'NEA, supra note 2, § 9.14.
Some of these states have based their statutes on Section 210 of the 1948
English Companies Act. This non-dissolution Section permitted the court to
make "such order as it thinks fit" upon a showing of oppression and a finding
that dissolution would be just and equitable but would "unfairly prejudice"
some of the members. See generally L. GOWER, THE PRINCnPLES OF MODERN
ComPANY LAw 598-604 (3rd ed. 1969); F. O'NEAT, supra note 2, § 9.12; Afterman,
Statutory Protection for Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Model for Reform,
55 VA. L. REV. 1043 (1969); Rajak, The Oppression of Minority Shareholders, 35
MOD. L. REV. 156 (1972),
Section 210 has been replaced by § 75 of the English Companies Act of 1980,
which provides:
(1) Any member of a company may apply to the court by petition for
an order under this section on the ground that the affairs of the com-
pany are being or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly
prejudicial to the interests of some part of the members (including at
least himself) or that any actual or proposed act or omission of the
company (including an act or omission on its behalf) is or would be so
prejudicial.
(2) If in the case of any company-...
(b) it appears to him that the affairs of the company are being or
have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the
interests of some part of the members or that any actual or proposed
act or omission of the company (including an act or omission on its be-
half) is or would be so prejudicial, he may himself (in addition to or
instead of presenting a petition for the winding-up of the company
under section 35(1) of the 1967 Act) apply to the court by petition for
an order under this section.
(3) If the court is satisfied that a petition under this section is well
founded it may make such order as it thinks fit for giving relief in re-
spect of the matters complained of.
(4) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (3) above, an or-
der under this section may-
(a) regulate the conduct of the company's affairs in the future;
(b) require the company to refrain from doing or continuing an
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Whether relief takes the form of dissolution, or some less
"radical" remedy, the noteworthy aspect of both the Model Act
and the Proposed Model Act Supplement is that relief is avail-
able only on the basis of narrowly defined grounds, including
misconduct on the part of those in control. This Article will
utilize the popular reference to such misconduct as "oppres-
sion." 134 Although the focus of the present discussion is on the
dissatisfied but nonoppressed shareholder, brief consideration
of the concept of oppression is necessary both to define the
traditional parameters of relief and to determine whether the
concept necessarily entails misconduct by those in control.
act complained of by the petitioner or to do an act which the petitioner
has complained it has omitted to do;
(c) authorise civil proceedings to be brought in the name and on
behalf of the company by such person or persons and on such terms as
the court may direct;
(d) provide for the purchase of the shares of any members of the
company by other members or by the company itself and, in the case
of a purchase by the company itself, the reduction of the company's
capital accordingly.
English Companies Act, 1980, § 75.
134. This term is common to the Model Act, the Model Act Supplement, and
common law grounds for involuntary dissolution. The term has correctly been
described as "nebulous." Comment, supra note 121, at 129. The vagueness of
the term is not necessarily undesirable: "Circumstances which may give rise to
'oppression' are 'so infinitely various that it is impossible to define them with
precision.' It might be added, moreover, that any attempt to define 'oppressive'
would tend to reduce the flexibility of the provision." Id. at 140-41. To a similar
effect, see Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 130, at 303-
04. The concept of "unfair prejudice" may be gaining popularity as a ground for
relief, although the extent to which it differs from oppression is uncertain. The
Proposed Model Act Supplement in § 16 includes as grounds for relief other
than dissolution both oppressive and unfairly prejudicial conduct. See supra
note 131. Thus, while oppression would be a ground for dissolution under the
Model Act, see supra note 127, unfair prejudice would not. The recent amend-
ments to the English Companies Act also suggest a distinction between oppres-
sion and unfair prejudice. See supra note 133. Previously, § 210 of that Act
utilized oppression as the standard for general equitable relief. The tendency
of the court to view oppression restrictively as "burdensome, harsh and wrong-
ful" was subjected to a substantial amount of criticism. See, e.g., F. O'NEAT,
supra note 118, § 9.13. Section 75 of the English Companies Act of 1980 employs
instead an "unfairly prejudicial" standard. A number of states base relief upon
the related concept of unfairness, although once again the extent to which this
differs from oppression is not clear. See, e.g., CAL CORP. CODE § 1800(b) (4)
(West 1977) (does not refer to oppression but instead speaks of "pervasive
fraud, mismanagement, or abuse of authority or persistent unfairness"); MICH.
Comp. LAWs ANN. § 450.1825(1) (1973) ("willfully unfair and oppressive"); MINN.
Bus. CORP. ACT § 302A.751 (1) (b) (2) (1981) ('"persistently unfair"); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 14A.12-7(1)(c) (West Supp. 1981) (directors or those in control have
"abused their authority.., or have acted oppressively or unfairly"); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-21-150(a) (4) (Law. Coop. 1982) ("oppressive or unfairly prejudicial").
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1. Oppression as Severe Misconduct
Although the concept of oppression is vague, most laymen
would agree that it suggests an "unjust or cruel exercise of au-
thority or power."' 3 5 Such a popular view of oppression is con-
sistent with the more lengthy composite treatment adopted in
Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc. :136
[Oppression is] burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct; a lack of
probity and fair dealing in the affairs of a company to the prejudice of
some of its members; or a visible departure from the standards of fair
dealing, and a violation of fair play on which every shareholder who en-
trusts his money to a company is entitled to rely.137
Baker represents a traditional approach138 under which se-
vere misconduct is required for a finding of oppression.13 9 In
135. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 799 (1981). See also Central
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 IL App. 2d 245, 255, 134 N.E.2d 653, 658-59
(1956), which cites a dictionary definition of oppression as "unreasonably bur-
densome; unjustly severe. Tyrannical. Overpowering to spirit or senses."
136. 264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973).
137. Id. at 628, 507 P.2d at 393. The Oregon Supreme Court was utilizing a
definition from Comment, supra note 121, at 134, which in turn was attempting
to provide a composite definition based on English decisions interpreting § 210
of the English Companies Act of 1948. See Scottish Co-op. Wholesale Soc'y,
Ltd. v. Meyer, [1958] 3 All E.R. 66, 71, 86 ("burdensome, harsh and wrongful
conduct" and "a lack of probity and fair dealing in the affairs of a company to
the prejudice of some of its members"); Elder v. Elder & Watson, Ltd., [1952]
Sess. Cas. 49, 55 ("a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing, and a
violation of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his money to a
company is entitled to rely"). See also White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 134, 189
S.E.2d 315, 319-20 (1972).
138. Baker has been selected as illustrative of a traditional, restrictive view
of oppression. No attempt is made here to provide a comprehensive review of
the types of situations which constitute oppression and thereby justify relief
under statutory or common law. See generally Prentice, Protection of Minority
Shareholders: Section 210 of the Companies Act 1948, 25 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
124 (1972); Rajak, supra note 133 (discussing § 210 of the English Companies
Act of 1948); Comment, supra note 121; Comment, Corporate Dissolution for 17-
lega Oppressive or Fraudulent Acts: The Maryland Solution, 28 MD. L. REv.
360 (1968).
139. The standards vary, perhaps more in their semantics than in their ap-
plication. See, e.g., Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 IlM App. 2d 245,
134 N.E.2d 653 (1956), where the court not only suggested that oppression is
"unjustly severe" or "tyrannical" conduct but also expressed concern that a
broader view of oppression would 'throw every business corporation ... open
to attacks by stockholders who are dissatisfied because the corporation is not
making money or even making enough money to satisfy those stockholders."
Id. at 257, 134 N.E.2d at 659-60 (emphasis added). An apparently softer articula-
tion of the standard is found in Baker, where the court nevertheless failed to
find questionable conduct by those in control as sufficiently oppressive to jus-
tify relief. A court may also show great tolerance towards those in control by
justifying questionable conduct as within the business judgment of the direc-
tors and officers. Illustrative of this line of reasoning is Polikoff v. Dole & Clark
Bldg. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 36, 184 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1962):
The Business Corporation Act has given to the courts the power to re-
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Baker, the majority shareholders had discharged a minority
shareholder from employment.140 In addition, they removed
the minority shareholders as directors, failed to notify them of
corporate meetings, falsified corporate records to indicate that
the minority shareholders had been notified of or were present
at such meetings, denied them access to corporate records, and
advanced corporate funds to another company in which one of
the majority shareholders held an interest. With the possible
and very arguable exceptions of the discharge of a minority
shareholder from employment and the removal of the minority
shareholders from the board,141 the actions of those in control
cannot be viewed as reasonable and fair. Whether those ac-
tions constituted the type of oppressive conduct which justified
relief was another question, and the Oregon Supreme Court in
Baker held that relief was not warranted. The court at various
points attempted to define oppression through such concepts as
"abuse of corporate position,"' 42 "plundering" 43 and an "incor-
rigible" majority which "can no longer be trusted to manage
[the corporation] fairly,"144 none of which, in the court's view,
lieve minority shareholders from oppressive acts of the majority, but
the remedy of liquidation is so drastic that it must be invoked with ex-
treme caution. The ends of justice would not be served by too broad an
application of the statute, for that would merely eliminate one evil by
substituting a greater one--oppression of the majority by the minority.
See also Fincher v. Claibourne Butane Co., 349 So. 2d 1014, 1019 (La. Ct. App.
1977) ("Plaintiff as an employee, was not guaranteed indefinite employment by
virtue of his status as a stockholder .... The power and authority of corpo-
rate management.., was vested in the corporate board of directors and its
chief executive officer. This power includes the hiring and firing of corporate
employees . . . ."). But see Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J.
Super. 141, 154, 400 A.2d 554, 561 (1979), a~fd, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994
(1980) ('Traditional principles of corporate law, such as the business judgment
rule, have failed to curb [the abuse of corporate power]. Consequently, actions
of close corporations that conform with these principles cannot be immune
from scrutiny.").
140. This action was justified by the majority shareholders on the ground
that the minority shareholder had not made any sales and "was not doing the
company any good." 264 Or. at 622, 507 P.2d at 390.
141. Many would argue that the denial of employment is a classic example
of oppression regardless of whether those in control have good reasons for
their action. See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 138, at 145, cited with approval in F.
O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 9.13, at 640 n.1.
142. 264 Or. at 629, 507 P.2d at 394.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 630, 507 P.2d at 394 The court also implied that it will be more
difficult to establish oppression in situations involving a single act than a con-
tinuing course of conduct. Id. This comment has been articulated elsewhere.
See, e.g., Comment, supra note 121, at 136. Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b) (4)
(West 1977) ("abuse of authority or persistent unfairness"); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.751(1) (b) (2) (West Minn. Business Corp. Act Supp. 1981) (those in con-
trol have acted "in a manner persistently unfair"). This raises the interesting
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was present in this controversy.1 45
The reluctance of many courts to find conduct oppressive
may result from a view of dissolution as a drastic remedy to be
mandated in only extreme situations involving bad faith on the
part of the majority shareholders.146 The perception of the
remedy as harsh is based upon the assumption that a signifi-
cant portion of the going concern value of a corporation will not
be realized in a liquidation sale,147 a problem which is com-
conceptual question of whether denial of employment is a single act or continu-
ing course of conduct. See also Comment, supra note 138, at 368 ("[T]he statu-
tory and common law cases clearly illustrate that dissolution will be granted
only for conduct which is flagrantly improper.").
145. 264 Or. at 638, 507 P.2d at 398. The court also equated the question of
oppression with "the fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing" owed by the
majority to minority stockholders. Id. at 629, 507 P.2d at 394. Others have
equated oppression with a breach of fiduciary duty, which is an equally vague
concept. See, e.g., Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 440 (W. Va. 1980)
("[W] e conclude that our cases involving the fiduciary duty owed by majority
shareholders, officers and directors of a corporation embrace the same stan-
dard which other courts have evolved under the term 'oppressive conduct."').
See also Fix v. Fix Material Co., Inc., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)
(indicating that fiduciary standards may be "useful" in evaluating whether the
conduct by those in control has been oppressive). The Fix opinion percep-
tively notes that a single breach of fiduciary duty will probably not be oppres-
sive unless it is extremely serious in nature or justice requires such a
classification. Id. Consider a rather extreme hypothetical in which a corporate
officer on a single occasion uses a company automobile for personal purposes.
It may be assumed that this use of corporate assets for personal gain, though
minor, is a breach of fiduciary duty, and the director could be required to reim-
burse the corporation for the use of the automobile. The breach, however,
would not appear sufficiently serious to warrant classification of the individ-
ual's conduct as "oppressive." See also Comment, supra note 121, at 132-35.
146. See, e.g., Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 11l. App. 2d 29, 184
N.E.2d 792 (1962). Compare Rajak, supra note 133, at 167, where the commenta-
tor concluded after reviewing judicial interpretations of "oppression" under
§ 210 of the English Companies Act of 1948 that "[i]t is clear... that unless the
circumstances are extreme, the courts will refuse to intervene in the internal
affairs of a company whether under section 210 or any other jurisdiction."
147. There is general acceptance of the proposition that the going concern
value of an enterprise is likely to exceed its liquidation value. See, e.g., A.
BROMBERG, supra note 39, § 83A, at 474; Busmnrss ArD SEcurrIs VALUATION 11
(G. Ovens & D. Beach ed. 1972); Z. CAvirCH, 1 BusINESS ORGANizATIONs wrrH
TAx PLANNING § 3.05, at 3-33 (1981); Comment, supra note 121, at 140; Comment,
supra note 127, at 797; Comment, Dissolution Under the California Corpora-
tions Code: A Remedy for Minority Shareholders, 22 U.C.LA L Rav. 595, 609
(1975). Cf. 2 H. MARSH, supra note 132, § 20.22, at 638 ("[A] liquidation does not
necessarily contemplate that the assets will be sold piecemeal and the goodwill
of the business sacrificed by a termination of the business."). Because of the
possibility that some significant portion of going concern value or goodwill may
not be realized if the assets are liquidated, courts frequently view corporate
dissolution as a "drastic," "harsh" or "last resort" remedy. See, e.g., Stumpf v.
Stumpf 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 235, 120 Cal. Rptr. 671, 674 (1975); Callier v. Callier,
61 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 1013-14; 378 N.E.2d 405, 408 (1978); Barnett v. International
Tennis Corp., 80 Mich. App. 396, 417, 263 N.W.2d 908, 918 (1978); Baker v. Com-
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pounded because its impact will normally be spread propor-
tionally among all shareholders, regardless of whether they
have acted wrongfully. To the extent that other remedies are
available, one might expect to find less reluctance on the part
of courts to determine that a given course of conduct was op-
pressive.148 The availability of remedies other than dissolution,
however, seemed to have no effect on the Baker court.149 The
refusal of the court to find appropriate any other form of relief,
including such minor options as retention of jurisdiction by the
lower court for the protection of the minority shareholders and
issuance of an injunction prohibiting continuing acts of oppres-
sion,15 0 suggests a restrictive approach to the concept of op-
mercial Body Builders, 264 Or. 614, 628, 507 P.2d 387, 3q3 (1973); Masinter v.
Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 438-39 (W. Va. 1980). See also Patton v. Nicholas, 279
S.W.2d 848, 857 (Tex. 1955) ("[W]e agree with the practically unanimous judi-
cial opinion that liquidation of solvent going corporations should be the ex-
treme or ultimate remedy, involving as it usually will, accentuation of the
economic waste incident to many receiverships and most forced sales."); Brom-
berg, supra note 29, at 647 ("[T]he liquidation right [of a partner] will be injuri-
ous to the business in many, perhaps in most, cases.").
148. This is one of the arguments by the drafters of the Proposed Model Act
Supplement. Section 16 of the Supplement provides a wide range of relief
which may be ordered under circumstances indicating, among other grounds,
actions which have been "oppressive" or "unfairly prejudicial" to the peti-
tioner. See supra note 131. The Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws
justifies the expanded form of relief as follows:
The primary danger in tying relief for oppression and related conduct
to dissolution is that dissolution is such a radical remedy that courts
have traditionally refused to issue a dissolution order if the corporation
was solvent except in extreme cases of fraudulent conduct. Moreover,
even though authority may exist to grant relief other than dissolution,
some courts have been reluctant to grant any relief unless the fact situ-
ation itself justifies dissolution.
Proposed Model Act Supplement, supra note 130, at 302.
149. The court outlined ten remedies which may represent alternatives to
dissolution: (1) order dissolution at a future date to become effective only if
differences are not resolved prior to that date; (2) appoint a receiver to monitor
the continued operations of the business; (3) appoint a special fiscal agent to
report to the court concerning the continued operation of the business and to
retain jurisdiction by the court; (4) retain jurisdiction without the appointment
of a special fiscal agent; (5) order an accounting; (6) issue an injunction to pro-
hibit continuing acts of oppression; (7) order the declaration of a dividend or a
distribution of capital; (8) order a buy-out of the minority's stock, (9) permit
the minority to purchase additional stock, and (10) award damages. 264 Or. at
632-33, 507 P.2d at 395-96.
150. The court was influenced by the fact that the conduct complained of by
the plaintiff occurred only in one year and did not continue after that year.
Nevertheless, the failure to view the issuance of an injunction against further
falsification of corporate records, for example, as an appropriate remedy is in-
explicable. Compare with Baker the approach taken in Patton v. Nicholas, 279
S.W.2d 848, 854 (Tex. 1955). Although the majority's suppression of dividends
was viewed as a "wrong akin to breach of trust," the court in Patton treated
liquidation as an extreme remedy and instead ordered the payment of reason-
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pression for reasons other than the apparent harshness of the
dissolution remedy.
2. Oppression as a Frustration of Reasonable Expectations
The traditional approach to the concept of oppression typi-
fied by Baker focuses more on the character of the actions by
those in control than it does on the impact that those actions
may have on minority shareholders. This approach is consis-
tent with a reluctance to grant relief unless the conduct of
those in control is sufficiently overreaching that it warrants
"punishment,"' 5 ' and it quite naturally pays great deference to
such control-enhancing doctrines as the business judgment
rule 5 2 and the principle of majority control.5 3
A very different approach to oppression which would offer
a broader basis for relief focuses not on the propriety or intent
of those in control but rather on the impact of their actions
upon the minority shareholders. 5 4 Oppression, under this ap-
proach, "is probably best defined in terms of the reasonable ex-
pectations of the minority shareholders in the particular
able dividends. The court order included a retention of jurisdiction for five
years to insure the payment of reasonable dividends in the future.
151. Even with the availability of less drastic remedies than dissolution,
many courts nevertheless are reluctant to find the conduct of those in control
"oppressive." See supra notes 135-50 and accompanying text. Cf. A. RUBNE,
THE ENSNARED SHAREHOLDER 11 (1966) ("On the whole directors are now per-
sonally honest and manage to oppress their shareholders by strictly legal
means.").
152. See, e.g., Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 11. App. 2d 29, 35-36, 184
N.E.2d 792, 795 (1962).
153. The mere fact that a member of a company has lost confidence in
the manner in which the company's affairs are conducted does not lead
to the conclusion that he is oppressed; nor can resentment at being
outvoted; nor mere dissatisfaction with or disapproval of the company's
affairs, whether on grounds relating to policy or to efficiency, however
well founded.
In re Five Minute Car Wash Services Ltd., [1966] 1 W.L.R. 745, 751. Dean
O'Neal has observed that, in denying relief to "squeezes," the courts usually
rely on either or both the business judgment rule or the principle of majority
control. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 3.03, at 59.
154. Compare Re Lundie Brothers Ltd., [1965] 2 All E.R. 692, 698-99 (Plow-
man, J., concluding that "oppression involves, I think, at least ... [a] lack of
probity or fair dealing to a member," quoting Re Harmer, Ltd., [1958] 3 All E..L
689, 701 with In re M. Dailey & Co., Unreported (Sup. Ct. Vict. 1968), aff'd 43
Austl. L.J.R. 19 (1969) ("it is to be observed that [Section 186 of the Uniform
Australian Companies Act of 1961] speaks of oppression in terms of its impact
on the oppressed, not in terms of the intention of the oppressor."). The unre-
ported Australian opinion was interpreting a provision of the Australian Com-
panies Act providing relief upon a showing that the affairs of the company are
being conducted in "a manner oppressive to one or more of the members." The
opinion is quoted in Afterman, supra note 133, at 1062-63.
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circumstances at hand."155 Although the reasonable expecta-
tions approach to date has received more scholarly then judi-
cial attention, several recent decisions have applied the
analysis and may serve to stimulate further development in
this area.156 An examination of two such cases will demon-
strate not only the extent to which this approach varies from
the traditional line of inquiry in "oppression" cases but also the
difficulties inherent in applying an analysis of expectations to
the fault-based concept of oppression.
In Topper v. Park Sheraton Pharmacy, Inc., ' 5 7 three indi-
viduals formed two corporations, each of which was to operate
a pharmacy in a prominent New York hotel. Petitioner Topper
actively participated in the venture for approximately one
year,158 during which time the business prospered. The other
two shareholders, however, discharged Topper as an officer and
excluded him from participation in the management of the
business. Topper contended that the discharge constituted
"oppressive" conduct within the meaning of the New York in-
voluntary dissolution statute.159 The controlling shareholders
155. Afterman, supra note 133, at 1063. A widely-cited student work on the
subject of oppression had earlier suggested, without developing, such an analy-
sis. See Comment, supra note 121, at 141. See also O'Neal, supra note 7, at 885-
88, where Dean O'Neal argues in favor of a reasonable expectations analysis as
an appropriate model for legislation.
The expectations of the parties at the inception of the relationship are, of
course, of primary importance for this inquiry, although it has also been argued
that new expectations may develop as a relationship matures and these may be
relevant in determining whether the reasonable expectations of the minority
have been thwarted. See Afterman, supra note 133, at 1063-64, O'Neal, supra
note 7, at 886.
156. See Capitol Toyota, Inc. v. Gervin, 381 So. 2d 1038 (Miss. 1980); Exadak-
tilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (1979), affid,
173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (1980); In re Taines, 111 Misc. 2d 554, 444
N.Y.S.2d 540 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); Topper v. Park Sheraton Pharmacy, Inc., 107
Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). See also Masinter v. Webco
Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980).
157. 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). Topper is dis-
cussed in Davidian, Corporate Dissolution in New York: Liberalizing the Rights
of Minority Shareholders, 56 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 24, 48-56 (1981).
158. During this time, Topper was the most active of the three shareholders.
In order to participate in this enterprise, Topper quit a job which he had held
in Florida for twenty-five years, moved his family to New York, and invested
his life savings in the venture. 107 Misc. 2d at 26-27, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 361-62.
159. Section 1104-a of the Business Corporation Law permits a twenty per-
cent or more shareholder of a corporation not listed on an exchange or regu-
larly quoted in an over the counter market to seek judicial dissolution on the
grounds that the directors or those in control "have been guilty of illegal, fraud-
ulent or oppressive actions toward the complaining shareholders" or that the
"assets of the corporation are being looted, wasted, or diverted for non-corpo-
rate purposes." N.Y. Bus. ColuP. LAw § 1104-a (McKinney 1981).
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argued that there was just cause for the discharge and that
their conduct was therefore not "oppressive." The court
concluded:
Whether the controlling shareholders discharged petitioner for cause
or in their good business judgment is irrelevant. The court finds that
the undisputed understanding of the parties was such at the time of
the formation of the corporations that the respondents' actions have se-
verely damaged petitioner's reasonable expectations and constitute a
freeze-out of the petitioner's interest; consequently, they are deemed
to be "oppressive" within the statutory framework.
1 6 0
The surprising aspect of this conclusion is the court's unwill-
ingness to consider whether the discharge of petitioner had
been for cause. That Topper may have been dishonest, incom-
petent, lazy, uncooperative, or otherwise unsuitable was
deemed irrelevant. Without regard to the reasons of the con-
trolling shareholders, the simple act of discharging Topper rep-
resented a denial of his reasonable expectations and was,
therefore, "oppressive."
The important question not adequately addressed in Top-
per is the extent to which the expectations of shareholders
other than the one seeking relief warrant consideration.161 It is
not unlikely that each of the three shareholders in Topper com-
mitted resources to the enterprise with the expectation that all
of the funds would continue to be available to the business so
long as it was prosperous and the decisions of those in control
were made in good faith. If it is assumed for the sake of discus-
sion that there was sufficient cause for discharging Topper and
that the remaining shareholders were unable to raise sufficient
funds to purchase his interest at the statutorily-mandated "fair
160. 107 Misc. 2d at 28, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362 (emphasis added). See also In re
Taines, 111 Misc. 2d 554, 444 N.Y.S.2d 540 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
161. This is not inconsistent with the following statement of the test: "Op-
pression.., is probably best defined in terms of the reasonable expectations
of the minority shareholders in the particular circumstances at hand." After-
man, supra note 133, at 1063. It may be argued that the court's view of the rea-
sons for discharge as "irrelevant" is limited to the particular facts of this case
and is therefore insignificant as a matter of precedent. Support for this can be
found in the court's finding of an "undisputed understanding of the parties."
107 Misc. 2d at 28, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362. This finding is, at best, vague, and there
is little information given as to the nature of the understandings of the other
participants. Further, three separate shareholder agreements had been exe-
cuted; none contained any references to the employment of Topper. Also un-
clear is the court's comment that "[the controlling shareholders do not deny
that petitioner's expectations, not expressed in any written agreement, formed
a necessary component of the corporation's formation." Id. at 28, 433 N.Y.S.2d
at 362. Whether this statement was offered as a truism or a comment on the
particular facts before the court is ambiguous.
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value,"'162 the question then arises who should bear the eco-
nomic consequences that may arise from a liquidation of corpo-
rate assets and the accompanying possibility that some or all of
the going concern value may not be realized as a result of the
liquidation.163 Under the approach taken by the court, any neg-
ative economic consequences resulting from the dissolution
would be allocated among each of the participants in propor-
tion to their shareholdings.164 Further, if dissolution is to be
avoided by a purchase of Topper's interest, then the valuation
of those shares at "fair value" would presumably be based on
going concern rather than liquidation value.165 If this is the
case, Topper would receive something best described as a
"windfall" at the expense of the remaining participants.166 To
the extent that it was Topper who failed to discharge his duties
as originally contemplated by the parties, one may properly ask
why it should not also be Topper who bears the economic
consequences.
A somewhat different approach to an expectations analysis
is found in Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co. 167 In this
New Jersey case, the plaintiff acquired a twenty percent inter-
est in a corporation which owned and operated a restaurant.168
162. Whether the oppression justified dissolution was a question not ad-
dressed by the court. It instead found that the controlling shareholders had
elected to purchase Topper's interest. Section 1118(a) of the Business Corpora-
tion Law permits any shareholder not petitioning for judicial dissolution under
§ 1104-a to elect to purchase the shares of the petitioner. N.Y. Bus. Coin. LAw
1118(a) (McKinney 1981). If agreement cannot be reached concerning valua-
tion, § 1118(b) permits a judicial determination of the "fair value" of the shares
"as of the day prior to the date on which such petition was filed, exclusive of
any element of value arising from such filing." N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1118(b)
(McKinney 1981). This suggests that the full going concern value should be
recognized, and the fact that less than this amount may be realized if a dissolu-
tion is ordered is presumably not an appropriate factor to consider in establish-
ing the value of the shares. In Topper, the court ruled that language in
affidavits filed with the court that "we have agreed to negotiate a reasonable
price for the purchase of Topper's stock" constituted an election under
§ 1118(a). 107 Misc. 2d at 28-29, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362. See generally Davidian,
supra note 157.
163. See supra note 147.
164. This may also be the consequence of dissolution as a result of oppres-
sion defined in the more traditional fashion. See supra text accompanying
notes 135-50. But ef. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A.12-7(8) (a) (West Supp. 1981) (per-
mitting "any [sales price] adjustments deemed equitable by the court" where
the buy-out occurs in a dissolution suit based upon misconduct).
165. See supra note 162.
166. This would equal the differences, if any, between the going concern
and liquidation values of both companies.
167. 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (1979), aff'd, 174 N.J. Super. 559, 414
A.2d 994 (1980).
168. The stock was issued for $20,000 and was apparently given to the plain-
[Vol. 67:1
DISSATISFIED PARTICIPANT
He expected to learn the restaurant business and eventually
take part in the management of the venture.169 Unfortunately,
plaintiff was unable to get along with the other employees and
stockholders, and he was eventually discharged for what the
court viewed as "unsatisfactory performance."170  He then
brought an action described by the court as an "oppressed
shareholder" suit.171
Like the New York court in Topper, the court in Exadak-
tilos believed that the expectations of the parties should form
the starting point for the analysis,172 and, as in Topper, the
court recognized that expectations are typically not outlined in
any written .agreement. 73 The Exadaktilos court concluded,
however, that even though the discharge of the minority share-
holder frustrated his expectations, it was not an act of oppres-
sion by those in control. The point of distinction between
Topper and Exadaktilos is that the court in the latter case also
considered the propriety of the actions by the controlling
shareholders:
The promise of employment was honored, the opportunity being lost
through no fault of defendants. The parties' expectation that plaintiff
tiff by his father-in-law, who remained as the largest stockholder in the com-
pany. In addition, the plaintiff co-signed a note given by the corporation to
secure a loan of $220,000, and it appears that additional capital contributions
were made by the stockholders. 174 N.J. Super. at 150, 152 n.2, 400 A.2d at 558,
562 n.2.
169. Some of the other shareholders were less than enthused that plaintiff
had become a participant: 'There is some indication that plaintiff's opportunity
was extended over the objection of the other two shareholders and it is clear
that they never welcomed him as a fellow participant in the enterprise." Id. at
155, 400 A.2d at 561.
170. Id. at 155, 400 A.2d at 561. 'The evidence shows that plaintiff failed to
get along with employees, causing the loss of key personnel, that he quit on
more than one occasion, without reason or notice, and that he was not compati-
ble with the other principals." Id.
171. Id. at 144, 400 A.2d at 556. Section 14A.12-7(1) of the New Jersey Corpo-
rations Code outlines the grounds for involuntary dissolution or other relief.
Subsection (c) sets forth the following grounds for corporations having twenty-
five or fewer shareholders: "[T]he directors or those in control have acted
fraudulently or illegally, mismanaged the corporation, or abused their authority
as officers or directors or have acted oppressively or unfairly toward one or
more minority shareholders in their capacities as shareholders, directors, of-
ficers, or employees." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A.12-7(1) (West Supp. 1981). The re-
lief sought by the plaintiff is not specified in the opinion. Authorized remedies
under section 14A.12-7 include appointment of a custodian or provisional direc-
tor, dissolution, and a sale of the petitioner's stock to the electing corporation
or holders of at least fifty percent of the shares.
172. 167 N.J. Super. at 154, 400 A.2d at 560. The court began its analysis of
the issue of oppression by noting that the relatively few courts which have con-
sidered the question have "fail[ed] to suggest any perspective from which to
judge what is oppressive or unfair." Id.
173. Id. at 155, 400 A.2d at 561.
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would at some time participate in management was likewise thwarted
by plaintiff's failure to satisfy the condition precedent to participation,
i.e., that he learn the business.1 7 4
The Exadaktilos decision could be viewed as nothing more
than a restatement in contemporary terms of the traditional ap-
proach to oppression articulated in Baker; the court's analysis
of the expectations of the complaining shareholder would then
represent little more than "lip service" to the plight of certain
minority shareholders and therefore an inconsequential part of
the opinion. 7 5 On the other hand, the decision might be
viewed as an acceptance, on a limited basis, of the reasonable
expectations analysis. Arguably, Exadaktilos differs from Top-
per only in its analysis of the reasonableness of the expecta-
tions. In Topper, the court assumed that it was reasonable to
have an absolute expectation of continued employment, while
in Exadaktilos the court assumed that it was reasonable to ex-
pect continued employment only so long as the services were
performed in a competent fashion and contributions were being
made to the enterprise.1 7 6 Viewed in this light, Exadaktilos
represents a significant limitation on the reasonable expecta-
tions analysis, and as such is not likely to produce results dif-
ferent from those of the traditional approach to oppression.
Topper and Exadaktilos highlight the difficult nature of the
issues presented when minority shareholders attempt to with-
draw from a venture because of a frustration of their original
expectations.1 7 7 For example, if it is assumed that in Exadak-
tilos the grant of relief would have a disruptive impact on the
continued operation of the business or would cause financial
174. Id. at 156, 400 A.2d at 562 (emphasis added).
175. In Capitol Toyota, Inc. v. Gervin, 381 So. 2d 1038 (Miss. 1980), the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court interpreted Exadaktilos as a case in which relief was
denied because "the complaining party's reasonable expectations had been
thwarted, but not grossly so." Id. at 1039.
176. It is unclear what result the court would reach if the minority share-
holder in Exadaktilos had been discharged because of business or economic
conditions rather than poor performance.
177. Although this Article is concerned primarily with the ability of a dissat-
isfied participant to withdraw from the venture, in some situations a minority
shareholder may also seek damages for the actions of those in control or de-
claratory relief clarifying the rights of the parties in the continuing venture.
Such a case was presented in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370
Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976), where a shareholder discharged from employ-
ment and removed as a director sought declaratory relief and damages rather
than dissolution. In directing the award of relief to the shareholder, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Council held that the actions of the controlling
shareholders represented an attempted "freeze-out" of the minority and there-
fore were a breach of the fiduciary duty which they owed to this individual. Id.
at 853, 353 N.E.2d at 664.
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hardship to the remaining shareholders, then the position of
those who desire to avoid the negative impact of such relief
must be viewed with some sympathy, for they also had reason-
able expectations that each participant would commit not only
his capital but his efforts to the development of the venture. To
the extent that continuity of the business enterprise and alloca-
tion of adverse economic consequences on the basis of fault are
appropriate policy objectives, these goals were achieved in Ex-
adaktilos and perhaps lost in Topper. It is, on the other hand,
appropriate to view with equal sympathy the position of the mi-
nority shareholder in Exadaktilos. After investing at least
$20,000 in a venture in which he expected to play an active
role, 7 8 this individual was relegated to the position of a passive
investor whose return will be substantially less than the return
of those who play a more active role in the operation of the
business. 7 9 It is less than satisfactory to conclude that he has
only himself to blame for his position, and that if he had been
brighter, more sdlled in personal relations, or blessed with the
foresight to bargain for protection in advance, his capital would
not be "trapped" in a venture from which he has been
isolated.180
B. ABILITY OF A MINORITY SHAREHOLDER TO OBTAIN RELIEF
WITHouT REGARD TO MISCONDUCT: THE CALIFORNIA
AND NORTH CAROLINA "RIGHTS OR INTERESTS"
STANDARDS
When misconduct is the basis for relief, the complaining
minority shareholder must ordinarily point to some objectiona-
178. For this purpose, the fact that the stock was received as a gift is not
relevant. It should also be noted that the plaintiff co-signed a $220,000 corporate
note and apparently made additional capital contributions to the venture. See
supra note 168.
179. As such, his return on investment would be substantially lower than
that of the shareholders who played an active role in the management of the
business. The court implicitly left open the possibility that relief might be
granted if dividends were not paid in the future by noting that "[a]lthough it
would seem too early in the life of this corporation to expect dividends, the
facts on that issue are not in." 167 N.J. Super. at 156, 400 A.2d at 562.
180. Expectations may also be asserted independent of the question of op-
pression as a basis for relief other than dissolution. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Spring-
side Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 850, 353 N.E.2d 657, 662-63 (1976) (where
the dissatisfied shareholder sought declaratory relief and damages based upon
breaches of fiduciary duty by the majority, the court held that "by terminating
a minority stockholder's employment or by severing him from a position as an
officer or director, the majority effectively frustrate the minority shareholder's
purposes in entering on the corporate venture and also deny him an equal re-
turn on his investment.").
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ble action or inaction by those in control. Although the reason-
able expectations analysis could be utilized as a basis for relief
independent of oppression,181 when it is used as a method for
defining oppression there must be some relationship between
the frustration of the minority shareholder's expectations and
decisions made by those in control. For example, if in Topper
the complaining shareholder had become physically or men-
tally disabled and could no longer perform his duties, the grant
of relief might well have turned on such an inconsequential
matter as whether he was discharged from employment follow-
ing the disability. If he was not terminated but instead was
simply unable to report to work, it is probable that relief would
have been denied because there was no act by the other share-
holders which was objectionable.182
An entirely different and largely untapped basis for relief is
found in the California183 and North Carolina 84 statutes, which
provide for dissolution or other remedies 85 upon a showing
that such relief is "reasonably necessary for the protection of
the rights or interests of the complaining shareholder."186 Al-
though relatively little litigation has developed under these
statutes, the fact that the ground for relief has not been stated
181. See infra text accompanying notes 242-67.
182. This conclusion is supported by the following language in Topper:
The court may determine the understanding of the parties as to the
role the complaining shareholder is expected to play .... The court
can then decide whether the controlling shareholders have acted con-
trary to that understanding or, in the language of the statute, "have
been guilty of ... oppressive actions toward the complaining
shareholders."
107 Misc.2d at 35, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
183. Among the grounds for involuntary dissolution set forth in § 1800(b) of
the California Corporation Code is the following: "(5) In the case of any corpo-
ration with 35 or fewer shareholders... liquidation is reasonably necessary for
the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining shareholder or
shareholders." CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b) (5) (West 1977).
184. One of the grounds for involuntary dissolution set forth in the North
Carolina Business Corporation Act is if "[1]iquidation is reasonably necessary
for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining shareholder."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125 (a) (4) (1975).
185. Both the California, CA.. CORP. CODE § 1804 (West 1977), and North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1 (1975), statutes give the court broad discre-
tion to fashion a remedy other than dissolution.
186. These statutes. are to be distinguished from those which employ a
broader basis for relief if it is in the interest of shareholders generally. See,
e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:143A(3) (West 1969) ("beneficial to the interests
of the shareholders"); MAss. ANN. LAws 156B § 99 (Law. Co-op. 1979) (if dead-
lock and "the best interests of the shareholders will be served"); N.1h REv.
STAT. ANN. § 294.97 (1978) (repealed 1981) ("reasonably necessary for the pro-
tection of the rights of stockholders or creditors"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 1.195(3) (West 1953) ("beneficial to the interest of the shareholders").
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with reference to the misconduct of the controlling sharehold-
ers removes significant obstacles placed in the path of the dis-
satisfied but nonabused shareholder in jurisdictions which
follow the Model Act or similar approaches.
The potential breadth of this standard is illustrated in the
California case, Stumpf v. C.E. Stumpf & Sons, Inc.187 A corpo-
ration was formed and owned in equal shares by a father and
his two sons. Three years later, a management dispute devel-
oped and one of the sons "ceased to be employed"188 by the
corporation. Thereafter, he was removed as an officer of the
corporation. The son made no attempt to return as a partici-
pant in the family business and received no income after his
withdrawal. Although the corporation did not pay dividends,
there was no evidence of "abuse of authority or... persistent
unfairness" by the other participants toward the son after he
left the business.189 Rather than attempting a reconciliation,
the dissatisfied shareholder successfully brought an action
seeking the involuntary dissolution of the corporation.190 In af-
firming the lower court's decree of dissolution, the court of ap-
peal held that dissolution may be ordered "when necessary to
assure fairness to minority shareholders."'91 In so ruling, the
187. 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 120 Cal. Rptr. 671 (Ct. App. 1975). Stumpf is signifi-
cant because it is the only California case in which the judgment rested on the
rights or interests ground alone. Earlier cases relied or could have relied upon
alternative grounds. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Special Projects, Inc., 260 Cal. App.
2d 496, 501, 67 Cal. Rptr. 374, 377 (1968) (internal dissension resulting in dead-
lock); Buss v. Martin, 241 Cal. App. 2d 123, 134, 50 Cal. Rptr. 206, 214 (1966) (per-
sistent mismanagement).
188. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 232, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 672. It is unclear whether he
resigned or was discharged, although the two may often be indistinguishable in
a close corporation.
189. Id. at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 673. The court did not address the question
of whether there had been an abuse of authority or persistent unfairness to-
ward the son before he left the business. See infra note 193.
190. The action was brought under the predecessor to § 1800(b) (5) of the
California Corporations Code, which was substantially the same as the current
version except that relief on this ground was not then limited to corporations
with thirty-five or fewer shareholders. CAL. CORP. CODE § 4651(f) (West 1977)
(repealed 1977). It has been observed that restriction of this remedy to corpo-
rations with a limited number of shareholders was because of the "drastic" na-
ture of the dissolution remedy. 1A H. BALLANT-,E & G. STERLMG, CALn'oRNIA
CORPORAnON LAws § 320.03. (R. Clark ed. 1981). However, it should be
remembered that dissolution is not the only remedy available upon a showing
of the prerequisites for relief set forth in § 1800(b) (5). See CA1. CORP. CODE
§ 1804 (West 1977).
191. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 674. The court added that the
ability of the holders of fifty percent or more of the shares under then § 4658 of
the Code to purchase the shares of a petitioner seeking involuntary dissolution




court seemed to be influenced by the hostility which existed
among the parties and the fact that the complaining share-
holder received no income from the business following his
withdrawal, although the court provided no guidance as to the
methodology to be employed in determining fairness. 192
The reference to "fairness" in Stumpf is curious in light of
the statute's wording, which seems to render irrelevant the
question of fairn ess or any consideration of the position of the
other shareholders.193 Indeed, the statute could be construed
to mean that a simple need for cash on the part of a dissatisfied
shareholder would be a sufficient ground for relief.194 Such a
broad reading, however, would make dissolution a remedy
available to any shareholder virtually as a matter of right and
would render the other grounds for dissolution largely superflu-
ous.195 An alternative interpretation would be that in referring
to "rights or interests of the complaining shareholder," the stat-
utes are addressing the rights or interests of the shareholder as
a participant in the enterprise. Under this interpretation, the
dissolution in Stumpf was not granted to protect the com-
192. There is some indication that the court was not aware of the unique-
ness of the provision with which it was dealing. At one point it indicated that
some states have construed provisions similar to subdivision (f) and required a
showing of deadlock or management misconduct before relief would be
granted. The authority cited for this proposition by the court, which purport-
edly contained a "survey of the jurisdictions," was concerned primarily with
deadlock as a ground for dissolution and did not review any statutory provi-
sions similar to subdivision (f). See generally Israels, supra note 127.
193. "[A]buse of authority or persistent unfairness toward any sharehold-
ers" are alternative grounds for relief. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b) (4) (West
1977).
194. See H. BALLANTrE & G. STERLING, CALIFoRNIA CoRPoRATIoN LAws
§ 3.18 (1938).
195. This reading also raises interesting questions concerning the role and
enforceability of shareholders' agreements. Note in this connection § 2000(a) of
the California Corporations Code, which allows the corporation or shareholders
possessing fifty percent or more of the shares to avoid dissolution by purchas-
ing the petitioner's shares. This section permits a reduction of the amount paid
to the petitioner to reflect "damages resulting if the initiation of the dissolution
is a breach by [any petitioner] of an agreement with the purchasing party or
parties" unless the ground specified for dissolution is § 1800(b) (4) ("pervasive
fraud, mismanagement, or [misapplication or waste of property]"). CAL. CoRP.
CODE § 2000(a) (West 1977). It is unclear whether agreement for this purpose
includes implied agreements concerning the duration of the venture. For a dis-
cussion of this issue as applied to partnership, see supra text accompanying
notes 57-106. If there is no agreement concerning dissolution, it could be ar-
gued that the attempted dissolution nevertheless should be treated as in
breach of an implied agreement if not taken in good faith. See Page v. Page, 55
Cal. 2d 192, 197-98, 359 P.2d 41, 45 (1961); supra text accompanying notes 80-99.
As a matter of pleading practice, counsel representing petitioners seeking in-




plaining shareholder's need for cash or his other rights or inter-
ests unconnected with the business venture. Rather, he was
entitled to a decree of dissolution because, unlike the other
participants, he was not receiving significant. benefits from the
business and, consequently, a continuation of the business was
not in his interest.196 Under such an approach, a consideration
of fairness is not wholly irrelevant, but the methodology to be
employed in assessing this issue is less than clear.
Although Stumpf remains the only decision considering in
any depth the "rights or interests" ground for relief,'97 it illus-
trates the potential usefulness of this standard to dissatisfied
shareholders. It is perhaps particularly significant that the
court in Stumpf chose to describe the severing of the business
relationship as a situation in which the son had "ceased to be
employed," treating the reason-involuntary resignation, a dis-
charge, or something in between-as irrelevant. The question
of motivation or fault has no role under the rights or interests
inquiry, and it is this feature which makes the California and
North Carolina' 98 statutes promising sources of relief for dis-
196. Under this approach, relief might have been denied if the possibility of
employment remained open to the son. He would then be on an equal footing
with the other participants in the venture.
197. The North Carolina cases are of little assistance in this regard. A re-
cent decision has indicated that the provision "vests broad equitable powers in
the trial court in determining whether a corporation should be involuntarily
dissolved" but provides little guidance beyond this. See W & H Graphics, Inc. v.
Hamby, 48 N.C. App. 82, 87, 268 S.E.2d 567, 570 (1980). See also Dowd v. Char-
lotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 263 N.C. 101, 104, 139 S.E.2d 10, 13 (1964) ("We are not
required, at this stage, to determine to what extent the interests of other share-
holders may be balanced against those of one complaining shareholder who
seeks liquidation and dissolution." (emphasis added)); Royall v. Carr Lumber
Company, Inc., 248 N.C. 735, 737, 105 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1958). For additional Califor-
nia cases involving this ground but providing little if any guidance, see Hagan
v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 498, 2 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1960); Reynolds v. Special
Projects, Inc., 260 Cal. App. 2d 496, 67 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1968); Buss v. Martin Co.,
241 Cal. App. 2d 123, 50 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1966).
198. It may be argued that the California "rights or interests" ground is po-
tentially more significant than that contained in the North Carolina statute.
Under the North Carolina statute, the grounds for involuntary dissolution in-
clude, in addition to the rights or interests ground, only deadlock among direc-
tors or shareholders or the existence of a prior agreement entitling the
complaining shareholder to compel the dissolution of the corporation. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a) (1)-(4) (1975). Thus, the "rights or interests" ground in
North Carolina must also cover the more traditional oppression or wrongful
conduct standard as well as mismanagement, insolvency, and corporate waste.
See generally R. ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAw AND PRACTIcE
§ 29-12 (2d ed. 1974). Under § 1800(b) (4) of the California Corporations Code,
on the other hand, protection is provided to the minority shareholder against
"fraud, mismanagement or abuse of authority or persistent unfairness [or mis-
management or waste of corporate assets]," and the availability of the "rights




The virtually untapped potential of these statutes as
sources of power for minority shareholders is apparent;
whether they are well founded as a matter of policy is another
question. In permitting a court to focus solely on the rights and
interests of a single shareholder, the statutes are apparently
based on the assumption that the shareholders who desire to
avoid dissolution may simply purchase the interest of the dis-
satisfied shareholder. Stumpf itself articulates this assump-
tion: "A dissolution judgment does not necessarily entail a
sacrifice; the majority may preserve the corporation by buying
out the minority."199 To the extent that this assumption is cor-
rect, the result reached in Stumpf is appealing. If, however,
such funds are not available, or if they are not available on rea-
sonable terms, or if the withdrawal of capital by the com-
plaining shareholder has an adverse impact on the business or
the personal finances of the remaining shareholders,2 00 then
the issue becomes whether, as a matter of policy, the minority
shareholder should be able to withdraw funds or compel a dis-
solution of the corporation and, if so, on what terms. Like the
reasonable expectations approach to defining oppression, the
"rights or interests of the complaining shareholder" standard of
relief has so far failed to develop a satisfactory method for bal-
ancing the competing interests and expectations of minority
and majority shareholders.
the minority shareholder even where no significant misconduct on the part of
those in control is involved. Thus, the California ground is clearly expansive;
the breadth of the North Carolina provision, because it must also be utilized to
cover more traditional grounds for relief, is less clear.
199. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 234, 120 Cal Rptr. at 674. A similar observation is set
forth in Jordan, The Close Corporation Provisions of the New California Gen-
eral Corporation Law, 23 U.C.L.A. L. RaV. 1094, 1146 (1976): "An unwilling par-
ticipant in the enterprise should not be forced to continue in the absence of
some good reason. The other shareholders can always continue without him;
they have the right under section 2000 to prevent dissolution by purchasing his
shares." See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1 (1975) (specifying the forms of re-
lief which a court may grant other than dissolution, including an order that the
corporation or other shareholders purchase the shares of any shareholder).
200. See infra text accompanying notes 225-31.
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III. CONTINUITY OF LIFE VERSUS FREE
DISSOLVABILITY: THE ACCOMMODATION OF
COMPETING VALUES WITHIN THE
CLOSE CORPORATION
A. THE CORRECTNESS OF THE PARTNERSHIP ANALOGY
Given the significant influence of partnership law on the re-
form of the law applicable to close corporations, 201 considera-
tion should be given to whether the approach taken by the
U.P.A. to the permanence of the enterprise is appropriate for
the close corporation. For this purpose the partnership model
may be summarized as resting on two propositions: (1) the re-
lationship among partners is dissolvable at the will of any one
of them even in the face of an agreement to the contrary;2 02 and
(2) an agreement that establishes a partnership term or under-
taking may be express or implied and will have as its principal
effect the assignment of economic consequences in the event of
a "wrongful" dissolution.2 03
The attractiveness of partnership law as a model for the re-
form of close corporations law is based largely upon the per-
ceived similarity between the two types of enterprise.2 04 The
201. The attractiveness of the U.P.A. as a source for reform has not been
limited to corporate law. See, e.g., Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage:
Tradition and Change, 62 CAr. L. REv. 1169, 1255-58 (1974) (suggesting that the
U.P.A. might serve as a model for a "Uniform Conjugal Partnership Act"). See
also Weyrauch, Metamorphoses of Marriage, 13 FAr. L.Q. 415, 428-29 (1980).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 33-49.
204 See, e.g., Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ("In an
intimate business venture such as this, stockholders of a close corporation oc-
cupy a position similar to that of joint adventurers and partners"); Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 592-93, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975) ("Because
of the fundamental resemblance of the close corporation to the partnership, the
trust and confidence which are essential to this scale and manner of enterprise,
and the inherent danger to minority interests in the close corporation, we hold
that stockholders in the close corporation owe one another substantially the
same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one
another."); 68th St. Apartments, Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546, 549, 362
A.2d 78, 85 (1976), alffd, 150 N.J. Super. 47, 48, 374 A.2d 1222, 1222 (1977) (after
observing that "once corporate technisms are thus overcome, the relationship
of the principals can be seen to be that of partners or coventurers," the court
attempted to apply partnership dissolution principles to a close corporation); C.
RonnucH, supra note 110, § 2.21 (close corporation "functionally more closely
allied to the partnership than to the 'corporation"); Bradley, Toward a More
Perfect Close Corporation-The Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54
GEo. L.J. 1145, 1148-50 (1966) (shareholders in a close corporation wish their
ventures to assume many of the characteristics of partnerships as set forth by
the U.P.A); Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 26, at 2 (close corporation is the
"functional equivalent" of the partnership); Israels, The Close Corporation and
the Law, 33 CoRN. L.Q. 488, 491 (1948) ("IT]he participants [in a close corpora-
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most common and valid point of comparison is size.2 05 Because
of the small number of participants in such enterprises, it is
often assumed that most partners and owners of close corpora-
tions are active participants in the management of their busi-
nesses. This gives rise, or so the argument goes, to the
development of relationships between the parties which are
highly personal in nature. It is therefore not uncommon to see
close corporations referred to as "chartered partnerships" 2 6 or
"corporate partnerships," 20 7 and the thrust of much of corpo-
rate law reform has been to free the close corporation from the
traditional rigidities and formalities of the law applicable to
publicly-traded enterprises.2 08
tion] consider themselves 'partners' and seek to conduct'the corporate affairs
to a greater or lesser extent in the manner of a partnership," and the "objective
of the participants in a close corporation is to equate the scheme of governance
of their enterprise to that of a partnership").
205. In this sense size refers to the number of participants and not the
scope of operations. See F. O'NEAT, srupra note 118, § 1.04. Dean O'Neal notes
that "[w]hile Ford 'went public' in 1955, many sizeable companies still retain
most of the characteristics of a close corporation." Id., § 103.
206. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrolyte Co., 367 Mass. 578, 586, 238 N.E.2d
505, 512 (1975); Ripin v. United States Woven Label Co., 205 N.Y. 442, 447, 98 N.E.
855, 856 (1912).
207. See, e.g., Conway, The New York Fiduciary Concept in Incorporated
Partnerships and Joint Venturers, 30 FORD L. REv. 297, 306 (1961); Hornstein,
Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAw & CoNTEmp. PRoSs.
435, 436 (1953).
208. See Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53
VA. L. REv. 259, 284 (1967). See generally F. O'NAL, supra note 118, §§ 1.14(a)-
1.14(b). Professor Bradley has noted: "That corporation statutes were written
against the backdrop of the widely held corporation has been observed ad
nauseam." Bradley, supra note 204, at 1145. See also Hetherington & Dooley,
supra note 26, at 1 n.1 (the authors note that the trend toward legislative recog-
nition of the close corporation may be broader than might appear from the
number of states which have enacted integrated close corporation statutes be-
cause many other states have enacted statutory amendments of little relevance
to the publicly held corporation and obviously intended to apply primarily to
the closely held concern). For a listing of statutes recognizing close corpora-
tions, see supra note 15. Much of the reform accomplished to date has focused
upon permitting shareholders in close corporations to reach agreements and
arrange their affairs as if they were partners. See generally F. O'NEA, supra
note 118, § 5.07(a). See also CAL. CoRP. CODE § 300(b) (West 1977) (providing
that an agreement among shareholders of a close corporation will not be inva-
lid as "an attempt to treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or to ar-
range their relationships in a manner that would be appropriate only between
partners"). Indeed, it is now widely recognized that the shareholders' agree-
ment is not only a significant element of business planning but is also an im-
portant method of protecting the positions of minority shareholders. No
attempt will be made here to provide a representative sampling of the volumi-
nous literature on the subject of shareholders' agreements. See generally F.
O'NEAL, supra note 118, §§ 5.01-7.29. Compare Hetherington & Dooley, supra
note 26, at 2 ('The emphasis on contractual arrangements reveals a fundamen-
tal misunderstanding of the nature of close corporations. Whether the parties
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If it is assumed that the relationships among owners of
close corporations, like those among partners, are 'personal,"
then the logic of the official comment to section 31 of the U.P.A.
may, at least superficially, also apply to close corporations:
The relation of partners is one of agency. The agency is such a per-
sonal one that equity cannot enforce it even where the agreement pro-
vides that the partnership shall continue for a definite time. The power
of any partner to terminate the relation, even though in so doing he
breaks a contract, should, it is submitted, be recognized.
There are, however, a number of distinctions between close
corporations and partnerships which limit the applicability of
the partnership model of dissolution to the close corporation.
1. The Definitional Problem
This Article has assumed a point which has plagued com-
adopt special contractual arrangements is much less important than their abil-
ity to sustain a close, harmonious relationship over time.") with Elson, Share-
holders Agreements, A Shield for Minority Shareholders of Close Corporations,
22 Bus. LAw. 449, 457 (1967) ("I would emphasize that a well-drawn stockhold-
ers' agreement entered into contemporaneously with the formation of a corpo-
ration is the most effective means of protecting the minority shareholder.").
The willingness to respect shareholders' agreements has recently been ex-
panded by some courts to include implied understandings concerning reason-
able expectations, the denial of which may constitute oppressive conduct by
those in control of the corporation. See supra text accompanying notes 151-80.
It has been noted that implied agreements may be accorded the status of
"agreements" which alter the application of certain of the provisions of the
U.PYA See supra text accompanying notes 57-86. The extent to which compa-
rable informal understandings among shareholders in a close corporation
should be recognized is a question which has received comparatively little at-
tention. Dean O'Neal has suggested that "[t]hough oral voting agreements are
usually enforced if they are otherwise valid, unnecessary risks are run by fail-
ing to reduce agreements of this kind to writing." F. O'NEAL supra note 118,
§ 5.26. See also Wasserman v. Rosengarden, 84 Ill. App. 3d 713, 716, 406 N.E.2d
131, 134 (1980) (an oral agreement which included understandings concerning
election of officers and directors and distribution of salaries and profits "clearly
was a shareholder's agreement."); 68th Street Apartments, Inc. v. Lauricella,
142 N.J. Super. 546, 362 A.2d 78 (1976), aff'd, 150 N.J. Super. 48, 374 A.2d 1222
(1977) (a case where the court applied in a rather curious fashion partnership
principles in the context of a close corporation). It is interesting to compare
these decisions with the formalism not infrequently required by statute. For
example, although the California Corporations Code -recognizes the enforce-
ability of a shareholders' management agreement in a close corporation, CAl
CORP. CODE § 300(b) (West 1977), the agreement must be in writing and among
all of the shareholders, CAu. CORP. CODE § 186 (West 1977). Cf. CAL. CoRP.
CODE §§ 706(a), (d) (West 1977) (validating a written voting agreement but fur-
ther providing that this section does not invalidate any other agreement among
shareholders which is not otherwise illegal). See also F. O'NEAL, supra note
118, § 5.26 n.5 ("Some statutes which validate written agreements clearly indi-
cate that they are permissive only and 'shall not be interpreted to invalidate




mentators, courts, and legislatures. That point concerns the
definition of a close corporation.
Statutory definitions of close corporations frequently spec-
ify a maximum number of participants, although the use of
such widely varying maxima as ten,209 thirty,210 and fifty21' re-
flects a range of viewpoints on this issue. Judicial approaches
to the question tend to be less precise; one landmark opinion
defined a close corporation as "one in which the stock is held in
a few hands, or in a few families, and wherein it is not at all, or
only rarely, dealt in by buying or selling."2 12
Although no attempt will be made here to resolve this diffi-
cult issue,2 13 it must nevertheless be observed that, as the defi-
nition of a close corporation expands, the analogy with the
partnership becomes attenuated. For example, if a close corpo-
ration contains no more than two or three shareholders then
the analogy is quite appealing when the point of reference is a
partnership containing a similar number of participants. On
the other hand, when a close corporation consists of, for exam-
ple, fifty shareholders, one may question the extent to which
the relationships among the participants in that enterprise bear
a significant resemblance to those existing in a corporation or
partnership consisting of only two or three members. 2 14 In-
209. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(a) (West 1977).
210. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 342 (1975).
211. See, e.g., Proposed Model Act Supplement, supra note 130, at 277.
212. Galler v. Galler, 32 IL. 2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583 (1964), appeal dis-
missed, 69 ll. App. 2d 397,.217 N.E.2d 111 (1966), modified, 21 Mli. App. 3d 811, 316
N.E.2d 114 (1974). See also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 586,
328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975) (a close corporation is "typified by: (1) a small
number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock, and
(3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the management, direction
and operations of the corporation").
213. See generally F. O'NEAL, supra note 118, § 1.02. Dean O'Neal has sug-
gested that a close corporation is one whose shares are not generally traded in
the securities markets. Id. This, of course, will include some entities with a
sizeable number of owners, most of whom may be passive investors. For a sug-
gestion that a close corporation should be defined as one in which all of the
stockholders are active participants in the management and conduct of the
business, see C. ROHaucH, supra note 110, § 2.21. Another commentator has
taken a quite different view. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRucTuRE OF THE CORPO-
RATION 12 (1976) ("[I]t will frequently happen even in closely held corporations
that by accident or design there are some shareholders who do not wish to be
active in the management of the business.").
214. If the definition of a close corporation focuses upon whether or not the
shares are publicly-traded, the number of shareholders may be far in excess of
fifty. Most close corporations, however, have a more limited number of partici-
pants. Professor Conard has estimated that almost ninety-five percent of cor-
porations have ten or fewer shareholders. See Conard, The Corporate Census:
A Preliminary Exploration, 63 CAT. L REV. 440, 458-59 (1975). A study of Swed-
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deed, it is reasonable to assume that the rare general partner-
ship consisting of fifty participants will tend to adopt certain
characteristics more traditionally associated with the corpora-
tion, including centralized management.21 5
The integrity of the definition of a close corporation is im-
portant in evaluating perhaps the most important characteristic
of a small ownership base-the so-called 'personal" relation-
ship which is said to exist among the owners. In fact, it is the
nature and comparability of this personal relationship which is
said to be that characteristic of the close corporation which
makes it most like the partnership.216
2. Evaluating the "Personal" Nature of the Relationships
Categorization as "personal" does little to describe the true
nature of a relationship. It may, for example, be one of friend-
ship, marriage, or professional or business association. Al-
though it is undeniably correct that the relationship among
shareholders in a corporation with two or three owners is likely
to be more personal than that which exists among shareholders
in a publicly held corporation, it does not follow that the rela-
tionship is necessarily as personal as that which may exist in a
comparably-sized partnership. In fact, there are several rea-
sons why differences between the legal principles governing
the two forms of enterprise may facilitate, if not require, the
development of closer personal relationships or dependencies
among partners than among shareholders.
ish corporations cited in this article provides evidence that, at least in Sweden,
the largest percentage of corporations is at the low end of the one-to-ten spec-
trum. This study of the largest Swedish corporations indicates that thirty-nine
percent are owned by only one shareholder and twenty-seven percent have be-
tween two and ten shareholders. Id. at 456 n.33 (discussing Severiges 500 Stor-
sta Foretag, STocKHoLM: EKONOmSiK LrI ERATUR AB (1972)).
215. The right given each partner under § 18(e) of the U.P.A. to participate
in management is subject "to any agreement between them," U.P.A. § 18, and
management authority may be delegated to a specific partner. See, e.g., Bern-
stein v. Ross, 22 Mich. App. 117, 120-21, 117 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1970); Elle v. Bab-
bitt, 259 Or. 590, 602-03, 488 P.2d 440, 445-46 (1971); McCallum v. Asbury, 238 Or.
257, 261-62, 393 P.2d 774, 776 (1964).
216. See, e.g., Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (refer-
ring to the close corporation as an "intimate business venture" and comparing
it to a partnership); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 592-93, 328
N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975) (speaking of the "trust and confidence which are essen-
tial to this scale and manner of enterprise"); Elson, supra note 208, at 450
("[Tihe old bromide that entering into a partnership is like entering into a
marriage applies with equal force to close corporations."); Hetherington &
Dooley, supra note 26, at 2-3 ('Typically, [partnerships and close corporations]
are founded by individuals who have a virtually complete identity of interests
and strong feelings of trust and confidence for one another.").
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No corporation carries with it mutual agency; every part-
nership does.2 17 The limitation of liability accorded to share-
holders in a close corporation has the effect of defining the risk
of each shareholder 2 18 as the amount of his or her investment
in the enterprise;219 the risks of the partner, on the other hand,
are not defined and the ultimate legal exposure of a partner is
to a large extent dependent upon the actions of his or her
coventurers. No shareholder has an automatic right to partici-
pate in management; every partner does. The scheme provided
by the U.P.A. for the management of a partnership is one in
which each participant has a potentially significant role to play
in the management of the partnership, and the ability of even a
minority partner to bind the partnership in the ordinary course
of business may thus give rise to a mutual dependency not
present in the limited liability setting of the close corpora-
tion.220 The corporate entity, therefore, may have something of
217. See U.P.A. § 9.
218. Any personal guarantees required of a shareholder would increase the
risk, which will nevertheless remain defined.
219. It is interesting that the reform of close corporation law has not served
as the occasion for a re-examination of the principle of limited liability. See
Fessler, supra note 54.
220. Several significant distinctions between the participation rights of part-
ners and shareholders should be recognized.
Section 18(e) of the U.P.A. provides that "fall partners have equal rights
in the management and conduct of the partnership business." This is subject
to any agreement between the partners. See also U.P-.A §§ 9 ("Partner Agent
of Partnership as to Partnership Business"), 10 ("Conveyance of Real Property
of the Partnership"), 11 ("Partnership Bound by Admission of Partner"), 12
("Partnership Charged with Knowledge of or Notice to Partner"), 13 ("Partner-
ship Bound by Partner's Wrongful Act"), 14 ("Partnership Bound by Partner's
Breach of Trust"), and 15 ("Nature of Partner's Liability"). See generally D.
FEssix, supra note 13, at 18-85. Historically, minority shareholders have not
had a comparable right to participate in management. Because of the sharp
distinction between ownership and management of corporations, the minority
shareholder who is not also an officer or director has no management role
whatsoever. Even if the participant is a director, he or she may constantly be
outvoted on issues of importance, and as an officer, the participant's duties may
be defined and subject to supervision by the board or other officers.
Further, unanimity plays an important role under the U.P.A., for some ma-
jor decisions concerning the partnership may require the approval of all the
partners. Section 18(h) of the U.P.A. provides that "[a]ny difference arising as
to ordinary matters connected with the partnership business may be decided
by a majority of the partners; but no act in contravention of the agreement be-
tween the parties may be done without the consent of all of the partners." This
section does not specifically address decisions which are neither related to "or-
dinary matters" nor covered by the partnership agreement. It would appear,
however, that matters outside the scope of the partnership business require
unanimous consent. See, e.g., A. BROMBERG, supra note 39, § 65 at 381-82; M. EI-
SENBERG, supra note 213, at 10-11. See also U.PJL § 9(3) (c) ("one or more but
less than all the partners have no authority to [d]o any ... act which would
make it impossible to carry on the ordinary business of a partnership"). Una-
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a depersonalizing effect upon the relationship among share-
nimity requirements, on the other hand, are not common under corporate
codes. But cf. Mn. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 4-601 (Michie Cum. Supp.
1981) (a consolidation, merger, share exchange, or transfer of assets of a close
corporation requires unanimous shareholder approval). While some decisions
may require supermajority votes of the shareholders, see, e.g., TEx. Bus. CORP.
AcT. ANN. art. 5.03 (Vernon 1980), VA. CODE § 13.1-70 (1978) (two-thirds share-
holder vote required for merger or consolidation), the minority shareholder
who does not have, alone or in concert with others, a sufficient number of
shares to affect the outcome of such a vote may be disregarded. Certain major
decisions however, may, activate appraisal rights for minority shareholders.
See generally M. EISENBERG, supra, at 68-84., Buxbaum, The Dissenter's Ap-
praisal Remedy, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1229 (1976); Manning, The Shareholder's
Appraisal Remedy: An Essay For Frank Coker, 72 YALE LJ. 223 (1962); Note,
Valuation of Dissenter's Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 I~Hv. L. REV. 1453
(1966).
There also exists a distinction between the concept of majority rule in part-
nerships and close corporations. Majority in a partnership refers to numbers
and not interests. See U.PA. § 18(h) ("Any difference arising as to ordinary
matters connected with the partnership business may be decided by a majority
of the partners"). It has been suggested that the U.P.A. principle "is commonly
varied by leaving ordinary business decisions to a 'majority in interest."' Com-
ment, Drafting Problems of Partnership Agreements, 40 CAL. L. REV. 66, 70
(1952). The authority cited for this proposition, Worcester, supra note 55, at
992, however, does not support it. In a corporation, majority refers to shares
rather than individuals. This was not always the case:
That is, each shareholder was entitled to one vote if given by him in
person. This was at first the rule in the East India Company, but natu-
rally enough it soon became distasteful to the larger owners, and vari-
ous changes were made at different times; ... It soon became usual to
allow the larger holder more than one vote, and it was customarily pro-
vided in the charters how many votes should belong to the owner of a
given number of shares, the owner of a large number having more
votes than the owner of a few, but not proportionately more.
Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800 II, 2 H v.
L. REV. 149, 156-57 (1888). Further, since management of a corporation is typi-
cally entrusted to an elected Board of Directors, the number of matters on
which a shareholder vote is required is limited. The typical Board itself func-
tions by majority vote. See, e.g., MODEL BuslNEss CORP. AcT § 40 (1980).
Partners have greater access to information than shareholders. Section 19
of the U.P.A. provides that "every partner shall at all times have access to and
may inspect and copy any of [the partnership books]." This right is also "sub-
ject to any agreement between the partners," and at least one court has sug-
gested that such an agreement may be implied. See People v. Phillips, 207
Misc. 205, 206, 137 N.Y.S.2d 697, 699 (1955). In adopting the U.P.A., Alabama
modified § 19 so that this right is available at all "reasonable times." AL. CODE
§ 10-8-45 (1980). Further, § 20 of the U.P.A. provides: "Partners shall render on
demand true and full information of all things affecting the partnership to any
partner or the legal representative of any deceased partner or partner under le-
gal disability." Although this section requires the rendering of information
only "on demand," it has been suggested that an affirmative duty to disclose
may arise from the fiduciary duties of partners to each other. See A. BROM-
BERG, supra note 39, at 388. See also U.P.A. §§ 21 (providing that partners are
accountable as fiduciaries), 22 (setting forth the circumstances under which a
partner may demand a formal accounting as to partnership affairs). Sharehold-
ers, on the other hand, must generally establish a "proper purpose" in order to
gain access to information concerning their corporation. See generally W. CARY
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holders, at least when compared to that which exists among
partners.
3. Formalities in the Creation of the Legal Relationships
It is ironic, to say the least, that this most serious of busi-
ness relationships, a partnership, may not only be created with-
out the observance of any formalities, but may also be
effectively established to the surprise of one or more of the par-
ticipants.221 Both the point at which the relationship is estab-
lished and the existence of oral or implied understandings
affecting the applicability of various provisions of the U.P.A.
may be unclear. Consequently, the U.P.A. starts from the prop-
osition that the partnership relationship, which is so easily es-
tablished but which has such potentially serious economic
consequences to each of the partners, may be dissolved at any
time by the express will of any of the partners. 222
Because corporations can arise only by design, the reasons
for free dissolvability do not apply with the same force to close
corporations. Not only are shareholders better able to define
the risks involved in the venture because of their limited liabil-
ity, but the mere act of incorporation requires some degree of
deliberation and, hopefully, awareness by the participants of
the nature of the relationship about to be established. The de-
liberation required for the creation of a corporation, combined
with the fact that shareholder status confers neither an auto-
matic right to participate in management nor real or ostensible
powers of agency, demonstrates that the reasons which support
the application of a policy of free dissolvability to partnerships
do not apply with equal force to corporations. 223
& M. EISENBERG, supra note 118, at 344-53; F. O'NEAi, supra note 2, at § 3.09-3.11;
Starr and Schmidt, Inspection Rights of Corporate Stockholders: Toward a
More Effective Statutory Mode4 26 U. Fia. L. REv. 173 (1974). It has been sug-
gested that significant practical obstacles may face the shareholder desiring
information:
It is standard corporate practice to question the motives and good faith
of the applicant, although in almost all cases he will prevail. The de-
fense is usually pro forma and not supported by the cases. The objec-
tives are to wear down the shareholder, undermine his efforts, increase
his costs, and delay any further steps he may take.
W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra, at 351-52. While such a limitation on the
rights of shareholders may be justified for publicly held corporations, it has
been criticized as inappropriate for closely held concerns. See O'Neal, Molding
the Corporate Form to Particular Business Situations: Optional Charter
Clauses, 10 VAND. L. REV. 1, 40 (1956).
221. " See supra note 53.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32.
223. The point is not that partnerships are fundamentally different from
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B. FREE DISSOLUTION AND THE CLOSE CORPORATION
It may be argued that, even though the analogy between
close corporations and partnerships suffers from some limita-
tions, the partnership model provides a useful method by
which the interests of minority shareholders in close corpora-
tions may be protected. By giving each shareholder the right to
compel a dissolution of the corporation and a liquidation of its
assets, this model would provide minority interests with far
greater liquidity than they now enjoy. In addition, those desir-
ing to avoid the consequences of dissolution would have an in-
centive to resolve differences with the dissatisfied minority or,
failing this, to negotiate a purchase of the minority's interest at
fair value.224
The concept that corporations should be dissolvable at the
will of a minority shareholder, however, rests upon at least
three questionable assumptions. The first is that the remaining
shareholders may easily avoid the negative or unfair conse-
quences of a dissolution by purchasing the interest of the dis-
satisfied shareholder. The second is that an adjustment of
either the amount payable to the withdrawing partner in the
event of a buy-out or the method by which that amount is paid
need not be made to reflect the premature termination of the
relationship. The third is that the value of protecting the inter-
ests of minority shareholders is superior to that of continuity of
corporate life and can best be served by undermining the per-
manence of the corporate entity.
close corporations; rather, it is that there are sufficient distinctions to warrant
careful consideration of the extent to which particular principles set forth in
the U.P. are applicable to close corporations. Rather than relying upon the
supposed comparability of close corporations and partnerships to justify the
broad adoption of partnership law as a model for reform of close corporation
law, consideration should be given to the subtle yet significant distinctions
which exist, and are likely to continue to exist, between partnerships and close
corporations. To the extent that particular provisions of the U.P.. are also ap-
propriate models for the reform of corporate law, it should be because the ra-
tionale for the borrowed principles applies equally to both partnerships and
close corporations and not because partnerships and close corporations are
thought to be identical and therefore should be governed by the same
principles.
224. The most complete presentation of this theory is found in Hetherington
& Dooley, supra note 26. See a1yo Hetherington, supra note 55. At various
points in this Article the proposal will be referred to as the free dissolvability
proposal. As advanced by Professors Hetherington and Dooley, it would permit
the remaining shareholders to avoid a dissolution through the purchase of the
interest of the withdrawing shareholder.
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1. The Myth of the Painless Buy-Out
The assumption that those who desire to avoid a dissolu-
tion of the corporate enterprise may easily do so by purchasing
the interest of a dissatisfied minority shareholder225 ignores a
number of problems which may be encountered by those who
wish to continue the venture.
There are limited sources of funds which will enable the
corporation or the remaining shareholders to purchase the in-
terest of a minority shareholder. Conceivably, either the corpo-
ration or the remaining shareholders may have sufficient liquid
assets to purchase the interest. If the corporation is the pur-
chaser, however, it is thereby deprived of the ability to utilize
those funds in a fashion best suited for the needs of the busi-
ness.2 26 In addition, the dispersal of corporate funds to a with-
drawing shareholder may render the creditors of the enterprise
less secure,2 27 and as a result may impair the ability of the cor-
poration to obtain additional financing in the future.228 If
shareholders are the purchasers, they may be placed in a posi-
tion of committing far greater personal resources to the enter-
225. See, e.g., Stumpf v. C.E. Stumpf & Sons, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 120
Cal. Rptr. 671 (1975), supra text accompanying notes 187-200. See also Hether-
ington & Dooley, supra note 26, at 30, where it is observed that "[ilf a court or-
ders dissolution and one party wishes to continue the business, a mutually
advantageous purchase of the other's interest will result." The authors further
observe that the question of financing the buy-out is "irrelevant to the analy-
sis." Id. at n.80. The problems of financing the buy-out, however, should not be
treated as irrelevant unless the expectations of the other participants who com-
mitted their capital to the venture and desire to continue the business are also
treated as irrelevant.
226. There also may exist one or more "neutral" shareholders arguing that
the expenditure of funds is not for a proper corporate purpose.
227. An additional issue is the extent to which statutory restrictions on the
distribution of funds to shareholders through redemptions or dividends would,
or should, affect the purchase of an unhappy shareholder's interest by the cor-
poration. See, e.g., MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 45 (1980) (distributions may
not be made if they would render the corporation unable to pay its debts as
they become due or the assets of the corporation would be less than the sum of
its liabilities and the amount payable pursuant to any liquidation preference
rights of outstanding shares). For a discussion of this issue as applied to the
free dissolvability proposal, see Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 26, at 55-56.
A "lawful" distribution may, of course, nevertheless affect the credit-worthiness
of a corporation; similarly, the possibility that a "lawful" distribution to a share-
holder may be made in the future may also be a matter of somd concern to the
creditors.
228. If the payment is to be made in installments, the corporate debt in-
creases. In addition, payments to the withdrawing shareholder may decrease
the shareholders' equity in the corporation. As the amount of debt increases in
relation to the equity, a perception of increased risk in an extension of credit
may result. See generally Baxter, Leverage, Risk of Ruin and the Cost of Capi-
tal 22 J. Fmn. 395 (1967).
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prise than they might originally have anticipated or either
reducing or terminating their participation in the venture.
The corporation or the remaining shareholders may not
have sufficient liquid assets to fund the purchase. In such cir-
cumstances it may be necessary for either or both of them to
attempt to obtain financing for the purchase. As recent exper-
iences in the financial markets have demonstrated, there are no
guarantees that such financing will be available.229 Either the
condition of the credit market or the perceived credit risk may
make it impossible or costly to obtain financing. Even assum-
ing that financing is available, increasing corporate or share-
holder debt may make the securing of future financing more
difficult or expensive.
An alternative method of funding a buy-out is to attract a
new investor to the enterprise. This individual may either
purchase the interest of the withdrawing shareholder directly
or subscribe to additional capital stock of the corporation, al-
lowing the corporation to utilize the proceeds to purchase the
interest of the withdrawing shareholder. If such an individual
can be found, however, he or she may be willing to commit
funds to the venture only upon receipt of significant conces-
sions from the controlling shareholders. Thus, any "deal" pur-
suant to which the shareholders initially committed their
resources must now be modified because of a fellow share-
holder's desire to withdraw from the venture.
Finding a satisfactory method of funding the purchase of
the interest of a shareholder who demands either a dissolution
or buy-out represents a serious problem. Much of the litera-
ture devoted to the use of buy-sell or cross-purchase agree-
ments in estate planning focuses on exactly the same problem.
In estate planning, however, the employment of such agree-
ments is greatly facilitated by the availability of life insurance
to fund buy-outs. 230 No comparable source exists for funding a
buy-out precipitated by a dissatisfied shareholder.
Funding obstacles may to some extent be relieved by care-
ful drafting of the terms of the buy-out. For example, one pro-
229. See generally Nadler, Inflation, Commercial Lending, and America's
Future, 61 J. CoMM. BANx LENDING 23 (1979).
230. See, e.g., Kahn, Mandatory Buy-Out Agreements for Stock of Closely
Held Corporations, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1969); Matson, A New Look at Business
Buy-Out Agreements, 25 PRAc. LAw. No. 5, at 43 (1979); Samuels, Funding -Part-
nership Buy-and.Sell Agreements with Life Insurance, 35 TAXEs 857 (1957);
Sherman, Problems of Inadequate Funding of a Buy-Sell Agreement, 110 TF. &
EST. 986 (1971); Note, The Use of Life Insurance to Fund Agreements for Dispo-
sition of a Business Interest at Death, 71 HAnv. I. REV. 687 (1958).
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posal has suggested that protection can be provided "against
sudden cash drain by a provision in the proposed statute au-
thorizing the court, upon a showing of good cause, to provide
for installment payments of the purchase price for a period of
time not exceeding five years."23 1 Although this may provide
protection against a "sudden cash drain," it still exposes the
corporation or the remaining shareholders to a "sustained cash
drain."
Thus, if the dissatisfied minority shareholder has the power
to compel a dissolution of a close corporation, avoiding this re-
sult by means of a buy-out will often be far from painless. The
question remains, however, whether the dissatisfied share-
holder should be in a position to inflict this result on the other
participants and, if so, whether adjustments should be made in
the value of the shareholder's interest or the terms pursuant to
which payment is made. These questions in turn give rise to a
need to evaluate the nature of the mutual commitment made
by shareholders in a close corporation.
2. Implied Undertakings and Close Corporations
Free dissolvability of close corporations would provide
many minority shareholders with bargaining leverage that they
do not now enjoy.23 2 In some instances, this leverage would, of
course, be nonexistent because the controlling shareholders
would have both the resources and the desire to eliminate the
minority shareholder from the venture. In other situations,
however, the controlling shareholders might perceive the mi-
nority shareholder's threat as real and be forced to adjust their
actions in order to accommodate the needs or demands of the
minority shareholder. Whether a minority shareholder in this
latter situation should be given negotiating leverage through
the power to disrupt is perhaps best analyzed by comparison to
the position of his or her counterpart in the partnership.
Although the proposal making close corporations freely dis-
solvable is based on partnership principles, it fails to make the
important distinction, recognized by the U.P.A., between the
ability to withdraw and the terms under which the withdrawal
will be made.233 The U.P.A. starts from the proposition that a
partnership is freely dissolvable, but it also recognizes that
231. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 26, at 51.
232. This leverage could be used to negotiate either favorable terms for the
withdrawal or a change in business policies. See supra note 109.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 27-45.
[Vol. 67:1
DISSATISFIED PARTICIPANT
partners have sometimes intended something other than a frag-
ile relationship and in such situations the U.P.A. imposes what
may be undesirable consequences on the partner who prema-
turely dissolves the association. Some courts have even found
dissolutions wrongful because of implied, as opposed to ex-
press, partnership terms or undertakings.234 The case for im-
plied terms or undertakings may be even greater in the
"typical" close corporation, the formation of which requires a
measure of deliberation and adherence to formalities. Thus, in
the case of the close corporation it is reasonable to reverse the
assumptions of the U.P.A. and start from the rebuttable pre-
sumption that those who form a corporation intend that the
contributions of each will remain available for the needs of the
business and that no shareholder has a right to use as leverage
for the purchase of his or her interest the threat of a dissolu-
tion of the corporate entity. To the extent that this reversal of
assumptions is appropriate, one may question the policy of per-
mitting an individual to treat an investment in a close corpora-
tion as if it were a mutual fund, subject to liquidation at any
time without regard to the effect which this may have on the
coventurers or creditors.2 3 5
3. Some Benefits of Permanence
Because of the legal effects of the partnership relationship
and the ease and informality with which it can be created, any
attempt to accord a significant measure of permanence to a
partnership would be ill-advised as a matter of policy. Con-
tinuity of life, on the other hand, is frequently advanced as a
desirable characteristic of the corporate form of organization, 236
providing benefits not available under the partnership mode of
association. A number of factors may, however, serve to under-
mine the principle that close corporations represent permanent
relationships. 237 An evaluation of the benefits of continuity of
life is therefore most realistically approached by examining the
problems which might arise if close corporations were rendered
234. This assumes that the business is continued by the remaining part-
ners. See U.P. § 38; supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
235. The free dissolvability alternative ignores this consideration and in-
stead treats as a paramount value the freedom to redirect resources:
"[E]ficiency requires that an owner be able to redirect the use of his resources
in accordance with his changing perceptions. Liquidity is thus essential to the
efficient allocation of resources in the capital market, .... ." Hetherington &
Dooley, supra note 26, at 44.
236. See supra note 110.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 111-16.
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more freely dissolvable than is presently the case. A considera-
tion of some of the more desirable consequences of a measure
of permanence follows.
a. Ability to Attract Financing
The financing problems of a close corporation range from
securing the confidence of trade creditors extending credit in
the ordinary course of business to providing a degree of psy-
chological if not financial security to larger lenders. Because
corporations are distinct debtors,238 society encourages a meas-
ure of corporate continuity of life. If corporate funds must be
used to purchase the interest of a dissatisfied minority share-
holder, the stability of the debtor may be undermined and the
relative risk of extending credit may increase in the eyes of the
unsecured, and possibly even secured, creditors. Perhaps even
more unsettling to the creditors is the prospect of dissolution
followed by a liquidation of corporate assets, since there is no
assurance that the amount realized from the sale of assets will
be sufficient to satisfy corporate obligations. To make corpora-
tions more freely dissolvable, therefore, may affect the terms
under which they are able to secure credit.
b. Ability to Attract Equity Investors
Whether free dissolvability encourages or discourages the
commitment of capital or labor to closely held corporations
may depend upon whether the investment in a given situation
results in a controlling or a minority interest in the venture.
From the point of view of a controlling shareholder, the current
state of affairs approaches the ideal, for if he or she controls
sufficient shares to cause a voluntary dissolution,23 9 then the
corporation is, from this person's perspective alone, freely dis-
solvable. To extend the dissolution right and thereby grant
bargaining leverage to additional shareholders will subject the
controlling shareholder to risks not now faced and, accordingly,
may render less desirable the position of controlling share-
holder in a closely held corporation. Conversely, according mi-
nority shareholders additional bargaining leverage through the
right of dissolution may render minority positions in closely
held corporations more attractive, although the possibility that
any other shareholder may disrupt the continuity of the enter-
238. See In re First Nat'l Bank of Arthur, Ill., 23 F. Supp. 255, 256-57 (E.D. Ill.
1938).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 113-16.
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prise should be of concern to even a minority participant in the
venture.
c. Enhanced Role for Shareholders' Agreements
Recent reform of corporate law tolerating, if not encourag-
ig, shareholders' agreements concerning the allocation of con-
trol within and the management policies of the enterprise has
borrowed heavily from the overriding principle of the U.P.A.
that participants in a business venture should be in a position
to arrange their affairs by agreement.240 This increasing recog-
nition accorded the shareholders' agreement may be under-
mined to a significant extent if a participant is free at any point
to escape from what is perceived to be an undesirable agree-
ment by demanding a dissolution of the corporation or a
purchase of his or her interest.24 1
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPECTATIONS IN A CLOSE
CORPORATION
The development of the reasonable expectations analysis
as a method of defining oppression has been evaluated in an
earlier portion of this Article.242 It was there suggested that the
approach not only significantly departs from the fault-based op-
pression standard, with which there is societal experience, but
also improperly ignores the expectations of participants other
than the dissatisfied shareholder. Expectations of participants
in a business venture should not, however, be treated as irrele-
vant.243 This section will focus on the extent to which recogni-
240. See supra note 208. The importance of the agreement in any type of
planning process is obvious, and it is somewhat ironic that the tendency of
planning in the partnership context may be directed to a significant degree to-
wards attempting to provide some measure of stability to the venture. For ex-
ample, establishing a definite term or providing for a deferred pay out of a
withdrawing partner's interest can each be viewed as an attempt to provide a
measure of continuity of life to an otherwise fragile relationship. In general,
however, partnerships lack the permanence which would give agreements
among their participants anywhere near the importance that they enjoy as
broad-based planning devices in the context of close corporations.
241. If free dissolvability were allowed, it would not be surprising if most
agreements began to include a waiver of the dissolution right, thus rendering
the privilege meaningless when the parties have reduced their understandings
to writing. Professors Hetherington and Dooley would attempt to limit this re-
sult by restricting the waiver of the buy-out right to two years, thus presumably
rendering it virtually impossible to contract for permanence. See Hetherington
& Dooley, supra note 26, at 52.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 154-180.
243. Frustration of expectations may in some situations be the basis for a
claim based upon breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nurs-
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tion can be given to the frustration of expectations as an
independent basis for relief at the same time that the expecta-
tions of others and the benefits of some measure of perma-
nence are recognized.244 If the matter is approached as
independent of the issue of misconduct, relief may be tailored
to reflect the absence of wrongful conduct by those in control of
the venture.
1. Legitimizing Expectations
An expectations-based analysis should not be used to ex-
tend relief to all types of unhappy shareholders. The dissatis-
fied shareholder most in need of relief but least likely to find it
under most modern statutory and equitable frameworks is the
one who committed labor or capital to an endeavor on the basis
of certain expectations or assumptions which now appear inca-
pable of fulfillment. It is not sufficient to tell this participant
that so long as the venture is solvent and those in control do
not act in an abusive or wasteful fashion, his or her capital
must remain committed to a venture which may be meeting
ing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976) (relief sought did not in-
clude dissolution).
244. Dean O'Neal has described the importance of expectations as follows:
'The reasonable expectations of the shareholders, as they exist at the inception
of the enterprise, and as they develop thereafter through a course of dealing
concurred in by all of them, is perhaps the most reliable guide to a just solution
of a dispute among shareholders . . . " O'Neal, supra note 7, at 885-87. See
also O'Neal & Magill, California's New Close Corporation Legislation, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1155, 1166-69 (1976). It is unclear to what extent Dean O'Neal
would provide relief solely upon the basis of a frustration of reasonable expec-
tations or use reasonable expectations as a basis for defining the type of mis-
conduct which in turn justifies relief. It appears, however, that he would not
limit the application of an expectations analysis to defining misconduct. See
also Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries, Ltd., [1972] 2 W.L.IR 1289, [1972] 2 All
E.R. 492, where the House of Commons interpreted the "just and equitable"
standard for the winding up of companies under § 222 of the English Compa-
nies Act. Lord Wilberforce concluded that the removal of a minority share-
holder from the Board justified this relief:
[T] here is room in company law for recognition of the fact that be-
hind it [a legal entity], or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights,
expectations and obligations inter se which are not necessarily sub-
merged in the company structure. That structure is defined by the
Companies Act and by the articles of association by which the share-
holders agree to be bound .... The "just and equitable" provision
does not... entitle one party to disregard the obligation he assumes
by entering a company, nor the court to dispense him from it. It does,
as equity always does, enable the court to subject the exercise of legal
rights to equitable considerations; considerations, that is, of a personal
character arising between one individual and another, which may make
it unjust, or inequitable, to insist on legal rights, or to exercise them in
a particular way.
[1972] 2 W.L.R. at 1297, [1972] 2 All E.R. at 500.
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only the needs of others. A satisfactory approach to the prob-
lem must be sympathetic to this individual and at the same
time recognize that the other participants in the venture have
not acted in a socially objectionable fashion and have a legiti-
mate interest in minimizing any disruptive impact which may
result from withdrawal of the dissatisfied shareholder. The two
tasks of an expectations-based analysis must therefore be to
define the circumstances under which a dissatisfied share-
holder will be entitled to relief and to structure carefully the
type of relief which should be available.
a. Prerequisites for Relief
Setting forth the prerequisites for relief under an expecta-
tions-based analysis is a difficult task, for the inquiry is based
on subjective aspects of the original basis upon which the rela-
tionship between the participants was formed, the present
state of the relationship, and the likelihood that the expecta-
tions will be realized. The following set of criteria, however,
should be helpful in at least narrowing the inquiry. Except as
noted, the burden should be on the dissatisfied shareholder to
establish the satisfaction of each criterion. It should be empha-
sized that these guidelines are intended to apply only to an ex-
pectations-based analysis; the availability of relief now
provided by statute or equity for such matters as oppression,
deadlock, mismanagement, and failure of corporate purposes
should continue to be available to minority shareholders unaf-
fected by the proposals contained in this Article. 245
To be entitled to relief under an expectations-based analy-
sis, the dissatisfied shareholder should show: (1) that he or she
became a participant because of a substantial expectation or
set of expectations known or assumed by the other partici-
pants; (2) that the prospect that the expectation will be
achieved is unlikely; and (3) that the failure to achieve the ex-
pectation was in large part beyond the control of the
participant.
(1) Substantial Expectation Accepted by Other Participants
One of the problems of the reasonable expectations ap-
proach to the concept of oppression is that it does not consider
the possibility that an individual may have had privately held
expectations which were not made known to the other partici-
245. See supra text accompanying notes 121-33.
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pants, and which had they been made known, would not have
been accepted. Such a failed communication is the responsibil-
ity of the participant now asserting the expectation. Therefore,
only expectations embodied in understandings, express or im-
plied, among the participants should be recognized.
The clearest type of expectation is one which is set forth in
a shareholders' agreement signed by all of the parties. In this
type of situation the expectations-based analysis would not
preclude the dissatisfied shareholder from pursuing whatever
contractual rights he or she may have. As Dean O'Neal has in-
dicated, however, and as the previous discussion of the ten-
dency of some courts to imply terms in partnership agreements
has affirmed, informal agreements are common in small busi-
ness ventures:
A close corporation's charter and bylaws almost never reflect the full
business bargain of the participants. The participants typically enter
into 'agreements' among themselves, which sometimes are reduced to
writing in the form of a formal preincorporation agreement or a share-
holders' agreement, but which are often oral, perhaps just vague and
half-articulated understandings. Even when the participants formalize
their bargain in a written shareholders' agreement, their participation
in the business is often grounded on assumptions that are not men-
tioned in the agreement.246
That assumptions are not made explicit does not require that
they be disregarded when they are accepted or assumed by the
other participants. By requiring that the expectations at least
be based on implicit understandings, the expectations-based
analysis may be viewed as further recognition of the rights of
shareholders in a close corporation to arrange their affairs by
agreement.
Only substantial expectations should be accorded recogni-
tion. The classic example of what, in a given situation, may be
a substantial expectation is employment. When combined with
the common tendency of a close corporation not to pay divi-
dends, the loss or denial of employment may prove to be devas-
tating to the minority participant. The extent to which
246. O'Neal, supra note 7, at 886 (emphasis added). See also Ebrahimi v.
Westbourne Galleries Ltd., [1972] 2 W.L.R. 1289, 1297, [1972] 2 All ERL 492, 500
(quoted supra note 244). Cf. Wasserman v. Rosengarden, 84 fll. App. 3d 713, 406
N.E.2d 131 (1980) (enforcing oral shareholders' agreement). It should be noted
that the parol evidence rule may preclude certain disputes on the basis of mat-
ters not contained in an existing written agreement and render legally incom-
petent evidence of prior promises, agreements, or understandings. See Ivitchill
v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646 (1928). See generally 3 A. CoRmm, CoPBIm oN
CoNTRAcTs §§ 573-96 (1960 & Supp. 1971). For a discussion of the application of
the expectations-based analysis when there exists a written shareholders'
agreement, see infra text accompanying notes 259-61.
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expectations other than employment should be treated as sub-
stantial must be decided on a case-by-case basis.247
(2) Unlikely Prospect of Expectation Achievement
This criterion is largely self-explanatory. It should be
noted, however, that there is no compelling reason to provide
relief under the expectations-based analysis for temporary
rather than permanent frustrations of expectations. Further, a
court should not grant relief for failure to achieve expectations
within an unreasonably short period of time.248 It would ap-
pear appropriate to require the dissatisfied shareholder to es-
tablish prima facie the satisfaction of this condition. The
burden should then shift to those opposing relief to establish
that there is some significant probability that the expectation
will be achieved.
247. For example, the removal of a minority shareholder as a director is fre-
quently combined with the discharge of that individual as an officer-employee.
See generally F. O'Nn.AL, supra note 2, § 3.06. This action affects both the right
to participate in business decisions and the right to receive income for services
performed for the venture. Ordinarily, it may be expected that the denial of in-
come is more serious than the loss of the directorship, which is presumably a
minority position on the board and therefore in most situations powerless to
effect corporate action. To the extent that supermajority voting requirements
imposed by the articles, bylaws or statutes will render the denial of the seat on
the board more meaningful, the expectation that a role in management would
be accorded is, of course, more substantial. Failing this, it would not appear
that the denial of a right to be formally heard would, independent of a dis-
charge from employment, typically be a substantial expectation. This is partic-
ularly true in light of the nature of the close corporation, where the denial of a
powerless seat on the board does not prevent the minority shareholder from
making his or her views known on a more informal basis. Cf. Latty, The Close
Corporation and The North Carolina Business Corporation Ac, 34 N.C.L. REV.
432, 433 (1956) ("All this structure of representative government in the typical
corporation law is about as appropriate for a two-man get-together as Robert's
Rules of Order.").
248. The expectations of the passive investor may create the most problems
under this guideline. Obviously, an individual commits capital to a venture
with the expectation that a return will be forthcoming, either through an appre-
ciation in the value of his holdings or, more typically for a close corporation,
through a distribution of corporate earnings. The problem becomes one of de-
termining at what point it is reasonable to expect a return on capital, and to a
large extent this should depend upon the assumptions and expectations of the
parties which formed the basis for the venture. The issue may be somewhat
easier to address when the corporation has accumulated earnings over a sus-
tined period of time. If the corporation has declared no or only nominal divi-
dends at the same time that it has substantially increased salaries for active
shareholders, the claim of the dissatisfied passive shareholder is strengthened.
The more difficult cases will come when the corporation is able to operate on a
less than prosperous but solvent basis over an extended period and is unable
to generate sufficient earnings to provide a return to the passive investor. At
some point, the passive investor may, not unreasonably, desire a mechanism
whereby previously committed capital may be withdrawn from such a venture.
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(3) Failure to Achieve Expectation Beyond the Control of the
Participant
Requiring that the dissatisfied shareholder not be responsi-
ble for the failure to achieve his or her own expectations may
appear to be one of the more arguable of the prerequisites for
relief. The absence of such a condition, however, would enable
a dissatisfied shareholder to obtain relief by simply sabotaging
the expectations. The difficulty comes not with the need for
the requirement but rather with its application. The policy is-
sues are best illustrated by the expectation which perhaps will
raise the greatest problems under this requirement, that of em-
ployment. Although it should again be recognized that the
lines between each may not be distinct, the circumstances of
the frustration of an employment expectation may be divided
for discussion purposes into two classifications: (1) the em-
ployment opportunity is denied the participant by those in con-
trol; and (2) the participant is unable to perform services for
reasons other than the actions of those in control.249
The employment expectation may be defeated under cir-
cumstances in which the participant is willing and able to per-
form employment services but is not permitted to do so by
those in control. The reasons for denying employment may
range from an attempt to force the participant to sell his or her
interest at a distress price, for which relief based on the mis-
conduct of those in control may be available,2 50 to deteriorating
business conditions or declining needs for particular skills. 25 1
249. A different set of considerations arises when employment is available
on reasonable terms but the shareholder is unwilling to perform services. The
dissatisfied shareholder who has or had the ability to cause the achievement of
his or her own expectations is not a proper subject for relief under an expecta-
tions-based analysis.
250. The abrupt removal of a shareholder from employment and manage-
ment has been termed a "devastatingly effective squeeze-out technique." F.
O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 3.06 at 78. Few would deny that the denial of employ-
ment as a squeeze-out technique is "oppressive," although the problems of
proof concerning the motivations of those in control may make these very diffi-
cult cases for the minority shareholder to pursue successfully. The business
judgment rule together with the concept of majority rule further compound the
problems for the minority shareholder. See supra notes 152-53. For example, in
Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 622, 507 P.2d 387, 390
(1973), discussed supra text accompanying notes 136-50, the minority share-
holder was discharged because he was "not doing the company any good." The
minority shareholder claimed that the majority shareholder had attempted to
force the minority shareholder to sell his stock or "he would get no profits from
the business." This allegation was simply denied by the majority shareholder,
whose conduct, in the view of the court, was not sufficiently oppressive to jus-
tify any form of relief.
251. For a suggestion that motivation may be irrelevant and the denial of
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To the extent that relief is not otherwise available, denial of
employment in these circumstances presents the clearest case
for relief under an expectations-based analysis.
Much more difficult issues arise when the shareholder is
willing but not able to perform services for the enterprise be-
cause of a limitation not apparent at the inception of the rela-
tionship. This may be for any one of a number of reasons,
including lack of a required skill or intellectual capacity, a
physical or mental disability, or an inability to adapt to the
business. Where the assumptions upon which the employment
expectation is based are subsequently proven to be erroneous,
and it is beyond the power of the participant to achieve that ex-
pectation, then providing relief is preferable to requiring that
the participant continue to commit funds to an enterprise from
which he or she will receive little or no benefit. 252
b. Nature of Relief
The principal goal in structuring relief under an expecta-
tions-based analysis should be to provide the dissatisfied share-
holder eligible for relief with the method of liquidating his or
her investment which is least disruptive to the continuation of
the enterprise. Ideally, the parties will negotiate the terms of a
settlement, but failing this, the terms of the purchase can only
be determined through litigation or arbitration. These terms
may be viewed as the price which must be paid by the remain-
ing participants if they desire to continue the business. For
this purpose, the principal matters which need to be resolved
pertain to valuation and terms of payment.
(1) Valuation
Perhaps few determinations are as subjective as the valua-
tion of an interest in a closely held corporation.253 The choice
employment is by its nature oppressive, see Topper v. Park Sheraton Phar-
macy, Inc., 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S. 2d 359 (1980), discussed supra text accom-
panying notes 157-66.
252. Something more than inability to get along with the other shareholders
should be required in order to satisfy this criterion. Cf. Exadaktilos v. Cin-
naminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (1979), affd, 173 N.J.
Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (1980); supra text accompanying notes 167-80.
253. A considerable amount has been written on this problem. See, e.g., Ly-
ons & Whitman, Valuing Closely Held Corporations and Publicly Traded Secur-
ities with Limited Marketability: Approaches to Allowable Discounts from
Gross Values, 33 Bus. LAw. 2213 (1978); Schreier & Joy, Judicial Valuation of
"Close" Corporation Stock Alice in Wonderland Revisisted, 31 OK LA. L. REV.
853 (1978); Comment, Valuation of Shares in a Closely Held Corporation, 47
Miss. L.J. 715 (1976).
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of technique to be employed will, of course, have a substantial
impact on the eventual determination.25 4 In a given circum-
stance, for example, the highest valuation might be achieved by
utilizing an earnings-based method and disregarding the fact
that the interest being valued is that of a minority participant
rather than a controlling shareholder.255 While such an ap-
proach would certainly find favor with the dissatisfied share-
holder, it would be unrealistic and would work a substantial
hardship on the corporation or the other shareholders, who
would bear the burden of what they perhaps correctly perceive
to be an inflated valuation. Since the ultimate remedy which
can be granted to a dissatisfied shareholder is the right to com-
pel a dissolution of the enterprise, the valuation of the with-
drawing participant's account under an expectations-based
analysis should yield no more than the amount which would be
realized if the dissolution was ordered. This suggests the use
of a method based upon the liquidation value of corporate as-
sets, a technique of valuation which under most circumstances
can be expected to result in a lower figure than other
approaches.25 6
It may be argued that utilizing the liquidation value of as-
sets would work an unnecessary hardship on the dissatisfied
shareholder and ignores the fact that the corporation is not be-
ing dissolved and therefore has a value presumably in excess of
its liquidation value. Nevertheless, the continuation of the
business is not attributable to the actions of the dissatisfied
shareholder, who cannot reasonably ask for a greater remedy
than the right to compel a dissolution of the enterprise as a
method of liquidating his or her interest.
254. For a concise review of valuation techniques, see C. RoBET cH, supra
note 110, § 2.27.
255. "When valuing a minority interest in a private company, it is custom-
ary to allow a deduction from the fair market value to recognize the disadvan-
tages of being a minority shareholder." BusmEss AND SECURrrs VALUATION,
supra note 147, at 28.
256. This assumes that a substantial portion of the going concern value
would not be realized in the event of a liquidation of assets. See supra note
147. In their statutory free dissolvability proposal, Professors Hetherington and
Dooley provide: "Fair value shall be deemed to be the liquidation value of the
demanding shareholder's interest in the corporation, but taking intd account
the going concern value of the corporation, if any." Hetherington & Dooley,
supra note 26, at 56. This definition of fair value is based on that offered by
CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000(a) (West 1977), which permits a buy-out in certain cir-
cumstances to avoid an involuntary dissolution. California appears to be alone




The corporation and the remaining participants should be
protected to the extent possible against the prospect of a signif-
icant cash drain resulting from a redemption of the dissatisfied
shareholder's interest. Although some financial disruption is
inevitable when relief is accorded under the expectations-
based analysis, the primary objective of structuring the relief
should be to enable the remaining participants, if at all possi-
ble, to continue to operate the enterprise without being crip-
pled by extreme liquidity problems caused by the withdrawal
of a shareholder. For this purpose it may be necessary to struc-
ture installment payments with a commercially reasonable rate
of interest over an extended period of time.
The task of developing an installment schedule will not be
easy, and the burden of establishing the need for installments
and the appropriate period of time during which the payments
will be made should be on those who desire to continue the
business. Once a reasonable basis for the purchase of the dis-
satisfied shareholder's interest is developed, some method
must be devised to insure that payments will be made when
due. The danger here is that through the manipulation of such
matters as expenses, including salaries, and corporate expan-
sion, the remaining participants might be tempted to plead in-
ability to make payments to the withdrawing shareholder by
virtue of either the relevant statutory restrictions on the distri-
bution of funds to shareholders 25 7 or, more generally, by reason
of financial hardship. To protect against this possibility, the
withdrawing shareholder should be entitled to an immediate
decree of dissolution of the enterprise if for any reason there is
a default in payments.
2. Some Limitations on Expectations
a. Expectations and Permanence
This Article has suggested that to accord a minority share-
holder the absolute right to compel the dissolution of a close
corporation would undermine many of the desirable conse-
quences that result from some measure of permanence. 258 For
example, free dissolvability would potentially discourage third
party investors and lenders of capital. The expectations-based
approach to relief may have a similar effect because it may por-
257. See, e.g., MODEL BusiuEss CORP. AcT § 45 (1980).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 225-31.
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tend an increased measure of financial instability. Neverthe-
less, it should prove far less disruptive than free dissolvability,
for it not only establishes prerequisites to the availability of re-
lief but also mandates the structuring of relief in a manner
which, to the extent possible, treats as a priority the ability of
the other participants to continue the enterprise.
A measure of permanence is also beneficial because it facil-
itates and encourages agreements among shareholders as a
method of arranging the affairs of an enterprise.25 9 Free dis-
solvability undermines such agreements by providing a conve-
nient escape from the obligations they impose.260 Although the
expectations-based analysis is subject to the same criticism, it
will tend to undermine shareholders' agreements to a lesser ex-
tent. The approach, of course, is perhaps most necessary when
the participants have not had the foresight to reduce their un-
derstandings to writing. When there is an agreement, however,
a number'of questions may be raised concerning the role of an
expectations-based analysis. If the dissatisfied shareholder al-
leges the frustration of an expectation not addressed in an
agreement covering other aspects of substantive corporate pol-
icy, it is likely either than the expectation was not an induce-
ment to the shareholder's participation in the venture or that
there was no agreement on the matter. Under such circum-
stances, the expectations-based analysis would not provide re-
lief.261 If the expectation concerns a subject addressed in the
agreement, and if the frustration of the expectation also consti-
tutes a breach of the agreement, then at least under circum-
stances where all of the shareholders are parties to the
agreement it may be appropriate to grant relief under the ex-
pectations-based analysis if the remedies for a breach of the
agreement are inadequate. The most difficult problems will
arise when the agreement covers the expectation which has
been frustrated but no breach of the agreement has occurred.
For example, performance under an agreement to employ a
shareholder may be excused if the shareholder has suffered a
disability rendering the performance of further services impos-
sible. In this type of situation, the expectations-based analysis
can be viewed as complementary to the role of the sharehold-
ers' agreement. The agreement clearly defines the expecta-
tions, and unless there is some indication that the parties
259. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
261. See supra text accompanying note 247.
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intended to limit the remedies, relief could be available under
the expectations-based analysis if the other conditions for re-
lief under the approach have been satisfied.
b. Expectations and Subjectivity
It may correctly be observed that the expectations-based
analysis is lacking in objective standards and places considera-
ble responsibility on the courts. In this sense, the free dis-
solvability alternative is comparatively more objective and
therefore easier to apply.2 62
The subjective points of concern under the expectations
approach are the determination of expectations and the struc-
turing of relief. Although both of these determinations can be
expected to challenge the skill if not the patience of the judici-
ary, they are not significantly more difficult than the determina-
tion of such matters as oppression, unfair prejudice, fair value,
or the propriety of dissolution or alternative forms of relief.
Lack of objectivity is unquestionably a difficulty inherent in,
but not unique to, the expectations-based analysis.
c. Expectations and Numbers
Determining the existence and mutual acceptance of ex-
pectations becomes more difficult as the number of participants
increases. What may be a manageable task when only two or
three participants are involved may become exceedingly diffi-
cult as the number increases.263 Again, the integrity of the defi-
nition of a close corporation must be called into question when
it is applied to enterprises owned by more than a handful of
participants. 264 Like so many of the other reforms offered for
close corporation law, the expectations-based analysis is most
useful when applied to a venture with a very small number of
participants.
d. The Evolution of Expectations
The expectations-based analysis has thus far been ana-
lyzed as one which is to be applied based on expectations
formed at the time the enterprise was established. Both par-
262. The relative objectivity of the free dissolvability alternative as
presented by Professors Hetherington and Dooley is perhaps its major virtue.
263. For example, the possibility of common agreement on expectations in a
close corporation consisting of fifty participants is remote, and the approach
may not be applicable to ventures involving more than four or five participants.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 209-16.
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ticipants and expectations change, however, and the approach
is sufficiently flexible to accommodate these developments. For
example, an individual who joins a venture at a post-inception
stage of its development may have substantial expectations
which are accepted by the other participants. Although the ele-
ment of consensus may be more difficult to establish under
such circumstances, once it is substantiated the approach may
be applied.2 65 An individual's changing expectations are con-
ceptually somewhat more difficult to accommodate because
they may lack the element of mutual reliance or inducement
which forms the basis of the expectations approach. There
may be situations, however, in which the parties reevaluate
their expectations and reach new understandings which pro-
vide the basis for continued participation in the venture, and
under such circumstances application of the approach would be
appropriate.
3. Effectuating an Expectations-Based Analysis
In those jurisdictions which maintain the existence of equi-
table jurisdiction to dissolve a corporation independent of stat-
utory grounds for such action,26 6 the expectations-based
approach would provide a suitable basis for evaluating the peti-
tions of certain dissatisfied shareholders. Indeed, the approach
should be viewed as a set of guidelines for the exercise of equi-
table discretion. In other jurisdictions, application of the ap-
265. Ordinarily, expectations are personal and therefore would not be trans-
ferable for purposes of the approach suggested in this Article. Thus, an individ-
ual who acquires stock by gift or inheritance would not also take the
expectations of the original owner. However, an individual in such a position
may develop mutual expectations with the other participants which should be
recognized. Where, for example, the new participant agreed to commit addi-
tional capital or labor resources to the venture, there is no reason not to apply
the analysis if the other conditions required for its application are satisfied.
Consider, for example, Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super.
141, 400 A.2d 554 (1979), affd, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (1980), discussed
supra text accompanying notes 167-80, where the plaintiff co-signed a note and
apparently made additional capital contributions. There is some indication in
Exadaktilos, however, that the employment expectations of the plaintiff were
not accepted by all of the other participants, and if this is the case, relief should
not be extended under the expectations-based analysis. A particularly difficult
situation may arise when a spouse inherits the stock of a former active share-
holder and is relegated to the role of a passive investor. The expectations-
based approach is not an appropriate method of providing relief to the spouse,
for its use in this context would render it a form of automatic buy-sell arrange-
ment mandated upon the death of a shareholder. Although the expectations-
based approach is not applicable, the position of the spouse is most unfortu-
nate and warrants further scholarly attention.
266. See supra note 126.
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proach would require expansion of the current statutorily
enumerated grounds for relief. Although the modification of
these statutes would require some degree of creative drafting,
the resulting improvement over the prevailing emphasis on
misconduct as a prerequisite to the availability of relief justifies
the effort. The thrust of the Proposed Model Act Supple-
ment 267 is most unfortunate in this regard, for although it sub-
stantially modernizes and expands the types of relief which
may be made available under the Model Act, it does not in any
substantial sense overhaul the grounds for relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are a number of reasons why the free dissolvability
thought to exist for partnerships should not extend to close cor-
porations. The breadth of the concept of a close corporation
significantly undermines the ability to draw conclusions con-
cerning the nature of these enterprises and their comparability
to partnerships. What may be true for an enterprise consisting
of two or three participants will not apply with equal force as
the number increases to ten, thirty, fifty, or more. There are
also structural differences between the two forms of organiza-
tion which make a close corporation something more than a
partnership in a corporate shell. The mutual agency and un-
limited liability present in a partnership require a method of
terminating the business relationship. These factors are not
present in the close corporation. In addition, the greater for-
mality required to form a close corporation increases the likeli-
hood that participants will be aware of the risks they are
creating, and the need for an easy escape is therefore lessened.
Furthermore, if the buy-out is the method by which the remain-
ing participants under a free dissolvability system can avoid
liquidation and continue the business, it is not painless and
may undermine the economic viability of the entity, thereby
prejudicing the positions of both stockholders and creditors.
Finally, there are distinct benefits to some measure of perma-
nence and it would be ill-advised to discard these in favor of a
unified small business structure. This does not mean, however,
that the close corporation need be a prison for the minority
shareholder who finds that the expectations on the basis of
which he or she has committed resources to the enterprise will
not be realized. The problem, therefore, is one of accommodat-
267. See supra notes 130-31.
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ing competing values, a task which inevitably results in the
compromise of absolute principles. The expectations-based
analysis suggested in this Article represents an attempt to
strike such a balance.
